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Abstract 
This thesis has three main objectives: (1) to provide a critical political economy study 
of the complex interplay between rice, politics and power in East Asia; (2) to make a 
contribution to understanding the evolution of the regional and global food system 
through an historically-contextualised exploration of the political economy of rice in the 
East Asian region; and (3) to make a contribution towards an alternative analytical 
framework for the political economy of food insecurity in the region. 
This study focuses on the agricultural commodity of rice as a prism through which 
to examine and explore the complex and multidimensional nature of food insecurity in 
the region, with rice providing a lens through which to explore social relations and 
relations of power that underpin the political economy of food and agriculture. This 
study has identified a gap in literature in relation to a contemporary analysis of the 
political economy of rice, with a second gap appearing in relation to the evolution of the 
global food system from an East Asian perspective. This thesis aims to make a 
contribution towards addressing these gaps in literature. 
With these objectives in mind, this thesis responds to the following research 
questions and sub-questions: (1) What are the socio-political and economic 
characteristics of the commodity complex of rice in the East Asian region? What role 
does the political economy of rice play in regional food insecurity? (2) What does the 
political economy of rice in the East Asian region reveal about the characteristics of the 
contemporary global food system? To what extent do the socio-political and economic 
characteristics of the commodity complex of rice in the East Asian region contradict or 
reaffirm a ‘neoliberal corporate food regime’? (3) What does the political economy of 
rice in the East Asian region reveal about the Global Food Crisis of 2007–08? (4) What 
are the regional governance structures and institutions for the commodity complex of 
rice? How effective are these regional structures and institutions of governance, such as 
regional rice reserves, in addressing food insecurity? 
To investigate these questions, this thesis adopts an interdisciplinary theoretical 
framework. This approach draws on the strengths of a variety of social and political 
science disciplines, including critical approaches to international political economy 
(IPE), rural sociology and agrarian political economy. The objective of this 
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collaborative interdisciplinary approach is to provide a more holistic exposition of the 
socio-political and economic dimensions of the commodity complex of rice and food 
insecurity in East Asia. 
The thesis argues four main points. Firstly, due to the cultural, socio-political, and 
economic importance of rice in East Asia, few governments in the region have allowed 
the domestic rice sector to be influenced wholly by global market supply and demand 
forces. Rather, governments in the region routinely intervene in rice markets in an 
attempt to reconcile the paradoxical objectives of providing low rice prices for 
consumers and remunerative incentives to support the lives and livelihoods of farmers. 
Secondly, state-centric approaches to food security after the Global Food Crisis of 
2007–08 have spatially and temporally reproduced food insecurities, moving these 
insecurities around geographically within the region. Thirdly, much of the critical agri-
food literature to date has focused on the neoliberal characteristics of the corporate food 
regime. However, this literature has often overlooked the nuances in varieties of 
capitalism in East Asia, largely ignoring the rise of state capitalism and the emergence 
of neomercantilism. Finally, the East Asian rice complex is characterised by state-led 
capitalism and neomercantilism. The concept of a global ‘neoliberal/corporate food 
regime’ does not properly account for the agri-food sector in the East Asian region, nor 
does it capture the unique historical and cultural context of the region. Many states in 
the East Asian region, including China and Thailand, employ neomercantilist strategies 
in the rice sector.  
The thesis makes four contributions to knowledge. Firstly, by adopting an 
interdisciplinary theoretical framework, this research makes a contribution to a broad 
range of agri-food literature in the fields of critical IPE, rural sociology and agrarian 
political economy. Secondly, it brings new conceptual knowledge and empirical 
information from case studies about China and Thailand into existing literature on the 
regional and global agri-food system, and the political economy of rice in East Asia. 
Thirdly, case studies about the Global Food Crisis of 2007–08 and the role of regional 
rice reserves in the East Asian region bring new conceptual knowledge and empirical 
information into existing literature on these topics. Finally, the thesis provides new 
analysis in relation to food regime literature, and makes a contribution to understanding 
the commodity complex of rice in the agri-food system of East Asia. 
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1 Introduction 
This opening chapter begins by outlining the research objectives for this PhD research 
project and central research questions. This chapter provides an overview of literature, 
followed by an outline of the gaps in literature that have been identified and the 
proposed contribution to knowledge. The chapter concludes with a summary of the 
main arguments presented in this thesis. It provides an outline of the organisation of the 
thesis and chapter summations. This thesis focuses on the agricultural commodity of 
rice as a prism through which to examine and explore the complex and 
multidimensional nature of food insecurity in the region, with rice providing a lens 
through which to explore social relations and relations of power that underpin the 
political economy of food and agriculture. This study has identified a gap in literature in 
relation to a contemporary analysis of the political economy of rice, with a second gap 
appearing in relation to the evolution of the global food system from an East Asian 
perspective. This thesis aims to make a contribution towards addressing these gaps in 
literature.  
1.0 Research objectives 
This thesis has three main objectives: (1) to provide a critical political economy study 
of the complex interplay between rice, politics and power in East Asia; (2) to make a 
contribution to understanding the evolution of the regional and global food system 
through an historically-contextualised exploration of the political economy of rice in the 
East Asian region; and (3) to make a contribution towards an alternative analytical 
framework for the political economy of food insecurity in the region. 
1.1 Research foci 
With these objectives in mind, this thesis responds to the following research questions 
and sub-questions: 
1. What are the socio-political and economic characteristics of the commodity complex 
of rice in the East Asian region? What role does the political economy of rice play in 
regional food insecurity?  
2. What does the political economy of rice in the East Asian region reveal about the 
characteristics of the contemporary global food system? To what extent do the socio-
  
18 
political and economic characteristics of the commodity complex of rice in the East 
Asian region contradict or reaffirm a ‘neoliberal corporate food regime’? 
3. What does the political economy of rice in the East Asian region reveal about the 
Global Food Crisis of 2007–08? 
4. What are the regional governance structures and institutions for the commodity 
complex of rice? How effective are these regional structures and institutions of 
governance, such as regional rice reserves, in addressing food insecurity? 
1.2 Summary of main arguments  
The thesis argues four main points. Firstly, due to the cultural, socio-political, and 
economic importance of rice in East Asia, few governments in the region have allowed 
the domestic rice sector to be influenced wholly by global market supply and demand 
forces. Rather, governments in the region routinely intervene in rice markets in an 
attempt to reconcile the paradoxical objectives of providing low rice prices for 
consumers and remunerative incentives to support the lives and livelihoods of farmers. 
Secondly, state-centric approaches to food security after the Global Food Crisis of 
2007–08 have spatially and temporally reproduced food insecurities, moving these 
insecurities around geographically within the region. Thirdly, much of the critical agri-
food literature to date has focused on the neoliberal characteristics of the contemporary 
corporate food regime. However, this literature has often overlooked the nuances in 
varieties of capitalism in East Asia, and largely ignoring the rise of state capitalism and 
the emergence of neomercantilism. Finally, the East Asian rice complex is characterised 
by state-led capitalism and neomercantilism. The concept of a global neoliberal food 
regime does not properly account for the agri-food sector in the East Asian region, nor 
does it capture the unique historical and cultural context of the region. Many states in 
the East Asian region, including China and Thailand, employ neomercantilist strategies 
in the rice sector. 
1.3 Overview of literature 
1.3.1 The politics of rice and power in East Asia: towards an understanding of the 
East Asian food system 
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Food insecurity is a significant challenge for a globalising East Asian region, with local 
food systems becoming increasingly integrated into globalised markets and global 
commodity value chains. This broader reconfiguration of the East Asian food system is 
occurring in the context of a demographic shift, with rapid population growth in urban 
populations and changing food consumption patterns (Dawe et al. 2014). According to 
Dawe et al. (2014: v):  
The role of rice in East and Southeast Asia is shifting along with broader societal changes 
including changing economic structures, demography (including rapid urbanization), rising 
incomes and major changes in food consumption patterns. Nevertheless, the political 
economy of rice remains exceedingly complex within the region. Governments continue to 
employ an array of instruments to realize or balance among differing objectives and address 
the interests and pressures of different stakeholders. Rice remains closely tied to food 
security imperatives, but increasingly also to improving the incomes of rice producers, 
realizing commercial trade objectives, and, more recently, lowering the environmental 
footprint of agriculture in major rice-growing areas. 
 Over half the world’s human population is now living in cities, and it is predicted 
that by the mid twenty-first century, 70 per cent of Asia’s population will live in urban 
centres and cities (Dawe et al. 2014; Teng, Jackson and Escaler 2011). This profound 
urban shift has significant implications for individuals, households, rural communities 
and urban consumers in relation to the availability and affordability of, and access to, 
culturally appropriate, safe and nutritious food in the region (Timmer 2010). This shift 
also has substantial consequences for the lives and livelihoods of peasant farmers and 
rural families. As an essential staple food, rice is intrinsically linked to notions of ‘food 
security’ in East Asia and is often the focus of state-led food security imperatives and 
initiatives. Due to the cultural, socio-political, and economic importance of rice in East 
Asia, few governments in the region have allowed the domestic rice sector to be 
influenced wholly by global market supply and demand forces. Rather, governments in 
the region routinely intervene in rice markets in an attempt to reconcile the objectives of 
providing low rice prices for consumers and remunerative incentives to support the lives 
and livelihoods of farmers (Bazoobandi 2014; David and Huang 1996).  
The politics of food insecurity in an increasingly urbanised and globalised East 
Asian region lies in the increasing trend towards the disembedding of local peasant-
based, culturally-delineated production and consumption patterns, with correlative 
social ties and connections to households, families and local communities (Bazoobandi 
  
20 
2014; Pant 2014). Often it is the most vulnerable in society — rural landless labourers, 
small-scale producers, peasant farmers and the urban poor — who suffer most from 
food insecurity, hunger and malnutrition, particularly during times of food prices 
volatility and instability in the global food system. Paradoxically, small-scale producers 
and peasant farmers still produce a majority of the world’s food and a majority of rice in 
East Asia (Falvey 2010). Pant (2014: 121) provides an articulate elucidation of this 
emergent challenge: 
Asia’s incremental engagement with globalising processes is the key driver of its growth 
and transformation. The structural shift in economy in favour of the manufacturing and 
service sector is having a bearing on its agricultural sector and food security. Though the 
share of agriculture in domestic production is shrinking, it retains a strategic salience 
because a majority of people continue to rely on it for their livelihood. Further, with the 
growing population and surging number of middle class, the food economy has been under 
pressure both qualitatively and quantitatively. The strategy to meet the emerging food gap 
by integrating local food production into the global value chain is changing the dynamics of 
the Asian food regime by transforming agriculture from peasant based production to 
industrial agriculture. 
On one hand, the politics of food insecurity in East Asia are epitomised by the 
complex interplay of power dynamics between the cultural political economy of local, 
national and regional food systems and the neoliberal market logics and globalising 
processes of the contemporary global corporate food system (Pant 2014). As Young 
(2012:10) confirms, ‘the current food system has evolved in response to specific 
historical, political, and economic circumstances; it is not a natural system, but a 
socially constructed one which reflects patterns of power and privilege’. This insightful 
reflection on the agri-food system finds resonance in Pritchard and Burch’s (2003: 1) 
assertion that, ‘agri-food globalization is a contested historical process, featuring a 
complex interplay of developments at varying scales and in different geographical 
territories’. Agri-food globalisation is indeed a highly contested historical process 
shaped by patterns of power and privilege in the global political economy, and as such, 
it is far from an inevitable process (Pant 2014; Pritchard and Burch 2003; Young 2012).  
1.3.2 The paradoxes of food insecurity in the global food system 
An exploration of global hunger and undernourishment and its historical context is 
critical for comprehending the causes and consequences of contemporary food 
insecurity. In comprehending hunger in the midst of plenty, it is critical to ‘delve deeply 
into the global paradox’ of ‘the stuffed and the starved’ in order to ‘analytically frame 
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core issues and root causes before positing solutions’ (Holt-Gimenez 2010: xxiii; Patel 
2009a). De Schutter (2009: 1), the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, 
describes the paradox of hunger in the midst of plenty: 
We need to address the question of global hunger not as one of production only, but also as 
one of marginalization, deepening inequalities, and social injustice. We live in a world in 
which we produce more food than ever before, and in which the hungry have never been as 
many. 
It is estimated that 12.5 per cent of the global population, or one in eight people, are 
undernourished (FAO 2012). In the Asia–Pacific region alone, it is estimated that 578 
million people are undernourished (FAO 2011). At the same time, it is estimated that up 
to 1.3 billion tonnes of food — close to a third of all food produced globally — is 
wasted, and over a billion people suffer from obesity and overconsumption (FAO 
2012). This paradox is apparent in Sen’s (1986: 1) description that ‘starvation is the 
characteristic of some people not having enough to eat. It is not the characteristic of 
there not being enough food to eat’. In his seminal analysis of the social, political and 
economic transformation during the Industrial Revolution, Polanyi (1944: 80, 85) 
situates this paradox historically and provides a vivid elucidation of the contradiction of 
hunger in the midst of plenty, arguing:  
Pauperism, political economy, and the discovery of society were closely intertwined. 
Pauperism fixed attention on the incomprehensible fact that poverty seemed to go with 
plenty. Yet this was only the first of the baffling paradoxes with which industrial society 
was to confront modern man. He had entered his new abode through a door of economics, 
and this adventitious circumstance invested the age with its materialist aura… no wonder 
the contemporaries were appalled at the seeming contradiction of an almost miraculous 
increase in production accompanied by near starvation of the masses.  
Despite the apparent abundance produced by the industrialised food system, this 
paradox remains as evident today as it was then (Patel 2009a). Sahlins (1974: 174) 
eloquently addresses this inherent contradiction:  
This is the era of hunger unprecedented. Now, in the time of the greatest technical power, is 
starvation an institution. Reverse another venerable formula: the amount of hunger 
increases relatively and absolutely with the evolution of culture. 
Young’s (2012) work provides a systemic analysis of the social, political and 
economic dimensions of food. Young considers food and agriculture as a lens through 
which to explore social relations and explain the developmental project, mapping the 
geography of global inequality and the inherent contradictions and paradoxes of 
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orthodox approaches to development. Young’s systemic analysis provides a 
comprehensive critique of ahistorical, apolitical economistic accounts of the Global 
Food Crisis that are focused on symptoms, not the underlying structural, relational and 
ideational causes. According to Young (2012: 1), ‘the current food system has evolved 
in response to specific historical, political, and economic circumstances; it is not a 
natural system but a socially constructed one which reflects patterns of power and 
privilege’.  
Young (2012) reviews the symptoms of the contemporary Global Food Crisis, and 
makes the critical analytical demarcation between proximate and structural causes. This 
paper adds the following caveat to this demarcation: including the term relational 
alongside structural. Placing the causes of the Global Food Crisis within an historical 
context, Young provides a panorama of the politics of food in the past and present. The 
causes of the Global Food Crisis are immensely complex and interconnected; therefore, 
this type of delineation does have its limitations. Nonetheless, it does highlight that 
many of the causes of the Global Food Crisis have a long historical trajectory that map 
closely to the contours of power and privilege that have shaped the system. Young’s 
work adds further support to the argument that the global food system, due to its nature, 
has been in a state of perpetual crisis.  
Young’s analysis demonstrates that enduring inequalities are often reproduced 
through the substantive social relations and relations of power that constitute the 
contemporary global food system. It is those who experience enduring inequalities that 
are most vulnerable to food insecurity, particularly during times of food price volatility 
and instability in the global food system. Small-scale producers, subsistence and peasant 
farmers who produce a majority of the world’s food are nevertheless vulnerable to food 
insecurity, hunger and malnutrition (Bello 2009).  
1.3.3 Contesting food insecurity in the global food system 
Food security is a fundamentally contested concept — it has been widely debated and 
much confused and, since its inception, has ‘evolved, developed, multiplied and 
diversified’ (Maxwell 1996: 155). Smith et al. (1992) and her colleagues have mapped 
close to two hundred different definitions of the term. Orthodox definitions of food 
security decontest the concept through hegemonic discourses underpinned by ideas and 
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assumptions that marginalise alternative conceptions and constitute a type of common 
sense amongst policy makers and analysts. 
The dynamics of food insecurity are complex and multi-faceted. Understanding the 
dynamics of food insecurity requires an analytical framework capable of 
comprehending the complexities of the social, political, economic, environmental and 
ethical dimensions of this issue. While the concept of food security is highly contested, 
it broadly relates to the physical availability and access to food, as well as to its 
affordability and utilisation (FAO 2011). According to Nutzenadel and Trentmann 
(2008: 1–2): 
Most existentially, food is about survival… it is ingested and digested, its nutrients being 
broken up and absorbed by our bodies, our organs and tissues. Food becomes part of us. It 
should, therefore, not be surprising that food is an important source of personal identity and 
public anxieties. 
A critical exploration of the broader politics of food is crucial to understanding the 
ideas and assumptions that underpin the orthodox conception of food security 
(Caballero et al. 2006). Food security has become a dominant discourse and policy 
framework in national, regional and global governance. It is critical, when discussing 
food security, to critically reflect on the questions of how food is being secured and for 
whom (Burke and McDonald 2007; Shepherd 2013). While these questions are not the 
primary focus of this paper, they remain an important consideration in relation to an 
analysis of food insecurity. According to Hoffstaedter and Roche (2012: 152):  
It is important to note that much of security, and in turn insecurity, is largely subjectively 
defined: ‘what to some may represent security might to others mean insecurity’ (Horst 
2006: 48-49). Therefore, when we talk about security, this is intricately connected with 
notions of insecurity.  
A commonly used definition from the FAO (2009a, 2009b: 8) describes food 
security as a ‘situation that exits when all people at all times have physical, social and 
economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and 
food preferences for an active and healthy life’. Food insecurity exists ‘when people do 
not have adequate physical, social or economic access to food as defined above’ (FAO 
2009a, 2009b: 8). As indicated earlier, within this orthodox definition is an implicit 
assumption of maximising food production and enhancing food access opportunities, 
without particular attention to how, where and by whom food is produced. This common 
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definition is also uncritical of current patterns of food consumption and distribution. 
Some scholars have critiqued this orthodox approach, arguing that it is not a food 
systems approach, production is assumed not specified, the environment is downplayed 
and power is ignored (Holt-Giménez et al. 2009; McMichael 2009a, 2009b, 2010a, 
2010b; Patel 2009a, 2009b). The alternative concepts of food sovereignty and food 
democracy that contest control and the relations of power in the food system have 
emerged out of this systemic critique. These philosophies call for more localised and 
democratic food systems that provide more support for the livelihoods of small-scale 
rural producers and peasant farmers, and employ sustainable agro-ecological methods 
(Holt-Giménez and Patel 2009; Patel 2009b; Rosset 2006; Shiva 1992, 2000, 2009). 
1.3.4 Food sovereignty  
In contrast to the high-tech commercial/industrialised agriculture that is heavily 
dependent on petro-chemicals and fertilisers, food sovereignty movements call for a 
more localised, culturally-grounded, environmentally-sustainable and economically-
equitable approach to farming (Altieri 2009). It is important to remember that peasants 
and small-scale rural producers make up almost half of the world’s population, and 
provide at least 70 per cent of the world’s food (Rosset 2006). The term food 
sovereignty was devised to recognise the political and economic power dimensions 
inherent in food and agricultural debates. Food sovereignty has been broadly defined as 
a right of nations and peoples to control their own food systems, including their own 
markets, production modes, food cultures and environments. As a movement, it has 
emerged as a critical alternative to the dominant neoliberal model of industrial 
agriculture and trade liberalisation (Holt-Giménez and Patel 2009; Patel 2009b; Rosset 
2006). From this critical perspective, the Global Food Crisis of 2008 is a crucial 
contemporary conjuncture in the long historical trajectory of an ongoing crisis of the 
‘neoliberal corporate food regime’ (McMichael and Buttel 1990; McMichael 2000b; 
2006; 2008; 2009a; 2009b).  
1.3.5 Reconceptualising food security 
The University of Warwick’s innovative and interdisciplinary food security research 
hub has broadened the orthodox definition of food security, redefining food security and 
adopting a multi-dimensional perspective. The definition incorporates the following key 
points: 
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1. That all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, 
safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an 
active and healthy life. 
2. That people, local communities and nation states can build resilience in the face of 
significant environmental and social disruptions. 
3. That people can have confidence in an assured supply of sufficient and appropriate 
food, at affordable prices, now and for future generations (University of Warwick 
2015). 
While this definition still acknowledges the central role of the state, it encompasses a 
more holistic notion about building localised, community-based, sustainable food 
systems and broadens the discourse to encompass resilience in facing the challenges of 
global environmental change. While this definition broadens the analytical scope of 
food security, it has limited depth in relation to the socio-political, economic and 
normative dimensions of food insecurity, including enduring and emerging social 
inequalities and injustices that can affect the affordability of culturally appropriate food 
and access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food (Bakker and Gill 2003; Pottier 1999). 
This definition could be further deepened through a more substantive engagement with 
the politics of food and the unequal relations of power in the agri-food system (Young 
2012). These critical issues are addressed directly with the concept of food sovereignty 
discussed in the previous section. Nonetheless, this definition does broaden and deepen 
the concept of food security by adopting a holistic and multi-dimensional perspective on 
the concept.  
1.3.6 The nature-focused and society-focused approaches to the food problem  
Fundamentally, these contestations raise critical questions about the nature and purpose 
of the food system. This section provides an analysis of both nature-focused and 
society-focused approaches to the food problem as identified by Sen (1983).1 The 
philosophical and ideological tensions in this question are deep and have a long history, 
and there are ongoing debates between (neo)Malthusians, or those who ascribe to the 
                                                
1 These two categories are useful for the purpose of this paper; however, they can be misleading and overly simplistic. Many 
scholars do incorporate both socio-political and ecological issues in their analysis (Lawrence et al. 2010; Magdoff and Tokar 2010; 
McMichael 2013; Rosset 2006; Shiva 2009; Weis 2007). 
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ideas and assumptions of the nature-focused perspective of Thomas Robert Malthus, 
and contemporary economists like Sen (1983), who argue from a society-focused 
perspective that there is no ahistorical or apolitical food problem. For Sen (1981, 1983 
1986, 1992), food security is fundamentally about the issues of access and entitlement, 
rather than simply being focused on food production, availability and population 
growth.  
1.3.7 Nature-focused approaches 
Rapid industrialisation and the growth in urban populations in East Asia have 
contributed to the decline, and a growing scarcity, of agricultural land (Sombilla and 
Hossain 2000, Sombilla et al. 2002). As mentioned, according to Teng, Jackson and 
Escaler (2011: 1), ‘Over half the world’s human population is now living in cities; in 
Asia, at least 70 per cent will live in cities by 2050’. This crucial demographic shift 
highlights the ‘importance of the nexus between growing food and sustaining the 
environment to support farming’ (Teng, Jackson and Escalor 2011: 1). Economic 
growth and industrialisation in the region have facilitated competing demands for this 
valuable productive resource, with a diversion of arable land to meet the demands of 
rapid urbanisation and subsequent demands for housing, factories and roads (Sombilla 
and Hossain 2000: 42). Arable land per capita has been diminishing in recent decades in 
many East Asian countries (Sombilla and Hossain 2000).2 
Some scholars have predicted that soil and water deterioration will continue to be a 
crucial challenge in relation to food insecurity in the East Asian region in future years 
(Mukherjee 2008, 2009). The environmental factors of soil and water degradation and 
declining arable land will directly impact upon rice and grain production in upcoming 
years, and will strongly influence the harvest and supply of rice and grain over the next 
decade.3 Some scholars contend that the nature-focused approaches — while 
                                                
2 For example, in China alone, arable land per capita declined from 0.14 in 1965 to 0.008 in 1995 (Sombilla and Hossain 2000: 42). 
In 2006, China officially ‘set a “red line” to guarantee that its arable land never shrinks to less than 1.8 billion mu (120 million 
hectares) to ensure food security’ (Huang et al. 2002: 8). The rice area harvested in China declined from 37 million hectares in 1976 
to about 31 million hectares in 1997 (Sombilla and Hossian 2000: 42). China harvested 30 million hectares of rice in 2011. In Java, 
Indonesia, nearly ‘50,000 ha of land is taken out of rice cultivation every year’ (Sombilla and Hossian 2000: 42).  
3 The Asia Society and International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) in the Philippines have warned that the world needs to produce 
8–10 million tonnes more rice every year to ensure a reliable supply of the grain and keep the price affordable (IRRI 2010). The 
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foregrounding some important environmental issues — often overlook and marginalise 
the critical social, political, economic and normative issues that are at the core of the 
food problem (Sen 1986).  
1.3.8 Society-focused approaches 
Enduring inequalities are often reproduced through the substantive social relations and 
relations of power that constitute the contemporary global food system. It is those 
experiencing enduring inequalities who are most vulnerable to food insecurity, 
particularly during times of food price volatility and instability in the global food 
system (Sen 1992; Sen and Dreze 2001). 
In his analysis of the social anthropology of food security, Pottier (1999: vi) 
proposes that ‘the social dynamics of food security, as lived and perceived by those who 
suffer insecurity, must be reclaimed if the policy debate on food security is to emerge 
out of its impasse’. One of the prevalent critiques of orthodox discourses and official 
debates that frame the concepts of food security and insecurity is that they are often 
disengaged from the lived experience and everyday realities that food-insecure people 
face (Pottier 1999). For Pottier (1999), food is a profoundly social object around which 
social relations and cultural phenomena are produced and reproduced. While there is 
growing awareness among policy makers and officials responsible for food security 
planning that the issue of food insecurity is multi-faceted, the normative and discursive 
frames employed by the orthodox approach ‘have little affinity to the complex social 
worlds food-insecure people inhabit’ (Pottier 1999: vi). Nor do these approaches 
comprehend the constellation of complex social relations and cultural contexts within 
which and through which food insecurity is produced and reproduced (Pottier 1999: vi). 
According to Pottier (1999: vi): 
Official debate, as the 1996 World Food Summit in Rome reminded us, now assumes a 
uniform language for problem identification and solving; a language which speaks of the 
‘enabling policy environments’ and ‘poverty alleviation’, but shies away from discussion of 
the power imbalances that underpin and perpetuate existing forms of social inequality and 
injustice. 
                                                                                                                                          
world will have to produce 25 per cent more rice over the next 25 years, with Asia needing an estimated 67 per cent more rice than 
at present (Trethewie 2012). 
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Pottier’s (1999) seminal study examines the lived experiences and varied situated 
perspectives of food insecure people across the globe, with intent to provide an 
elucidation of the social and political relations that underpin and reproduce enduring 
forms of inequality, injustice and food insecurity.  
Pottier’s analysis finds support in Young’s (2012) work on the relationship between 
food and development. Young (2012) provides a systemic analysis of the social, 
political and economic dimensions of food. Young employs this analysis of food and 
agriculture as a lens through which to explore social relations and explore the 
developmental project, mapping the geography of global inequality and the inherent 
contradictions and paradoxes of orthodox approaches to development. At the core of 
Young’s (2012: 2) analysis is the contention that ‘the food system has become one of 
the most significant ‘globally embedded networks of production and consumption’.  
The arguments outlined find resonance in the earlier research of Nutzenadel and 
Trentmann (2008) on food and globalisation. These scholars assert that from a historical 
perspective, the socio-political organisation of food — the modes of production, 
distribution and consumption — have long been socially and politically constituted and 
contested (McMichael 2012b; Nutzenadel and Trentmann 2008). According to 
McMichael (cited in Bakker and Gill 2003: 169):  
In the past half century, food security has functioned as an enabling concept in the 
development arsenal. Its changing meaning reflects the transformation of the development 
ideology, from a public project of deploying foreign aid to support the ideal of the 
‘development state’, to a private project of marketing of the state and deepening the 
commodification of food.4 
Reporting the ideas and assumptions that underpin orthodox economic approaches 
to the concept of food security, McMichael (cited in Bakker and Gill 2003: 169) argues 
‘food security, like development, is a universal ideal. But like development, food 
security is ultimately a political relationship’. McMichael contends that the concept of 
food security is fundamentally constituted in and through social and political relations, 
which include relations of power.  
1.4 Rice, politics and power: the political economy of food insecurity in the East 
                                                
4 McMichael (2012b: 60) contends that the ‘privileging of exchange-value over use-value (‘ecological capital’ including farming 
knowledge) subordinates agriculture to a financial calculus at the expense of socio-ecological sustainability’. 
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Asian region  
There is increasing awareness that food insecurity is one of the most critical and 
complex issues facing the East Asian region, and indeed the world (Ingram et al. 2010; 
Lang and Heasman 2004; McDonald 2010; Pandey et al. 2010. Rice is the staple food 
for three and a half billion people globally, most of whom live in Asia (Dawe et al. 
2014). Mangahas (1974) adeptly charts the historically nuanced and culturally complex 
contours of the profound interplay between rice, politics and power in East Asia. 
According to Mangahas (1974: 295): 
In many parts of Asia, rice has always been known as a political commodity. Knowledge of 
its political setting, structure, and conflicts is necessary for an understanding of the rice 
economy and government policies toward it. One needs a model in which the relationships, 
variables, and parameters are political as well as economic. A number of important 
developments in the rice economy — changes in prices, production, consumption, farmers' 
incomes, and so on — may be traced to changes in the political components of the model. 
In order to grasp the multifaceted relationship between rice, politics and power, it is 
crucial to comprehend the importance of rice production, consumption and trade in East 
Asia. Approximately 90 per cent of the world’s rice is produced and consumed in Asia. 
This is influenced by a complex array of factors, including historical and cultural 
heritage, the favourable climatic conditions of Monsoonal Asia and the relatively low 
costs of production (Trethewie 2012). Each year, close to 700 million tonnes of paddy 
rice result in 450 million tonnes of milled rice being produced, with over 90 per cent of 
the production concentrated in Asia. China and India account for almost two-thirds of 
this production, with Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia, Pakistan and Myanmar making up 
the balance. International trade in rice is only around 30 million tonnes, with Africa and 
Asia making up over 85 per cent of the internationally traded rice volume (Dawe 2010). 
This equates to merely 7 per cent of all rice produced being traded across borders. 
As rice is a ‘thinly’ traded agriculture commodity, it is vulnerable to price volatility 
(Timmer 2013). The concept of a ‘thinly’ traded commodity refers to the fact that only a 
small amount of all annual global rice production is traded across borders on global 
markets (Dawe et al. 2014; Timmer 2013). The vast majority of domestic rice 
production in East Asia is consumed domestically (Dawe et al. 2014). As the global rice 
trade represents such a small percentage of overall global rice production and 
consumption, it is considered vulnerable to price fluctuations and volatility, as evident 
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during the rice price surge of 2007–08. This important event is discussed in detail later 
in Chapter 6. Rice accounts for half the food expenditure and one-fifth of total 
household expenditure for the rural landless and urban poor in Asia (IRRI 2010). 
According to David and Huang (1996: 463) from the China National Rice Research 
Institute: 
Rice continues to be the most important food staple in Asia, contributing 40–80 per cent of 
total calorie intake. Rice is also the major source of livelihood of small farmers and 
agricultural laborers in this region, where at least two-thirds of arable land is planted to rice. 
At least half of that rice area is rain-fed and vulnerable to drought and floods. Even in 
irrigated areas, higher cropping intensity has increased pest problems, contributing further 
to the production instability that characterizes the rice economy of monsoon Asia. 
Rice is an essential staple for sustenance and survival — it was also one of the first 
commodities to be traded on the international market. In Asia, rice has been traded 
across borders for millennia (Barker et al. 1985; Falvey 2000; Latham 1998). It has long 
been a profoundly political commodity — around which social relations, cultural 
phenomena and relations of power are formed and transformed (Cai 2010; Mangahas 
1974; Ponciano and Marissa 2008; Tadem 1986). David and Huang (1996: 463) 
contend:  
Because of the economic and political importance of rice in Asia, no government has left its 
domestic rice sector freely influenced by market demand and supply forces. Invariably, the 
central food policy question confronting Asian governments is how to reconcile the 
conflicting objectives of providing low rice prices to consumers and remunerative 
incentives to farmers. Maintaining stable domestic rice prices to both consumers and 
producers is a separate and equally important concern. Moreover, given the political 
importance of rice and the instability of the world rice market, most Asian countries aim for 
rice self-sufficiency rather than rely on international trade to pursue their food security 
goals. Among rice exporters, on the other hand, raising government revenues from rice 
exports is another policy objective. 
 A prolonged surge in prices of staple foods, such as rice, will directly impact on the 
domestic economies of countries that are net importers of food in the East Asian 
Region. As mentioned, food insecurity caused by price volatility has the most dramatic 
impact on the most vulnerable segments of society within these food import dependent 
countries. For this reason, governments routinely intervene in domestic rice markets to 
ensure socio-political stability and economic objectives. The interventions take many 
forms: subsidies and taxes on inputs and output, government control on international 
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trade, and direct participation in marketing through procurement and distribution of 
grains. As Trethewie (2012: 2) conveys: 
The regional rice market is seen merely as a platform for offsetting supply and demand 
imbalances in order to achieve domestic rice price stability. Governments play a heavy-
handed role in the rice economy in comparison to other agricultural commodities, 
particularly through tariffs, subsidies and farmer assistance programmes. Many government 
interventions were established decades ago when the sector was more vulnerable, and… 
these policies have carried through to today. Government bodies are involved in the trade 
and distribution of rice, in importing countries and exporting countries alike. Private traders 
are, however, playing an increasingly prominent role. 
 This study aims to make an empirical and conceptual contribution to understanding 
these state-led interventions in the rice sector. Specifically, the state-led interventions in 
China’s agri-food system will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4 and a detailed case 
study of the rice subsidy scheme in Thailand will be examined in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 
provides a case study of state interventions in the regional and global rice market during 
the global food crises of 2007–08. However, it is important discuss the gaps in literature 
before outlining the purpose of this thesis and the proposed contribution to knowledge. 
1.5 Gaps in literature 
There is a gap in literature in relation to a contemporary analysis of the political 
economy of rice in the regional and global food system. It has also been identified that 
there is a gap in literature in relation to the evolution of the global food system from an 
East Asian perspective. This study aims to make a contribution to understanding the 
evolution of the regional and global food system through an exploration of the political 
economy of rice in the East Asian region. This study seeks to move beyond the market 
logic of neoclassical and orthodox economic analysis, which renders rice as merely 
another commercial or purely economic commodity. In contrast, this study aims to take 
an innovative interdisciplinary critical IPE approach.  
This approach draws on the strengths of a variety of social and political science 
disciplines, including IPE, rural sociology and agrarian political economy, and other 
critical agri-food literature and scholarship. Arguably, both critical IPE and agrarian 
political economy are two such disciplines that have theoretical foundations in classical 
political economy, and both disciplines have much to offer in relation to understanding 
the political economy of the global food system. The cross fertilisation of these 
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disciplines has much to offer conceptually and empirically. IPE scholarship and 
literature has much to contribute to critical agri-food studies, with its rich conceptual 
and empirical work in understanding the global political economy. Ironically, critical 
agri-food studies and scholarship are often marginalised within the discipline of IPE. 
This is despite the constitutive role that these relations have played historically in the 
construction of the inter-state system and their substantive significance in contemporary 
global political economy. There are a few excellent scholarly expectations to this 
account: these scholars will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.  
The current (re)configuration of the global food system and its socio-political and 
economic dimensions has substantive significance for comprehending the broader 
configuration and transformation of the contemporary global political economy. Hence, 
critical agri-food scholarship including rural sociology, social anthropology, human and 
economic geography and agrarian political economy — to name but a few social 
science disciplines — have much to contribute towards a critical IPE perspective of the 
global food system and the political economy of food and agriculture. The objective of 
employing this interdisciplinary critical IPE approach is to provide a more holistic 
exposition of the socio-political and economic dimensions of the commodity complex 
of rice and food insecurity in East Asia.5  
Holslag (2006) and Taylor (2014) have produced comprehensive studies on China’s 
state-led neomercantilist strategy in the oil and energy markets; however, despite the 
global agri-food and energy markets becoming increasingly integrated, there has been 
no study to date exploring China’s state-led capitalism and neomercantilist strategy in 
the agri-food sector. Hoslag (2006) has provided a detailed study of China’s new 
mercantilism in relation to energy resources in Central Africa. Farnsworth (2011) has 
investigated China’s emerging role in the resource sector in the America’s depicting it 
as ‘a new type of mercantilism’. In a recent paper about resources policy, Humphreys 
(2013) outlined the ‘politics shaping world metal supply’ and described the 
                                                
5 It is important to note here the comprehensive work of Dawe (2010) on the 2008 rice price spike; however, this study employed an 
orthodox economic and neoclassical approach to rice as a commodity, utilising economic modelling. Also, from a holistic 
perspective, there are deep ecological dimensions to understanding the production of rice in East Asia. This study does touch on 
some of these ecological dimensions; however, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to engage with substantive ecological issues and 
debates in relation to rice production — refer to the substantive work on political ecology of food and agro-ecology of Altieri (2009) 
and Shiva (1992, 2000, 2009). 
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contemporary politics in this strategic resource sector as ‘new mercantilism’. These 
scholars are not alone in their analysis. Rodrick (2013) and Uzunidis (2011) have 
written extensively on what they describe as ‘new mercantilism’ and how it is 
transforming the contemporary global political economy. From a food regime 
perspective, McMichael (2013a) has recently investigated ‘land grabbing as security 
mercantilism in International Relations’. This pioneering study has created space for 
further research about new forms of mercantilism in the agri-food system and the 
complex relationship between new forms of mercantilism and state-led capitalism. To 
date, with the exception of a few scholars such as Potter and Tilzey (2005) and 
McMichael (2013a), there have been very few studies of ‘state capitalism’ and ‘new 
mercantilism’ in the contemporary global food system. This study aims to make a 
contribution towards addressing these gaps in the literature through a study of the 
commodity complex of rice in East Asia.  
1.6 Proposed contribution to knowledge 
The thesis makes four main contributions to knowledge. Firstly, by adopting an 
interdisciplinary theoretical framework — that will be outlined in detail in the next 
chapter — this research makes a contribution to a broad range of agri-food literature in 
the fields of critical IPE, rural sociology and agrarian political economy. Secondly, it 
brings new conceptual knowledge and empirical information from case studies in 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 about the political economy of rice in East Asia. In addition, 
the case studies will make a contribution to comprehending the political economy of 
the agri-food sectors in China and Thailand and bring a nuanced ‘regional perspective’ 
into existing literature about the global agri-food system. Thirdly, case studies in 
Chapters 6 and 7 about the role of rice in the Global Food Crisis of 2007–08 and the 
role of regional rice reserves in the East Asian region aim to bring new conceptual 
knowledge and empirical information into existing literature on these topics. Finally, the 
thesis provides new analysis in relation to food regime literature, and makes a 
historically contextualised contribution to understanding the commodity complex of rice 
in the agri-food system of East Asia. 
This study aims to make a contribution to conceptual knowledge in relation to 
understanding the relationship between food and concepts of power (Mintz 1995). It 
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seeks to comprehend the contemporary politics of food through mapping the critical 
interconnections between rice, politics and power in East Asia. As Mintz (1985: 214) 
argues, ‘in understanding the relationship between the commodity and the person, we 
unearth anew the history of ourselves’. This single commodity — rice — provides a 
substantive focal point through which to explore social relations and relations of power 
in the East Asian region. While some scholars employ cultural and social 
anthropological methods to specifically study rice using these methods, this study is not 
primarily focused on rice in this way. Rather, it focuses on rice as a crucial socio-
political and economic commodity in the region. Overall, this study aims to make a 
contribution towards a deeper understanding of the role of the commodity complex of 
rice in the regional and global agri-food system and global political economy. 
1.7 Organisation and chapter synopses 
In order to outline and substantiate these main arguments, the thesis is divided into eight 
chapters: 
This opening chapter has explained the impetus for commencing this PhD research 
project. This chapter has outlined the gaps in literature and discussed the proposed 
contributions to knowledge for the study. It has provided an overview of the research 
problem, research objectives and central research questions. Finally, this chapter has 
concluded with a summary of the main arguments presented in this thesis. 
Chapter 2 outlines the methodological considerations in this study and discusses the 
qualitative methodology and data collection methods employed in this thesis. It explains 
— and substantiates with reference to relevant literature — the interdisciplinary 
theoretical framework employed in this thesis. It defines East Asia as a geographical 
region and discusses the merits of a regional approach to food system analysis and the 
commodity complex of rice. It then proceeds to discuss the significance of the East 
Asian region in the global political economy and explains the importance of the cultural 
political economy of rice in East Asia. The final section of the chapter maps the rice 
import–export complex in East Asia. 
Chapter 3 examines state-led intervention in agri-food markets, and the development 
of neomercantilism and its role in the evolving global food regime. The first section 
provides an overview of food regime literature. This is followed by an exploration of 
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the historical legacies of the first and second food regime. The subsequent section 
discusses the debates in relation to an emerging third food regime. Following this 
discussion is an analysis of the incipient importance of South–South relations and trade 
in an increasingly multipolar global food system. The final sections of this chapter 
explore the conceptual linkages between the rise of state capitalism and the advent of 
neomercantilism and its implications for the global food regime. The implications of the 
proliferation of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) and 
their role in securing global supply chains for food, feed and fuel through the 
acquisition of foreign land and natural resources are examined. The chapter concludes 
by outlining the paradox of state-led capitalism and neomercantilism in the global food 
system. 
 Chapter 4 provides an analysis of the rice commodity complex and agri-food sector 
in China. This chapter opens with a discussion of the historical and cultural origins and 
importance of rice in China. The following section provides an analysis of 
contemporary food insecurity in China. After many years of pursuing a policy of 
national self-sufficiency in rice, China has recently become a major importer of grains 
and vegetable oils. In the context of increasing ecological degradation, some scholars 
contend that China is increasingly food insecure. Comprehending these emergent food 
insecurities is crucial to an understanding of state-led capitalism with Chinese 
characteristics and nascent neomercantilist strategies in the agri-food sector — 
including rice. The succeeding sections examine the role of China’s largest state-owned 
food company, COFCO, and its emergent role in the global food system. COFCO plays 
a central role is the entire rice commodity chain in China, including production, 
processing, distribution, and exports and imports. In the final sections, an analysis is 
provided of the dynamics of COFCO’s evolving role in securing global supply chains of 
food, feed and fuel in the global agri-food system. 
Chapter 5 explores the historical legacies of rice, politics and power in Thailand. 
The second section of the chapter provides a historically contextualised analysis from a 
world-historical perspective of Thailand’s agri-food system in the first and second food 
regime. It also discusses the implications for Thailand of a nascent third food regime. 
The subsequent sections outline the political economy of rice and food insecurity in 
Thailand, as well as the impact of the Global Food Crisis of 2007–08. The succeeding 
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section provides an analysis of the key stakeholders and structural power in the Thai 
rice industry. The final major section includes a case study of the rice pledging subsidy 
scheme in Thailand, advancing the argument that this is an insightful example of state-
led capitalism in the rice sector with unique Thai socio-cultural characteristics. 
 Chapter 6 focuses on a case study of global food prices during 2007–08. This price 
spike has been identified as a seminal event in the ongoing crises in the global food 
system. Scholars and researchers have often referred to this event as the Global Food 
Crisis of 2007–08. A number of scholars have identified the 2008 food price crisis as a 
‘critical conjuncture’ in the long historical trajectory of the global food system, and one 
that requires further research. This chapter will focus on this significant event in order 
to gain a deeper understanding of the implications for food insecurity in the East Asian 
region. This event has contemporary significance, as many underlying systemic issues 
that produced the surge in food prices between 2007 and 2008 continue to exist today 
— contributing to ongoing food price volatility and global food insecurity. These socio-
political and economic issues will be discussed in more detail throughout this chapter. 
This chapter outlines the broader historical context of a food system that has long been 
in crisis.  
 Chapter 7 proposes that many underlying systemic issues that produced the surge in 
global food prices in 2007–08 — discussed in the previous chapter — continue to exist 
today. This chapter present the argument that these complex and interconnected 
transnational issues are difficult to address solely on a national basis, instead requiring 
broader regional cooperation. This chapter opens with a regional perspective of food 
insecurity in East Asia. The following section provides an analysis of regional food 
reserves and the broader debates around food reserves as a ‘public good’. The 
subsequent section discusses regional cooperation and policy responses following the 
Global Food Crises of 2007–08. The latter half of chapter provides a case study analysis 
of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Plus Three Emergency Rice Reserve 
(APTERR) as an example of regional cooperation in relation to the commodity complex 
of rice and regional food insecurity. It is posited that while regional food reserves do 
have some limitations, they can benefit countries facing food emergencies and are an 
effective way of promoting regional cooperation and mutual assistance among 
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countries, amidst the challenges posed by increasing instability and price volatility in 
the contemporary global food system.  
Chapter 8 provides concluding observations, reflections and a summary of the 
thesis. It opens by summarising how the central research questions were addressed and 
discussing the main arguments advanced in the thesis. The second part of the chapter 
reviews the original conceptual and empirical contributions to knowledge of the thesis, 
and discusses possible wider implications for knowledge. The third part of this final 
chapter reflects on the theoretical framework, methodology and research process of the 
thesis. The last section of this thesis suggests some future areas of research. 
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2 Theoretical and methodological considerations 
2.0 Introduction  
To investigate the research problem and research questions outlined in Chapter 1, this 
thesis has adopted an interdisciplinary theoretical framework. This chapter opens by 
outlining the interdisciplinary theoretical framework employed in this thesis. This is 
followed by a discussion of the methodological considerations in this study. This 
chapter defines East Asia as a geographical region and discusses the merits of a regional 
approach to food system analysis and the commodity complex of rice. It then proceeds 
to discuss the significance of the East Asian region in the global political economy and 
explains the importance of the cultural political economy of rice in East Asia. The final 
section of the chapter maps the rice import–export complex in East Asia. 
2.1 Theoretical framework and methodological considerations: exploring the 
intersection of critical international political economy (IPE) and agri-food studies 
2.1.1 An interdisciplinary approach to critical IPE and agri-food studies  
This study has adopted a historically-contextualised, interdisciplinary critical approach 
to IPE. This approach draws on the strengths of a variety of social and political science 
disciplines, including critical approaches to IPE, rural sociology and agrarian political 
economy. The objective of this collaborative interdisciplinary approach is to provide a 
more holistic exposition of the socio-political and economic dimensions of the 
commodity complex of rice and food insecurity in East Asia.  
The theoretical framework for this paper is akin to the framework outlined by 
Borras Jr., McMichael and Scoones (2011a, 2011b). Borras Jr. et al. (2011a: 1) argue 
that ‘an engaged agrarian political economy combined with global political economy 
provides an important framework for analysis and critique’. Borras Jr. et al. (2011a: 1) 
affirms that, ‘agrarian political economy asks four key questions: ‘Who owns what? 
Who does what? Who gets what? And what do they do with the surplus wealth?’ This 
approach provides an analytical framework for an analysis and critique of ‘the 
conditions, dynamics, contradictions, impacts and possibilities’ of the global food 
system. A historically-contextualised rural sociology and agrarian political economy 
combined with critical approaches to global political economy provides an analytical 
framework — a starting point from which to analyse these critical questions.  
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This study has interpreted critical IPE in the tradition of Robert Cox (1981, 1987): 
particularly his rejection of the belief that there is a value-free theory. One of Cox’s 
(1981: 128) oft cited ideas has much resonance — ‘theory is always for some one, and 
for some purpose’. The term critical in IPE in this context refers to a kind of analysis 
that sees existing social orders and their structural inequalities as products of history, 
with the role of critical analysis is both to interpret and to help change existing social 
orders (Philips and Weaver 2011; Shields et al. 2011; Van Apeldoorn et al. 2011). Cox 
and Schechter (2002: 79) point out that ‘the real achievement of IPE was not to bring in 
economics, but to open up a critical investigation into change in historical structures’. 
By accentuating the reflective and transformative aspect of knowledge, a critical 
approach to IPE ‘appraises the defining boundary between the social relations involved 
in the economic and political spheres as an object of contestation’ (Gaze 2004: 602). 
According to O’Brien and Williams (2011: 32) critical approaches to IPE, ‘stand back 
from the existing order and asks how that order came about and under what conditions 
to can be changed to a different form of order’ In other words, ‘critical theorists seek to 
contribute to a better social order, embracing emancipatory strategies’ (O’Brien and 
Williams 2011: 32). Critical IPE scholars such as Worth (2011: 118) argue that to be 
critical means to have ‘progressive commitment towards emancipation and the belief 
that the present social system can be transformed in order to address its injustices’. 
Other scholars support this argument, including Abbott and Worth (2002), and Shields 
et al. (2011). 
This study has also adopted an interdisciplinary critical IPE in the tradition of 
Higgot and Payne (2000). In outlining their interdisciplinary critical approach to IPE, 
Higgot and Payne (2000: ix) argue that in order to address the substantive analytical 
challenge of comprehending ‘complex transnational phenomena’ what is required is a 
readiness to engage in interdisciplinary methodological approaches to social science. 
This study has adopted an inter-disciplinary methodological approach to social 
science. It draws on the strengths a variety of disciplines and theoretical approaches, 
including agrarian political economy and critical approaches to IPE. This type of inter-
disciplinary approach also finds support in Beeson’s (2007) analytical framework. 
Reflecting on the artificial and abstractive separation of politics and economics, Beeson 
(2007: 58) argues that disciplinary borders and demarcations ‘often make it difficult to 
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make sense of complexity and long-run historical change’. Drawing on the work of Cox 
(1981, 1987), Tilly (1984) and Strange (1986, 1988, 1991), and akin with Beeson 
(2007: 58), this thesis has adopted a critical inter-disciplinary approach to political 
economy that is able ‘to account for the ever more interconnected and transnational 
nature of economic and political activities in the contemporary era’. This study has also 
drawn on the recent critical IPE scholarship in relation to debates on capitalist diversity 
and ‘new directions in comparative capitalisms research’ to conceptualise ‘state 
capitalism’ and its historical and contemporary role in the global food system (Ebenau 
et al. 2015; Nolke 2015). 
While economics, political science, international relations and sociology have 
become separate intellectual streams, much of the origins of these disciplinary 
tributaries can be traced back to a common source in classical political economy (Blyth 
2002; Palan 2000; Watson 2005). Higgot and Payne (2000: ix) contend that ‘most social 
science started out as political economy until the marginalist revolution in economics in 
the second half of the nineteenth century’. Due to this spurious schism, economics 
emerged as a distinct discipline ‘disembodied from other social sciences’ and, 
subsequently, political science and sociology also matured as separate disciplines 
(Higgot and Payne 2000: ix). The concept of globalisation has challenged, in the most 
fundamental ways, the analytical boundaries that divide these traditional disciplines 
(Higgot and Payne 2000: ix). According to Higgot and Payne 2000: ix: 
One incontrovertible feature of the intense debate that globalisation has generated is that it 
has posed an enormous intellectual challenge for traditional social sciences. It has not only 
shattered the distinction between domestic and international (on which IR as a twentieth-
century social science discipline had similarly been built), but has also posed serious and 
continuing questions about both the capacity and utility of analyses that focus exclusively, 
or even predominantly, on discretely economic or political or social explanations of 
complex transnational phenomena. 
Higgot and Payne (2000: ix) argue that in order to address this substantive analytical 
challenge, what is required ‘is a readiness to tear down these intellectual barriers and 
bring together approaches, methods and disciplines which for too long have been set 
apart’. These scholars assert that since ‘no one set of disciplinary lenses’ has the ability 
alone to comprehend this ‘new world’ and adequately explain complex transnational 
phenomena, we must be ready and willing to go ‘trespassing’ (Higgot and Payne 2000: 
ix). Fundamentally, Higgot and Payne (2000) provide a clarion call for inter-
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disciplinary and multi-disciplinary methodological approaches to social science. These 
pioneering scholars transgress the boundaries of their own disciplines to engage in inter-
disciplinary research that facilitates intellectual cross-fertilisation across a wide range of 
social sciences. Through this process, they deepen and widen their own paradigms 
(Higgot and Payne 2000: ix). The interdisciplinary critical IPE approach and 
methodology adopted in this study is similar to what can be termed, ‘New Political 
Economy’ as reflected in the journal by the same name and the editorial stance taken in 
the first edition in 1995. This is summed up by Gamble et al.’s (1996: 5–6) notion of 
‘rejecting a single theoretical approach, and instead promoting a framework or toolkit 
which embraces non-exclusionary pluralistic approaches’:  
The methodology of the new political economy rejects the old dichotomy between agency 
and structure, and states and markets, which fragmented classical political economy into 
separate disciplines. It seeks instead to build on those approaches in social sciences that 
have tried to develop an integrated analysis. 
The methodology of new political economy was explicitly employed by Breslin 
(2007) in his comprehensive study of China and the Global Political Economy. Breslin 
(2007: 30) argues that the ‘basic principles of new political economy provide 
methodological and ontological tools for studying China’ and the East Asian region ‘in 
an era of globalisation’. Breslin (2007: 30) describes this methodology as a ‘more 
holistic approach to IPE’. According to Breslin (2007: 17), ‘for many scholars, the 
pathway to a framework of understanding contemporary IPE began with a study of 
classical political economy; however, there are many pathways’. What unites scholars 
who adopt the holistic new political economy framework is a rejection of ‘purely 
economistic interpretations that ignore power and politics’ and ‘apolitical and 
ahistorical tendencies within rational choice theory’ (Breslin 2007: 17). Critical IPE 
scholars share a common understanding of the denunciation of the ‘parsimonious 
explanatory power of statist and realist international relations’.  
The theoretical framework and methodology outlined above has been adopted in this 
study to provide an elucidation of the political economy of rice and agri-food systems in 
the East Asian region. This interdisciplinary theoretical approach provides an analytical 
framework and the conceptual tools necessary for a critical exploration of the politics of 
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rice and the contours of power and privilege that have shaped the regional and global 
food system.6 Hence, this framework is capable of more adequately comprehending the 
long historical trajectory of the complex interplay between rice, politics and power in 
East Asia in an era of globalisation. The critical IPE framework adopted in this study is 
interdisciplinary, as outlined in the next section.  
2.1.2 From Mintz to McMichael: a historically contextualised and culturally 
attuned ‘critical’ approach to IPE and agri-food studies 
In his seminal work entitled Sweetness and Power: The Place of Sugar in Modern 
History, Sydney Wilfred Mintz (1985: 214) made the profound observation that in 
comprehending the complex interplay between the ‘commodity and the person’ — and 
the broader connections between the commodity and structures and relations of power 
in the capitalist world-system — it is possible to gain a deeper appreciation and 
understanding of history. Mintz’s (1985) influential study of sugar and the Caribbean 
made a significant interdisciplinary contribution to the cultural anthropology of food, 
agrarian political economy and historical sociology. Mintz (1977, 1985, 1998) 
employed a historical materialist approach to socio-cultural anthropology to explicate 
the complex relationship between the ‘commodity and the person’ within a particular 
historical context. Drawing on Wallerstein’s (1974) thesis, he situated the commodity 
complex of sugar within the broader historical processes of colonialism and the 
expansion of the capitalist world-system (Mintz 1977). According to Mintz (1997: 254): 
By using materials treating one of the key areas in the growth of world capitalism, the 
Caribbean region, and by trying to examine the question of labor exaction there, I hope to 
be able to substantiate the theoretical significance of Wallerstein's work, while suggesting 
some of its persisting (but, I suspect, by no means wholly inescapable) limitations. 
Mintz’s (1985) work provides a profound study of power and the way it has 
operated historically and dialectically in shaping world history and human experience. 
Delineating the complex linkages between the local lived experiences and the broader 
global historical processes, he mapped the socio-political and economic relations and 
constellations of power during the colonial period through the prism of a single 
commodity — sugar. In many ways, Mintz was an intellectual pioneer of an 
interdisciplinary approach to the cultural political economy of food commodities (Mintz 
                                                
6 I refer here to conceptions of both structural and relational power (Nash 2010; Strange 1988).  
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and Du Bois 2002). His work — while grounded locally in fieldwork among peasants 
and sugar-cane workers in Puerto Rico, Haiti and Jamaica and ethnographic studies of 
slavery, colonialism and global capitalism — adopted a world systems approach and 
world-historical perspective to situate the role of sugar in the global food system and the 
global political economy (Mintz 1977, 1985). Mintz (1977: 254–5) contends:  
It must be stressed that the integration of varied forms of labor–extraction within any 
component region addresses the way that region, as a totality, fits within the so-called 
world-system. There was give-and-take between the demands and initiatives originating 
with the metropolitan centers of the world-system, and the ensemble of labor forms typical 
of the local zones with which they were enmeshed... The postulation of a world-system 
forces us frequently to lift our eyes from the particulars of local history, which I would 
consider salutary. But equally salutary is the constant revisiting of events ‘on the ground,’ 
so that the architecture of the world-system can be laid bare. Accordingly the balance of 
this critique is devoted to observations about the Caribbean sector of the periphery, and to 
the problems entailed in treating it in undifferentiated fashion. 
Adopting a world-systems method of analysis allowed Mintz (1985) to elucidate the 
complex interplay between the local lived experiences of slaves and peasant sugar-cane 
workers in the Caribbean with the colonial power and the expansion of global 
capitalism. That said, Mintz (1977, 1985, 1998) was careful to differentiate the 
Caribbean as a culturally and historically specific sector of the periphery.  
As Mintz (1985) demonstrated in his study of sugar, each commodity in the global 
food system has a unique historical and cultural context, and a distinctive set of social, 
political and economic dynamics. Mintz (1995: 1) employed a method of analysis 
capable of capturing the relationship between food and concepts of power in the world 
economy. Mintz’s (1985) work explored the complex interplay between sugar, politics 
and power in the global food system and the global political economy. 
This study has focused primarily on the commodity complex of rice. It is broadly 
inspired by the pioneering work of Mintz (1985) and his interdisciplinary critical 
approach to the global food system and global political economy. This study has sought 
to illuminate the complex interplay and interconnections between rice, politics and 
power in the East Asian region and more broadly in the global political economy. Rice 
is a crucial commodity and core staple food that is fundamental to understanding the 
social, political and economic dynamics of the East Asian food system. A 
comprehension of the political economy of rice is vital to understanding the causes and 
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consequences of food insecurity in the East Asian region. The political economy of rice 
provides substantive insights into the nature of the East Asian food system and the 
emergent ‘third food regime’. To date, there has been no comprehensive study of the 
political economy of rice in the East Asian region that has adopted an interdisciplinary 
critical approach to the global political economy. The approach employed in this study 
draws on aspects of the interdisciplinary approach employed by Philip McMichael 
(1990, 1992, 2000c, 2005a) to food regime analysis.  
Akin with Mintz (1985), McMichael (1995) reveals, from a world-historical 
perspective, the central role played by food and agriculture in the formation and 
transformation of the global political economy. Critical agri-food scholars such as 
Araghi (2003), Borras Jr. et al. (2011a, 2011b), Friedmann (2005), Lawrence and Burch 
(2009) and McMichael (2013a) conceptualise agriculture and food as integral parts of 
global capital accumulation, with structural problems of the current agri-food system 
are inseparable from the capitalist system. McMichael (1995: 1) asserts, ‘the emergence 
of a world economy depends on the reorganization of agriculture and food systems to 
provision the work force and the industries associated with the division of labour’. 
McMichael’s pioneering work (1990, 1995, 2000a, 2005a, 2005b, 2009a, 2009b, 
2010a, 2010b, 2013a) on food regime analysis employs incorporated comparison and a 
world-historical perspective. This is an approach that refines rudiments of dependency 
and world systems theory, making comparison ‘the substance of the inquiry rather than 
the framework’ (McMichael 1990: 386). This is a sophisticated approach to the study of 
the global food system and global social change (Weber 2007). McMichael applies 
incorporated comparison and a world-historical perspective to comprehend and 
investigate ‘social and political relations’ and ‘social struggles’ not captured by the 
more formal method of comparison (Weber 2007). According to McMichael (2000c: 
671): 
Incorporated comparison makes three particular claims. First, comparison is not a formal, 
‘external’ procedure in which cases are juxtaposed as separate vehicles of common or 
contrasting patterns of variation. Rather, comparison is ‘internal’ to historical inquiry, 
where process-instances are comparable because they are historically connected and 
mutually conditioning. Second, incorporated comparison does not proceed with an a priori 
conception of the composition and context of the units compared, rather they form in 
relation to one another and in relation to the whole formed through their inter-relationship. 
In other words, the whole is not a given, it is self-forming. This is what I understand we 
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mean by historical ‘specificity.’ Third, comparison can be conducted across space and time, 
separately or together. Cross-space comparison specifies a single conjuncture as combining 
particular spatially-located parts of a global configuration (such as an international food 
order, a debt regime, or the commodity complex of oil, or wheat, or micro-circuitry). On 
the other hand, cross-time comparison specifies an era as composed of temporally 
differentiated instances or versions of a world-historical process (such as state-building, or 
revolutions). 
This method of analysis is capable of analytically capturing and comprehending not 
only the crucial structural aspects of the global political economy and the global food 
system, but also social and political relations and relations of power that constitute and 
underpin these structures. McMichael (2000a) has applied this approach to the East 
Asian region in his analysis of the ‘food import complex’ in East Asia from a world-
historical perspective. This study has employed some aspects of McMichael’s (1995, 
2000c, 2013a) method and has applied this approach to the East Asian region and the 
regional food system to gain a deeper understanding of the political economy of rice 
(the commodity complex of rice) and the critical intersections of rice, politics and power 
in the region.  
Cross-time comparison, as outlined by McMichael (2000c: 671), identifies an era as 
‘composed of temporally differentiated instances or versions of a world-historical 
process’ — hence, an era could be a particular food regime such as the colonial food 
regime or the second food regime under US hegemony. McMichael (2000c) emphasises 
the importance of comprehending these eras with the broader world-historical process. 
Arguably, this method of analysis is particularly useful for studying a ‘commodity 
complex’ such as the commodity complex of rice as ‘cross-space comparison specifies a 
single conjuncture as combining particular spatially-located parts of a global 
configuration’ — in this case, the global configuration is an emergent third food regime 
(McMichael 2000c: 671). Thus, McMichael’s (2000c) method of analysis is employed 
in this study as a useful means of comprehending the commodity complex of rice in the 
East Asian region. It is also a useful method for understanding what this commodity 
complex reveals about the characteristics of an emergent third food regime.  
It is important to note that by focusing on the global and regional political economy 
of rice and food insecurity, this study has not been able to capture the nuances of the 
local lived experience in the same way as it is captured by social anthropologists such as 
Hanks (1972), Mintz (1985), Durrenberger (1996), or Shepherd and McWilliams (2011) 
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or rural sociologists like Borras Jr. et al. (2011a), Fairbairn (2011) or McMichael 
(2013b). It is beyond the scope of the thesis to address the sophisticated interplay from 
the local to the regional level across such a wide variety of countries with such 
divergent rice economies. That said, this study has drawn on the substantive fieldwork 
of social anthropologists and rural sociologists by employing qualitative research 
methods: document analysis, qualitative academic research (desktop study) and 
secondary data collection. 
2.1.3 Commodity chain analysis  
There have been a number of important and comprehensive agri-food studies employing 
commodity systems, commodity chains, and filière analysis to examine key 
commodities in the global food system. These include the study by Friedland, Barton 
and Thomas (1981) on the lettuce industry, the study by Dixon (2002) on the poultry 
sector and the wide-ranging study by Pritchard and Burch (2003) on the international 
restructuring of the processing tomato industry. As outlined in the theoretical 
framework, this study has adopted a critical IPE approach and food regime analysis, 
rather than specifically a commodity chain analysis; however, it is inspired by the 
intellectual rigour and contribution of these agri-food studies to understanding the role 
of key commodities in the global food system. Much inspiration has been drawn from 
these seminal studies on the role of commodities in the agri-food system and some 
aspects of this analysis are used in this study to comprehend the commodity complex of 
rice in East Asia. 
2.1.4 Qualitative methodology  
Qualitative methodologies have been employed throughout the study to provide a 
deeper understanding of the socio-political and economic characteristics of the 
commodity complex of rice in the East Asian region, and the role of rice in relation to 
food insecurity. Qualitative research places emphasis on meaning and interpretation 
(Crotty 1998; Neuman 2006; Wengraff 2001). That is, it attempts to comprehend social 
relations and the meanings people give to their lived experiences (Neuman 2006; 
Wengraff 2001). This study has employed the following qualitative research methods: 
document analysis, qualitative academic research (desktop study) and secondary data 
collection. Secondary data and information have been collected mainly through 
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published scholarly sources, such as books, reports, articles, policy papers and national 
and international journals. 
This study has used different types of primary and secondary sources. The following 
paragraphs discuss different types of secondary sources that have been used in the 
thesis, methods of obtaining them, as well as primary sources that have been used. 
The study has drawn on a wide range of secondary sources that are related to the 
study of the global political economy and the agri-food system. The interdisciplinary 
literature surveyed for the thesis comes from various disciplines across a range of social 
and political sciences, including international relations (IR), IPE, non-traditional security 
(NTS) studies, rural and historical sociology, social anthropology and agrarian political 
economy. The thesis has also drawn some of its empirical data from scientific studies 
conducted by major international institutions, such as the FAO and the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB) amongst many others. Primary and secondary sources were obtained through 
different channels, including academic books; journal articles; dissertations; reports 
based on academic conferences; and publications by non-government organisations 
(NGOs), international government organisations (IGOs) and government agencies and 
departments. 
The value of employing qualitative methodology in political and social science, IPE 
and agri-food research has been discussed extensively in the literature (Crotty 1998; 
Mahoney 2007; Neuman 2006; Ragin 2000; Wengraff 2001). Many agri-food and IPE 
scholars have argued that qualitative methods are essential for addressing particular 
research problems and existing conditions of knowledge (Araghi 2003; Arrighi 2010; 
Borras Jr. et al. 2011a, 2011b; Higgot and Payne 2000; McMichael 2000c). Ragin 
(2000: 4) notes that qualitative methods often compel researchers to ‘reconceptualise 
cases, and reconsider causes and outcomes’. Qualitative methods can assist in 
facilitating theoretical insights and innovation (Ragin 2000). As Collier, Brady and 
Seawright (2004: 238) argue, research design should involve an ‘interactive process 
between theory and evidence’. Collier, Brady and Seawright (2004: 238) advocate the 
production of interpretable findings resulting from ‘a particularly revealing comparative 
design’ and ‘a rich knowledge of cases and context’, which can plausibly be defended. 
In an interpretive context, the qualitative assessment of case studies and contextualised 
comparisons constitute appropriate responses to the existing conditions of knowledge 
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about the subject to be studied (Collier, Brady and Seawright 2004; Mahoney 2007; 
Ragin 2000) - in this case, the commodity complex of rice in the East Asian region.  
2.2 A regional approach to food system analysis and the commodity complex of 
rice 
‘Regional’, is an important spatial level to comprehend and analyse the broader 
dynamics of governance and food insecurity in relation to rice (Ingram et al. 2010). It is 
important to note that regions — such as Asia, Asia-Pacific or East Asia — are socially 
constructed as ways to organise the world — spatially and temporally — according to 
certain perspectives and perceptions. East Asia can be a somewhat misleading label as 
‘concealed beneath this rubric are very different ideas about the ways economic and 
political activity ought to be organised, and quite distinctive variations in political 
practices and economic structures as a consequence’ (Beeson 2007: 58). Yahuda (2011: 
5) notes that the region might best be conceived as still in a process of transformation 
and ‘whose identity has yet to be clearly defined’. This study takes this regional 
diversity into account by adopting an interdisciplinary critical approach to global 
political economy that remains perceptive to the contestation of cultural meanings in 
politics (Nash 2010). This interdisciplinary approach provides an analytical framework 
that is capable of comprehending the quite distinctive variations in political practices 
and economic structures in the region (Beeson 2007).  
2.3 Defining East Asia 
In his study of the historical origins of the East Asian region, Holcombe (2001:3) 
argued, ‘we need to take East Asia more seriously’. Holcombe (2001:3) contends that 
while the concept of Asia is vague and difficult to define, there is a ‘reasonably 
coherent’ understanding and definition of East Asia. The concept of East Asia may even 
be ‘older the nation-states it subsumes and in some ways it is more fundamental’ 
(Holcombe 2001:3). This argument finds support in Kang’s (2010) comprehensive 
historical study on the tribute system in early modern East Asia in his book, East Asia 
before the West. According to Holcombe (2001: 3):  
The East Asian civilization may even be said to represent the single most important major 
alternative historical evolutionary track to Western civilization on the face of this planet, 
with a continuing history of success that can rival that of what we call the West… For 
centuries, the Chinese empire — the largest individual state in East Asia — was also the 
single most economically developed state on Earth… As recently as 1800, China was still 
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probably the richest (wealthiest) country in the world. This traditional material wealth was 
paralleled by cultural sophistication. 
For the purpose of this study, East Asia has been defined as a diverse geographical 
and cultural area encompassing the subregions of Southeast Asia (the ten members of 
ASEAN) and North-East Asia (China, Japan, South Korea, North Korea and Taiwan) 
(Atanassova-Cornelis and van der Putten 2014; Holcombe 2001; Miyagi 2012). This 
conception of East Asia was strongly advocated by Mahathir Mohamad, the Prime 
Minister of Malaysia from 1981 to 2003 (Miyagi 2012). In 1990, he proposed the 
formation of an East Asian Economic Community (Miyagi 2012). This laid the 
foundations for regional cooperation and the formation of ASEAN Plus Three 
(ASEAN+3). The ASEAN+3 consists of the ten ASEAN member states — Brunei 
Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, 
Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam — plus the People’s Republic 
of China, the Republic of Korea and Japan. This thesis has a case study on China (as the 
world’s largest rice producer) in the Northeast Asian sub-region and on Thailand (as the 
world’s largest rice exporter) in the Southeast Asian sub-region. The study also has a 
case study on regional cooperation, food insecurity and rice reserves in East Asia.  
2.4 The significance of East Asia in the global political economy  
Some scholars have argued that a transition is occurring away from the primacy of US 
hegemony towards a more multipolar global political economy (Arrighi 2010; Jacques 
2012). Arrighi (2010: 379), an historical sociologist, argues that ‘there has been a 
consolidation of the re-centering of the global economy on East Asia, and within East 
Asia on China’. Arrighi (2010: 380) is careful not to suggest that any state in East Asia, 
including China, is poised to replace the United States as a hegemonic power in the 
short-term. However, Arrighi (2010: 380) argues that collective economic power of the 
East Asian states, ‘as the “workshop” and “cashbox” of the world economy’ is 
compelling the ‘traditional centers’ of economic power in ‘Western Europe and North 
America to restructure and reorganise their own industries, their own industries and 
their own ways of life’. Arrighi (2010: 380, 385) concludes:  
An East-Asian-centered world market society appears today a far more likely outcome of 
the present transformations of the global political economy than it did fifteen years ago… If 
China or East Asia were to become hegemonic in the future, it would be a very different 
type of hegemony than the Western type of the past five hundred years.  
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This transition to a multipolar global political economy and a potential re-centering of 
the world economy on East Asia has significant implications for the global food system 
and the emergent third food regime.  
2.5 The cultural political economy of rice in East Asia  
The global political economy of food and rice is inexorably cultural (Best and Paterson 
2010). The term agri-culture has, entwined in its very name, the concept of culture. 
Culture is interwoven into the diverse rituals, traditions, meanings, patterns, and 
practices of rice cultivation, production, circulation and consumption. From the soil 
where it is sown, to the markets where it is bartered, transported and exchanged to the 
serving bowl or plate where is finally consumed, the social, political and economic 
relations that coalesce around this commodity known as rice are profoundly cultural in 
all their various dimensions.  
There are ‘many important meanings of rice: as a potent social, political, cultural 
and historical object’ in addition to being the staple food grain in the region (Smith 
2008: 126). Rice is the most widely consumed and ecologically adaptable cereal on 
earth. However, rice is not just a crop and a staple food that provides calories to sustain 
life. Scholars such as Hanks (1972), Smith (2008) and Shepherd and McWilliams 
(2011) have suggested — based on their own fieldwork and empirical research — that 
rice can be interpreted as an allegory for culture, society, polity, ecology and a sense of 
identity in some parts of Asia. It is outside the scope of this thesis to attempt to validate 
this particular argument or to undertake further research to explore the validity of this 
particular argument.   
While this study has focused primarily on rice as a key commodity in the regional 
and global political economy of food and agriculture, it has also recognised the 
importance of the social and political struggles around the commodification and de-
commodification of rice. This is not to contend that the cultural dimensions of rice are 
not important. Culture is critically important; however, this dimension is not the 
principle focus of this study. 
This study has primarily focused on the socio-political and economic organisation of 
a single agricultural commodity — rice — to examine and explore the complex and 
multidimensional nature of food insecurity in the region and the relationship between 
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rice, politics and power. That said, it would abstractive and reductionist to suggest that 
it is possible to study the political economy of rice in the region by adopting an a-
cultural analysis. Rather, this study has adopted an interdisciplinary approach to global 
political economy — including aspects of political sociology — that remains perceptive 
to the contestation of cultural meanings in politics (Nash 2010). 
Nash (2010: 77) contends that there ‘there has been a well-documented cultural turn 
in social theory’. Nash (2010: 77) outlines that this ‘cultural turn’ takes two forms: the 
epistemological case ‘in which culture is seen as universally constitutive of social 
relations and identities’; and the historical case ‘in which culture is seen as playing an 
unprecedented role in constituting social relations and identities in contemporary 
society’. According to Nash (2010: 77), ‘as a consequence of the “social turn”, all social 
life must be seen as potentially political where politics is the contestation of relations of 
power’. Therefore,  due to the complexity of social relations, contemporary political 
sociology is concerned with ‘the play of power and politics across societies, which 
includes, but is not restricted to, relations between the state and society’ (Nash 2010: 2). 
In other words, the critical approach to global political economy employed in this study 
is akin to McMichael’s (2010a, 2010b, 2012a, 2012b, 2013a, 2013b) critical approach, 
which takes into account not only the crucial structural aspects of the global political 
economy, but also social and political relations and relations of power that constitute 
and underpin these structures. 
2.6 The rice import–export complex of East Asia  
Global rice exports are highly concentrated, with the top five exporters (Thailand, India, 
Vietnam, Pakistan, and the United States, in that order) controlling 87 per cent of global 
net trade. The Asia–Pacific region is home to the world’s six major rice producing 
countries — China, India, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Vietnam and Thailand — which 
together, account for more than 75 per cent of global output (Dawe et al. 2014). The 
strategic significance of rice is accentuated by the fact that price rises and volatility have 
been a catalyst for political tensions in the region, as seen in the reactions to tariffs on 
rice, and in the responses to a proposal for a Southeast Asian rice cartel (the 
Organisation of Rice Exporting Countries, or OREC) that excludes the region’s 
importing countries (George 1998; Timmer 1975; Trethewie 2012).  
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The rice complex of Southeast Asia is constituted by a constellation of state and 
non-state actors. The axis of the rice complex of Southeast Asia concerns the alignment 
of major rice exporting states and key rice importing states, along with the large 
corporate grain traders that form a critical links in the commodity chain of the regional 
rice trade (Dawe 2010). Thailand, Vietnam and Cambodia are all major exporters of 
rice, while Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines are all significant 
importers of rice (Timmer 2013). The strategic significance of rice is accentuated by the 
fact that price rises and volatility have been a catalyst for political tensions in the 
region, as seen in the reactions to tariffs on rice, and in the responses to a proposal for a 
Southeast Asian rice cartel (OREC) that excludes the region’s importing countries 
(Timmer 1975; George 1998; Trethewie 2012). Dawe et al. (2014: 1) — utilising FAO 
data for 2012 —estimate that: 
East and Southeast Asia accounted for about 60 percent of the world’s paddy rice 
production (with China alone accounting for around 28 percent). In the region, rice is also 
an important traded commodity, with the region featuring several of the world’s leading 
rice exporters (such as Vietnam and Thailand) and importers (such as China, the 
Philippines and Indonesia). Overall, the region accounts for at least 44 percent of total 
world rice exports and at least 19 percent of total imports. 
One key rice trader in the rice complex of Southeast Asia is Capital Rice Co. Ltd. 
(an affiliate of the STC Group, a Thai conglomerate of trading and manufacturing 
companies in the field of agro-industry). The company was established in 1977 and 
accounts for about a fifth of Thailand’s rice exports. Capital Rice exports jasmine rice, 
white rice and parboiled rice, along with other rice varieties, to Asia, Africa, America, 
Europe and the Middle East (FAO 2003). Another key rice trader is Phoenix 
Commodities, which has offices in Vietnam, Thailand and Indonesia (Phoenix 2015). 
Phoenix ranks amongst the top five rice traders in the global rice trade, ‘trading close to 
800,000 metric tons of rice annually’ (Phoenix 2015: 1). American Rice Inc. (United 
States) accounts for about 5 per cent of the world rice market (FAO 2003). The Rice 
Corporation, TRC (United States) is a major rice trading company, with worldwide 
operations and rice mills in Europe, Latin America and the United States (FAO 2003). 
TRC markets around one-fifth of US rice, it is a significant player in Southeast Asia 
through its joint venture with Vinafood I, one of Vietnam’s major rice exporters. Novel, 
a privately held firm based in Switzerland, is one of the world’s largest rice traders 
(FA0 2003).  
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Louis Dreyfus is the only one of the four big commodity traders to have any 
substantial stake in the global rice trade. The company sources paddy, brown, and 
milled rice from all over the world. Louis Dreyfus plays a significant role in the rice 
market of Southeast Asia as one of largest purchasers of Thailand’s export rice, taking 
around 700,000 tonnes a year (Murphy et al. 2012). Another major exporter is the 
Singapore-based Olam International, which is among the top three suppliers of rice, 
cotton, cocoa, and coffee to world markets. In the latter part of 2010, Olam International 
and Louis Dreyfus entered into negotiations which, had they succeeded, would have 
created the largest rice exporting company in the world. However, the merger talks 
collapsed in February 2011 (Murphy et al. 2012). Olam, a trading firm headquartered in 
Singapore (and which is part of an Indian conglomerate), is a large rice trader, and is 
one of the principal suppliers of rice to African countries (FAO 2003). It is beyond the 
scope of this study to analyse the activities of each of these companies; however, a case 
study in Chapter 4 examines in detail the activities of COFCO — China’s largest state-
owned agri-food company. Also, Chapter 5 briefly discusses Capital Rice Co. Ltd, a 
company that accounts for about a fifth of Thailand’s rice exports. 
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the methodological considerations in this study and discussed 
the qualitative methodology and data collection methods employed in this thesis. It has 
outlined the interdisciplinary theoretical framework adopted in this thesis. This chapter 
has defined East Asia as a geographical region and discussed the merits of a regional 
approach to food system analysis and the commodity complex of rice. It has also 
discussed the significance of the East Asian region in the global political economy and 
explained the importance of the cultural political economy of rice in East Asia. The 
final section of the chapter has mapped aspects of the rice import–export complex in 
East Asia. The next chapter (Chapter 3) will discuss food regime theory and the 
significance of adopting a world-historical perspective in relation to comprehending the 
global food system.  
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3. Food regime analysis: a world-historical perspective on the global 
food system 
3.0 Introduction  
As mentioned in the opening chapter, the agri-food sector is often overlooked within the 
disciplines of IR and IPE. This is despite the constitutive role that agri-food relations 
have played historically in the construction of the inter-state system and their 
substantive significance in contemporary global political economy (McMichael 2013a). 
The current restructuring of the global food regime and its socio-political and economic 
coordinates has significance for comprehending the broader configuration and 
transformation of the contemporary global political economy.7 This chapter examines 
the development of neomercantilism and its role in the evolving global food regime, and 
evaluates the question, ‘To what extent does this emergent paradigm contradict or 
reaffirm a neoliberal food regime?’ 
The first section provides an overview of food regime literature. This is followed by 
an exploration of the historical legacies of the first and second food regime. The 
subsequent section discusses the debates in relation to an emerging third food regime. 
Following this discussion is an analysis of the incipient importance of South–South 
relations and trade in an increasingly multipolar global food system. The final sections 
of this chapter explore the conceptual linkages between the rise of state capitalism and 
the advent of neomercantilism and its implications for the global food regime. The 
implications of the proliferation of SOEs and SWFs and their roles in securing global 
supply chains for food, feed and fuel through the acquisition foreign land and natural 
resources are examined. The chapter concludes by contending that the paradox of state-
led capitalism and neomercantilism in the global food system is that it both challenges 
and confirms the neoliberal corporate food regime. 
3.1 Overview of food regime literature  
There is a burgeoning amount of academic literature exploring the analytical frontiers of 
the evolving global food regime. The food regime concept draws on aspects of 
                                                
7 Refer to the comprehensive work on food regimes by Araghi (2003); Burch (2009); Campbell and Dixon (2009); Friedmann 
(1984; 1993); Friedmann and McMichael (1989); Lawrence and McMichael (2000; 2009a; 2009b); McMichael and Buttel (1990); 
Pritchard (2009); and Weis (2007).  
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dependency theory and world systems analysis, as well as being influenced by post-
colonial and post-structural critiques. It ‘situates the global ordering of international 
food production, circulation, and consumption relations within specific institutional 
arrangements corresponding to a hegemonic organizing principle in the state system’ 
(McMichael 2013a: 48). The food regime concept seeks to explicate the dynamics of the 
global food system by revealing the structures and processes of global food production, 
distribution and consumption (Burch and Lawrence 2009).8 It is a conceptual and 
methodological tool for spatially and temporally mapping relations of power in the 
global food system (Campbell and Dixon 2009). It has been utilised as a methodological 
tool to examine the world order and global trade in agro-foods (McMichael 2013b). In 
the past, global food regimes have been correlated with British, US, and corporate 
hegemony (McMichael 2013a). The recent corporate food regime was ‘institutionalized 
via WTO rules and protocols, privileging agro-exporters from the US and Europe in 
global food markets, served by states’ (McMichael 2013a: 48). 
Arguably, the current organisation of the global food system is in transition. One 
critical aspect of the evolving global food system that has often been overlooked in 
academic literature is the emergence of neomercantilism and the rise of state capitalism. 
Much of the food regime literature has focused upon hegemonic power relations 
between the Global North and the Global South, and the neoliberal characteristics of the 
‘corporate food regime’. However, this literature has often overlooked the nuances in 
varieties of capitalism and has largely ignored the rise of state capitalism and the 
emerging importance of South–South relations in the global political economy and the 
                                                
8 It is important to note that there is a body of work from actor-network theorists that critiques agrarian political economy and food 
regime analysis, claiming it has tendencies to obscure agency and prioritise structural accounts, and a failure to adequately assess 
and account for the ontological ‘baggage’ of imported conceptual frameworks and periodisation (Busch and Juska 1997; Goodman 
and Watts 1994). While this study acknowledges these critiques of more ‘structural’ approaches to agrarian political economy, this 
study adopts an interdisciplinary ‘critical’ IPE approach, which is sensitive to the nuances of post-structuralism and the cultural turn 
in social sciences. Critical approaches to IPE do not conform to the narrow notion of political economy outlined in the critiques 
above. The theoretical and methodological approach outlined in Chapter 2 is capable of comprehending a variety of actors, 
including states and non-state actors, as well as relations of power in the agri-food system. It is crucial to note that food regime 
analysis as adopted by McMichael (2013a) and Borras Jr et al. (2011a) draws on aspects of dependency theory and world systems 
analysis, as well as being influenced by, and sensitive to, post-colonial and post-structural critiques — overcoming many of the 
criticisms outlined by actor-network theorists.  
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global food system (Arrighi 2007; Ravenhill 2014). These important aspects of an 
emerging ‘third food regime’ will be discussed in the later section. Firstly, it is 
important to outline a historical overview of the first and second food regimes.  
3.2 Historical legacies of the first and second food regime 
According to writers such as Friedmann (2005), Friedmann and McMichael (1989), and 
McMichael (2013a), two distinct food regimes have been identified, with a third regime 
emerging. The first food regime — the British-centred colonial food regime — was 
based on the exploitation of foreign lands and peoples by European colonists. Cheap 
food was imported by the conquering nations under the mantle of mercantilism. This 
fed a burgeoning working class, allowing the wages of workers to be held down, and 
providing profits to industrialists for subsequent investment at home and abroad. The 
first regime lasted from the 1870s to 1914 and was eventually replaced with a second 
US-focused ‘Intensive Food Regime’ (McMichael 2013a). It was based on a capital- 
and energy-intensive form of hi-tech farming and the creation and dominance of durable 
(manufactured) foods. It saw the entrenchment of corporate agribusiness. According to 
Lawrence (2015: 203): 
The (first) regime began to falter between the Great Depression and the Second World War. 
A second ‘intensive’ food regime emerged in its place. Reliant upon the manufacture of 
durable foods and large-scale industrial farming, this regime came into crisis in the 1970s 
as global hunger increased, WTO negotiations waned and the environmental performance 
of ‘high-tech’ farming was roundly condemned. The third, current, food regime remains 
indeterminate. 
While the first regime collapsed from the over-exploitation of the colonies, 
combined with the Great Depression and the Second World War, the second regime — 
that had lasted roughly from the 1940s to the early 1970s — faltered as a result of the 
food price inflation crisis and the ambitions of transnational capital for increased 
opportunities for global trade (Burch and Lawrence 2009; McMichael 2013a).  
3.3 Towards an understanding of an emergent third food regime? 
Recently, academic studies and literatures have begun to address the financialisation of 
the global agri-food, feed, and fuel system (Burch and Lawrence 2009; Clapp 2012; 
Fairbairn 2011; Russi 2013). A number of writers have argued that a third food regime 
— variously termed the corporate food regime (McMichael 2013a), the financialised 
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food regime (Burch and Lawrence 2009), the corporate–environmental food regime 
(Friedmann 2005) and the neoliberal food regime (Pechlaner and Otero 2010; Wolf et 
al. 2014a, 2014b) — is currently emerging. Its features are said to include: corporate 
dominance of food supply chains, premised on global sourcing; environmental 
sensibilities built into systems of private food governance; a more neoliberalised 
marketplace; the financialisation of food and farming industries; global enclosure and 
subsequent peasant dispossession; and, the rise of protest movements such as La Via 
Campesina fighting for food sovereignty over free markets (Friedmann 2005; Burch and 
Lawrence 2009; McMichael 2013a).  
In contrast to some of the arguments outlined above, Pritchard (2009: 297) contends 
that ‘the WTO is more appropriately theorized as a carryover from the politics of the 
crisis of the second food regime, rather than representing any putative successor.’ 
Pritchard (2009) draws on a broadly conceived world-historical framework to point out 
that the impasse of the WTO’s Doha Round problematises the neoliberal characteristics 
of an emergent third food regime. Pritchard (2009: 297) argues the collapse of the Doha 
Round ‘should put an end to speculation of a WTO-led transformation of global food 
politics towards unfettered market rule; the supposed basis for a neoliberalised third 
food regime’. This is an important perspective to keep in mind in relation to discussing 
the second food regime and any potential emergent third food regime. Half a decade on 
from this astute analysis, are the contours of a potential third food regime emerging? 
It is critical to situate this contemporary juncture in the global food system within 
the context of a transition towards a multipolar international order and a multipolar 
global food system. This transition is characterised by the rise of Brazil, Russia, India, 
China and South Africa (BRICS),9 the presence of neomercantilism, and the rise of 
state-led capitalism with the subsequent proliferation of SOEs and SWFs. This broader 
reconfiguration of the global political economy has led to a restructuring of the global 
                                                
9 The transformation of the investment portfolio acronym created by Goldman Sachs’ Jim O’Neill in 2001 into an international 
coalition among Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa took shape in 2009, when respective heads of government met for the 
first time in Yekaterinburg, Russia. For a comprehensive analysis of the emergent role of the BRICS in global governance and the 
contemporary global political economy, refer to the work of Ban and Blyth (2013); Laidi (2012); Lane (2008), Wade (2011); 
Wansleben (2013). 
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food system and its socio-political and economic coordinates. This study contends that 
the Global Food Crisis of 2007–08 signalled a transition to a multipolar food system.  
This broader reconfiguration of the global political economy represents a shift away 
from the primacy of neoliberal capitalism that was historically promoted under US 
hegemony and the auspices of the Washington Consensus and the post-Washington 
Consensus and towards a variety of ‘models’ of state-led capitalism and 
neomercantilism — as exemplified in various forms by China, Brazil and Russia and, to 
a lesser extent, India and South Africa (Aldo and Lazzarini 2015; Bremmer 2008, 2009; 
Lane 2008; Lin 2013; Lyons 2008; Nolke 2015). It is contended that the emergence of 
neomercantilism in the global food system has a long historical trajectory. This is, 
arguably, grounded in the competing philosophical traditions, ideas and assumptions of 
the dynamic interrelationship between the state and the market (state–market nexus). 
The emergence of neomercantilism has also been facilitated by the failure of 
neoliberal policies to provide genuine food security, as well as a lack of trust in the 
market to provide essential public goods (Bello 2009; Madgoff and Tokar 2010). This 
market failure in the global food system was evident in the 2007–08 Global Food Crisis 
and the price spikes of 2010–11, and continues to be evident in relation to ongoing food 
price volatility (Clapp 2012; Clapp and Cohen 2009; McMichael 2013b).  
3.4 South–South relations and multipolarity in the evolving global food regime  
As suggested earlier, it is argued that the global political economy is currently in a 
transition from a unipolar system under declining US hegemony to a multipolar order 
shaped by the rise of the BRICS (Ban and Blyth 2013; Jacques 2009; Laidi 2012; 
Larionova 2012; Wansleben 2013). This evolving multipolar international order has 
systemic implications for the global food regime. While the first and second food 
regimes were primarily dominated by North–South relations, the new regime is 
increasingly characterised by trade flows in food and agriculture between South–South 
countries (De Castro et al. 2013; Ervine and Fridell 2015; Modi 2011; Martin 2008). 
The emergence of new nodes of power in the constellation of agri-food import and 
export complexes is facilitating a reconfiguration of the global food system. These new 
nodes of power are more diffuse and can no longer be situated in the historic North–
South divide (Ervine and Fridell 2015; Modi 2011). An exemplar of this reconfiguration 
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is the emergence of new agricultural powerhouses such as Brazil and Argentina in 
South America and the growing significance of agricultural trade between Brazil and 
China. In South Asia, India has emerged as a major rice exporter, while China is 
increasingly becoming one of the world’s largest importers of rice (Timmer 2013). The 
import and export powerhouses of China, India and Brazil are increasingly reshaping 
the contours of global agri-food relations.  
This contention is supported by McMichael’s (2012a: 48) proposition that there is 
currently a ‘redistribution of power across an increasingly multi-centric global food 
system, with rising agro-export powers in middle-income countries (as expressed in the 
formation of the Group of Twenty [G20])’. According to McMichael (2013a: 48), 
‘Northern states are losing their centrality in organizing and dominating the food/fuel 
regime’ — this transition is typified by the G20 challenge to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) mandate and multilateralism, and by some emerging economies 
and middle-income countries defying the WTO rules by directly securing access to 
offshore agricultural supply chains for domestic consumption. Dauvergne and Neville’s 
(2009) study supported the idea of an emergent polycentric/multipolar food regime. 
This argument is reiterated in Borras Jr. et al.’s (2011a: 25–26) description of an 
emerging ‘polycentric food–energy regime — in contrast to previous food regimes 
anchored by empires on either side of the North Atlantic’. With the rise of the BRICS, 
multiple hubs or centres of power have emerged in the integrated food–energy complex 
– this diffusion of power is reshaping the geography of the global food system, recasting 
agri-food relations and ushering in a new era in the geopolitics of food (Borras Jr. et al. 
2011a, 2011b; Larionova 2012; Wansleben 2013).  
China has been one of the strongest proponents of the South–South approach to 
development cooperation. In 2008, it established a US$30 million Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) trust fund to support technical field missions with Chinese 
agricultural experts in developing countries (Dawe et al. 2014). So far, 30,000 Chinese 
experts have shared their knowledge and experience in over 100 countries. In October 
2014, China announced a US$50 million donation to support the FAO’s program of 
‘South–South cooperation’ to improve food security and promote sustainable 
agricultural development over the next five years (Dawe et al. 2014). South–South 
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cooperation is the mutual sharing and exchange of development solutions between and 
among countries in poor southern-hemisphere countries. 
In just under a decade (2000–09) the global trade in food has doubled from US$548 
billion to US$1,169 billion (De Castro 2013), with South–South agri-food flows 
representing one quarter of the value of world trade in agricultural commodities (De 
Castro 2013). This reconfiguration is underpinning changing growth rates in 
consumption: there is growing demand for agricultural products in Asia and Africa, as 
well as an emergence of new agricultural powerhouses such as Brazil and Argentina in 
Latin America, for which agricultural products comprise more than half the total value 
of all national exports (De Castro 2013). Brazil, for example, increased its net foodstuff 
trade surplus balance by 460 per cent over a recent decade and forecasts a further 
increase of 50 per cent in the coming decade (De Castro 2013). China has emerged as 
one of Brazil’s largest export markets in agricultural commodities, particularly in soy.  
3.5 The emergence of state-led capitalism and neomercantilism in the global food 
system  
If it can be accepted that the emergent neoliberal corporate food regime is in a period of 
transition, it is important to identify ways of capturing and incorporating the analytical 
contours of the emergence of state capitalism and neomercantilism and how such 
models are reshaping the dynamics of the global food system. This transition is typified 
by the proliferation of SOEs and SWFs that are intensifying competition for natural 
resources across the globe. The rise of state capitalism and the proliferation of SOEs 
and SWFs exemplify contemporary forms of neomercantilism that challenge the 
embedded liberalism of the WTO, International Monetary Fund and World Bank. This 
critical transition occurring in the food regime is part of the broader shift from US 
hegemony and momentum towards a multipolar order with the re-emergence of the 
BRICs (Arrighi 2007, 2010; Laidi 2012; Larionova 2012). Ironically, this shift has been 
facilitated by the process of neoliberal globalisation (Fine 1994; Higgott and Payne 
2000). van Apeldoorn (2011: 220) asserts: 
The rise of what is arguably a ‘statist’ capitalism in the erstwhile periphery (China in 
particular) implies not just a challenge to ‘Western’ liberal capitalism, but also to our 
established understandings of current world order. 
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Some scholars have contended that the WTO-centered neoliberal corporate food 
regime is in crisis (Lawrence et al. 2010; Patel 2009; Rosset 2006). Arguably, this crisis 
is discernible in a new form of mercantilism that is apparent in the acquisition of 
offshore land for supplies of food, feed, and fuel (Borras Jr. et al. 2011a, 2011b; 
McMichael 2013a). McMichael (2013a: 48) situates the contemporary politics of land 
grabbing as ‘an expression of the changing geopolitical coordinates of the food regime 
in the context of a combination of food, energy, financial, and climate crises’ and 
asserts that there is a fundamental realignment in international relations around 
‘resource grabbing’ as states evoking national food security attempt to secure and 
guarantee their access to global supply chains of food, feed and fuel through the 
acquisition of agricultural infrastructure, natural resources and foreign land (McMichael 
2012a: 47; White et al. 2012).  
This realignment in international relations is being facilitated by institutional 
arrangements and ‘governance mechanisms to justify and enable a new phase of land 
investments’ (McMichael 2013a: 48). McMichael characterises this shift in 
international relations as a new type of ‘security mercantilism’ that paradoxically both 
‘affirms and contradicts a neoliberal order’ (McMichael 2013a, 47). He posits that 
security mercantilism is a crucial concept that typifies an emergent paradigm for the 
evolving third food regime and often manifests in a non-trade based form of food — 
foreign land acquisition across the globe (McMichael 2013a, 2013b). McMichael’s 
critical analysis of this new type of mercantilism in the global agri-food, feed, fuel and 
finance system has made a substantive contribution to understanding this theoretical 
paradigm, paving the way for further research.  
It is important to note that the argument advanced in this thesis differs from 
McMichael’s (2013a) analysis in a number of ways. There are some limitations with the 
concept of security mercantilism, as mercantilism has historically had deep security 
dimensions with strong links to perceived national security agendas. Hence, this paper 
uses the term neomercantilism to connote a new type of mercantilism in the 
contemporary political economy, acknowledging this paradigm is conceptually linked to 
economic nationalism and national security. Also, McMichael (2013a) does not engage 
with the concept of state-led capitalism. Arguably, engaging with the burgeoning IPE 
literature on state capitalism contributes much to understanding the conceptualisation of 
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new types of mercantilism in the agri-food system, particularly in relation to the 
political economy of the East Asian region. That said, McMichael’s (2013a, 2013b) 
essential work on security mercantilism in the global agri-food system adds further 
support to the arguments advanced in this thesis in relation to neomercantilism in the 
agri-food system. 
3.6 New mercantilism in the global food system: the politics of food scarcity  
The notion of increasing competition over diminishing natural resources and foreign 
land acquisition facilitating change in the geopolitical coordinates of the food system 
finds resonance in the recent work of Brown (2012), Kugelman (2013) and De Castro et 
al. (2013). These scholars highlight that over the last decade, world grain reserves have 
diminished by a third and world food prices have doubled. Brown (2012) and De Castro 
et al. (2013) consider that the world is essentially in a transition from an era of food 
abundance to one of scarcity, and that as food supplies tighten, states will no longer 
trust or rely on global markets for national food security, but rather increasingly act in 
their own perceived national interests to ensure food security through the acquisition of 
foreign land and by securing access to offshore food supplies. Brown (2012: 3) outlines 
the thesis that a ‘new geopolitics of food scarcity’ is emerging, where ‘food is the new 
oil’ and ‘land is the new gold’. Brown contends that the Global Food Crisis of 2007–08 
and record food price spikes in 2010–11 ushered in a global land rush and new era in 
the geopolitics of food.  
While Brown’s (2012) thesis does have inherent limitations — particularly in 
relation to its (neo)Malthusian analysis and assumptions — it does point to a global 
food system in transition and one increasingly shaped by states pursuing perceived 
national security interests. This shift is occurring in the milieu of states attempting to 
ensure domestic food security and socio-political stability in an era of climate change 
and amidst an ongoing food, fuel and financial crisis (Barrett 2013). The work of Brown 
(2012) and De Castro et al. (2013) also illuminates the (neo)Malthusian logic around 
increasing land and food scarcity that underpins aspects of the neomercantilist approach 
to food security. Perceived increasing scarcity of food and land in an era of 
environmental change is shaping national food security agendas and motivating a new 
form of mercantilism manifest in the acquisition of offshore land for supplies of food, 
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feed, and fuel (Kugelman 2013; McKeon 2013). The urgency to acquire offshore 
agriculture land and secure national food supplies, after the 2007–08 Global Food 
Crisis, provides an insight into the ‘spirit of the age of scarcity’ (De Castro et al. 2013).  
In his recent work on the ‘new politics of food’, McMahon (2013) provides a 
critique of the (neo)Malthusian logic of scarcity that abounds in neoclassical economics. 
McMahon claims this logic of scarcity is leading to land grabs with a new scramble to 
invest in farmland abroad. He situates this trend as part of the new geopolitics of food in 
the twenty first century with established companies and new competitors vying to 
secure global supply chains of food, feed and fuel. This analysis is supported by Borras 
Jr. et al.’s (2011a, 2011b) pioneering study of the agri-food, feed, fuel and finance 
complex. The scholars have mapped the changing dynamics of this complex, identifying 
the increasing integration of food, feed, energy and finance markets which has resulted 
in agri-food commodities becoming more fungible, with the acquisition or investment 
of capital in farmland (cultivated/arable land) being quickly converted into 
food/feed/(bio)fuel, depending on market prices/signals (price of crude oil and so on) 
and government policies. Brown (2012), Borras Jr. et al. (2011a, 2011b), De Castro et 
al. (2013) and McMahon (2013) reveal the panorama of the new politics of food and 
land, and how it is transforming the global food system. Their findings and research 
lend support to the argument this thesis posits that the emergence of neomercantilism is 
one of the defining features in the evolving global food regime. 
Perceptions of future food scarcity are leading state actors to secure national food 
supplies and production sources independently to the global marketplace. Some scholars 
contend that the BRICS and other emerging economies have embraced various varieties 
of state-led capitalism that hold little credence to the neoliberal doctrine or trust that free 
trade and global food markets alone can provide national food security (Aldo and 
Lazzarini 2015; Ervine and Fridell 2015; Nolke 2015). Some states in East Asia — such 
as China and Thailand — are employing state-led capitalism in the agri-food sector and, 
in some cases, implementing new forms of mercantilism that are intrinsically linked to 
state-centric perceptions of national food security. This argument is outlined in detail in 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. Chapter 6 highlights that these state-centric approaches to 
food security often spatially and temporally reproduce food insecurities, moving them 
geographically across the globe. Incongruously, attempts by states to achieve national 
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food security through neomercantilist means often come at the cost of increasing food 
insecurity in other countries. The latter approach often reproduces food insecurity by 
spatially and temporally shifting the loci of insecurity globally. This has been 
demonstrated through cases of foreign acquisition of agricultural land that have resulted 
in the dispossession of peasant or small-scale subsistence farmers from the land (Hall 
2011; McMichael 2012a, 2012b; Zoomers 2010). This process reproduces food 
insecurity and a loss of livelihood for those who are most vulnerable (Hofman and Ho 
2012). 
3.7 Towards an understanding of state-led capitalism and neomercantilism  
Due to the cultural diversity and the historical differences in the political economy of 
various states that are perceived as state capitalist, there is no universal or precise 
definition of state-led capitalism (Kyung-Sup et al. 2012). However, broadly conceived, 
it ‘denotes a political economy in which the state directs and controls key productive 
forces in an economy, yet employs capitalist practices’ (McNally 2013: 3). The notion 
of state capitalism broadly refers to the commanding and strategic role of the state in 
fostering economic growth, directing industrial policies and guiding the emerging 
market economy (Li 2012). In other words, the ‘visible hand’ of the state exerts 
significantly more control than the supposedly ‘invisible hand’ of the economy 
(Wooldridge 2012).  
This control of the economy is primarily exercised in a way that is consistent with 
the political goals and objectives of the government. Bremmer (2010: 5) characterises 
‘state capitalism’ as ‘a system in which the state functions as the leading economic actor 
and uses markets primarily for political gain’. While Bremmer’s (2010) definition 
provides a useful starting point, it sets up a false dichotomy: contrasting his notion of 
state capitalism as a fundamental challenge to an idealised form of neoliberal 
capitalism, in which the states do not intervene in free markets or in the running of 
corporations or allocation of credit.10 As discussed in Chapter 3, the US Farm Bill is an 
                                                
10 I refer here to Polanyi’s (1944) argument outlined earlier that laissez-faire is in fact a ‘utopia’ and has 
never really existed. Polanyi’s (1944, 1947) seminal work highlighted that the ‘free market’ mechanism 
was nothing if not planned, and required from its inception an ‘enormous amount of continuous state 
intervention’ in the market mechanism to ensure its stability and continuity. Contemporary scholars such 
as Chang (2008) have made similar arguments. This Polanyian argument finds support in Ervine and 
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example of a state-led subsidy scheme that problematises many of the idealised 
assumptions underlying Bremmer’s (2010) notion of free markets and neoliberal 
capitalism juxtaposed against the threat of state-led capitalism. It is important to reflect 
on the rich empirical research and IPE analysis of Stopford and Strange (1991), in 
which they studied over 50 multinational corporations and more than 100 investment 
projects in Kenya, Malaysia and Brazil. Stopford and Strange’s (1991) seminal study 
clearly accentuated the complexity of the mutual interdependence between state and 
firms in the global political economy. This theme of mutual interdependence between 
states and transnational corporations is examined in Nolke’s (2015) recent study of state 
capitalism in emerging markets. Moving beyond the reductionist and dichotomous view 
put forward by analysts such as Bremmer (2010), critical IPE scholars such as Nolke 
(2015) and Aldo and Lazzarini (2015) have completed comprehensive and insightful 
studies on the nature and form of contemporary state capitalism. According to Nolke 
(2015: 1) the ‘emergence of a third wave of state capitalism that is different from the 
previous two in the 19th and 20th centuries’. Nolke (2015:1) argues that contemporary 
varieties of state capitalism are not based purely on protectionist tariffs or ‘one central 
command’, but ‘rather on a variety of formal and informal cooperative relationships 
between various public authorities and individual companies’.  
In their recent analysis, Aldo and Lazzarini (2014) build on the notion of a complex 
mutual relationship between states and transnational corporations in the global political 
economy. Aldo and Lazzarini (2014: 2) provide a more nuanced conceptualisation, 
defining state capitalism as ‘the widespread influence of the government in the 
economy’. According to Aldo and Lazzarini (2014: 2), this influence can take many 
forms, including ‘either by owning majority or minority equity positions in companies 
or by providing subsidized credit and/or other privileges to private companies.’ Aldo 
and Lazzarini (2014) map out a spectrum of state intervention that includes not only a 
model where the state owns and manages SOEs — but also more nuanced models in 
which the state is a majority investor or a minority investor. 
                                                                                                                                          
Fridell’s (2015) recent analysis of the myth of ‘free trade’ and alternative approaches to ‘trade, politics 
and power’.  
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The state uses a variety of tools to implement control. State capitalism is typified by: 
the proliferation of national oil corporations; SOEs across a diverse range of industries 
including food and agriculture; national champions — private companies with state 
links; and SWFs, which are often repositories of funds generated through resource and 
mineral exports (Xu 2009, 2012; Xu and Bahgat 2010). While there are some 
similarities between the forms of state-led capitalism in China, India, Russia and Brazil, 
there are also some important cultural, political economic and historical distinctions 
between the Chinese and Brazilian models and the Russian and the Indian variations of 
state-backed capitalism (Aldo and Lazzarini 2014; Chu 2010). 
It is important to make the distinction between the varieties of state capitalism in 
East Asia and the broader global political economy (Kyung-Sup et al. 2012). Casanova 
and Kassum (2014), in their recent work about the political economy of Brazil, describe 
how Brazil is developing its own model of growth and development that they refer to as 
the Brazilian model with some features of state capitalism and innovative forms of 
welfare. Kroger (2012) depicts the Brazilian model as neomercantilist capitalism. State-
led capitalism in China has been referred to in the literature as red capitalism, 
authoritarian capitalism, and state monopoly capitalism. Amin (2013) prefers the term 
Chinese state capitalism, and makes the distinction between the varieties of state-led 
capitalism. Chinese state-led capitalism is conceived in this study as akin to the concept 
sino-capitalism or capitalism with unique Chinese cultural characteristics (Amin 2013; 
Cai 2012; McNally 2012; Xing and Shaw 2013). One of the features of the Chinese 
model includes employing neomercantilist strategies in important sectors such as the 
agri-food and energy sectors (Taylor 2014).  
State capitalism is intrinsically linked to the notion of economic nationalism and 
neomercantilism — that has long been premised on notions of wealth-as-power — and 
considers a favourable balance of trade as essential to national economic strength. It not 
surprising, then, to find that neomercantilism has distinct national security dimensions. 
This tradition in political economy draws on the significant work of scholars such as 
Thomas Mun, Alexander Hamilton and Fredrick List in providing a substantive critique 
and alternative perspective to economic liberalism. Graz (2004) identifies a type of 
‘transnational mercantilism’ emerging in the contemporary global trading order. 
Adopting a critical IPE approach, Graz (2004: 611) argues: 
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‘Mercantilist’ thinking allows us to reconceptualise the politics of trade by reference to 
three major claims: the articulation between the economic and political spheres, the 
intimate connection between domestic and international realms, and the embeddedness of 
trade policy within broader political economy concerns. The concrete manifestations of 
these categories and their relations are not given but socially and historically produced. 
 A historically contextualised understanding of mercantilism — past and present — has 
much to offer agri-food scholars in seeking to comprehend the socio-political and 
economic contours of the contemporary global food system. The mercantilist tradition 
in political economy highlights the dynamic interplay between socio-political and 
economic spheres, and the interconnections between domestic and international realms 
and the political economy of trade policy (Graz 2004). The contemporary revival of the 
mercantilist tradition in political economy can be traced to the work of eminent scholars 
such as Joan Robinson (1978) on ‘the new mercantilism’. In order to discuss the 
concept of neomercantilism it is important to define what is meant by the term 
mercantilism. 
3.7.1 Mercantilism: historical context  
For 250 years from 1500, mercantilism informed almost all theories of political 
economy and economic policy. It was inextricably linked to historical milieu of 
commercial society emerging in Europe, colonialism and the earliest experiences of 
industrialisation (Levi-faur 1997; Magnusson 1993, 1994, 1995). Thomas Mun’s (1664) 
England’s Treasure by Forraign Trade made an important contribution to early 
mercantilist thought. Mun (1664) attributed England’s ascendancy and success in 
international trade relations to a ‘strong state’ capable of structuring the country’s 
commercial activities so as to produce continual trade surpluses. Imports were 
discouraged by the use of tariffs, quotas and subsidies (Levi-faur 1997). According to 
Perrotta (2014: 94), ‘Mun is unanimously considered as the main representative of 
mercantilist doctrine, both by the critics and by the advocates of that approach’. In 1622, 
Mun was appointed to the committee of the East India Company and later he was 
appointed the director of the company. As with many mercantilists, the protection of his 
own company’s interests was interwoven with his analysis for the benefit of the nation 
(Perrotta 1991, 2014). The East India Company played an important role in the first 
‘colonial’ food regime. Mun (1664) did not specifically use the term mercantilism in his 
work — the first reference to the term mercantilism appeared in print in 1763 in 
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Marquis de Mirabeau’s Philosophie Rurale as systeme mercantile (cited in Magnusson 
1994).  
The concept of mercantilism delineates a system of political and philosophical 
thought and economic policy as well as an epoch in the development of economic 
doctrines during the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries before the 
publication of Adam Smith’s (1776) seminal critique of mercantilism in The Wealth of 
Nations. Smith associated the term mercantilism with the body of economic ideas that 
placed prominence on gaining national wealth and prestige through international trade. 
The mercantile doctrine prescribed that favourable balance of trade — when more 
money is received than is paid out — was considered the only satisfactory condition of 
commerce (Magnusson 1993, 1994, 1995). The establishment and maintenance of such 
a favourable balance was considered not only the responsibility of individual merchants 
and private enterprises, but also the central obligation of the government (Hont 2005; 
Perrotta 1991). This economic policy regime was typified by direct state intervention in 
markets in order to protect domestic merchants and manufacturers. At the core of this 
economic doctrine was the ‘positive balance of trade theory’ — essentially, a doctrine 
that demarcated that a country must export more than it imported and have a net trade 
surplus that would lead to an in-flow of gold bullion and increase national wealth.  
The German historical school depicted mercantilism as state building in a broad 
sense — advocating the active role of the state in economic modernisation and growth 
(Magnusson 1994). In the nineteenth century, influential thinkers associated with the 
German historical school contributed to the development of the concept of economic 
nationalism and mercantilist thought. One influential thinker who has been associated 
with this school of thought was Friedrich List (1841). List (1841) insisted that he was 
not a classical mercantilist and was careful to differentiate himself and his work from 
classical mercantilist scholars like Mun (1664). Nonetheless, many contemporary IPE 
scholars consider List’s (1841) National System of Political Economy to be a pivotal 
text in the tradition of economic nationalism (O’Brien and Williams 2011; Ravenhill 
2014). List promoted various forms of national protectionism as a system to secure state 
autonomy in the global political economy. Strategic protectionism was employed to 
develop and defend the national economy. It involved utilising the state apparatus to 
place tariffs or quotas on imports, nurture strategic domestic industries, support 
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industrialisation and raise the productivity of labour to close the productivity gap and 
enable exports to be more internationally competitive (Magnusson 1994). The aim of 
List’s scheme was to address the historical legacy of uneven development, rather than 
allow emerging and developing economies to be subsumed, exploited and subordinated 
in the international system.  
List’s (1841) work has implications for comprehending the colonial food regime 
(the first food regime) under British hegemony. Britain maintained a mercantilist 
agricultural policy in the form of the Corn Laws until these protectionist laws were 
repealed in 1846 (Polanyi 1944). List argued that institutionalised free trade was only 
pursued by Britain in the middle of the nineteenth century once it was able to dominate 
world markets in tradeable goods and commodities. This was largely due to Britain’s 
colonial expansion and exploitation of the working class, rapid industrialisation and 
advanced level of economic development that had provided it with productivity 
advantages and enabled it to dominate international trade. It was only after acquiring a 
dominate position in the international system and international trade that Britain became 
an advocate of free market ‘liberal’ capitalism (Chang 2008; Ervine and Fridell 2015). 
The strategic rationale of Listian protectionism was to create a structural transformation 
towards a more even playing field in the global political economy so that no one state, 
or several powerful states, could consistently dominate international markets and trade 
as a consequence of structural or competitive advantages obtained early (protected) 
development (Ravenhill 2014). While List (1841) did not consider himself a classical 
mercantilist, his work has been influential in the emergence and evolution of the neo-
Listian ‘development state’ in East Asia and the Chinese model of state-led capitalism 
that is discussed in detail in next chapter (Breslin 2007: 22). Chinese scholars like Han 
Deqiang (2000) have argued that China ‘needs a new political economy that rejects free 
market liberalism, and follows the strong state model championed by List’ and 
modelled on German and Japanese models of industrialisation (cited in Breslin 2007: 
22).  
List was exiled from native country Germany and spent time in the US. While 
exiled in the US, List was influenced by the work of Alexander Hamilton and others. 
List’s (1841) work was influential for many industrial planners during German and 
Japanese industrialisation (Breslin 2007). List’s work became synonymous with infant 
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industry protectionism, which was implemented by newly industrialising economies in 
the twentieth century. The Listian (1841) scheme of national political economy has 
significant implications for understanding the transition from the first to the second food 
regime under the hegemony of the United States. Following the mercantilist principles 
of Alexander Hamilton, the United States was largely protectionist for the first centuries 
of its economic development. In the 1930s, after the Great Depression and the First 
World War, the United States increased protectionism, instituting the Smoot-Hawley 
Tariff (Chang 2008). It was only after the Second World War when the United States 
emerged as the preeminent economic power and global hegemon that it became the 
principal architect of a new liberal world economic order. This was instituted through 
the Bretton Woods agreement in 1944, with the establishment of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). GATT laid 
the groundwork for the eventual emergence of the WTO and to the supposed emergence 
of a WTO-led neoliberal/corporate food regime (McMichael 2013a). 
The legacy of Listian protectionism was evident in the second food regime and 
arguably endures in an emergent third food regime, with contemporary forms of 
mercantilism evident in the European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and 
the Farm Bill in the United States — legislation that contains significant subsidies to 
support the agri-food sector. Potter and Tilzey (2005) argue that there is a long tradition 
of neomercantilism within the CAP, dating from the institution of community 
preference and export subsidies as central instruments of policy during the early years 
of the CAP, and the 1970s, respectively. Advocates of neomercantilism in agricultural 
policy regard the function of the state as being to safeguard and underwrite the 
productive capacity and export potential of farmers (Potter and Tilzey 2005).  
3.7.1 New mercantilism: contemporary context 
Historically, mercantilism has played a constitutive role in the evolution of the various 
food regimes. Therefore, it is not unexpected to find that new forms of mercantilism 
continue to play a substantive role in the reconfiguration and transformation of the 
current global food system. While contemporary or new mercantilism differs 
considerably from its classical antecedent, there are some striking commonalities — 
these include the determination by states to pursue export-led economic growth and to 
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intervene in markets to attain political objectives and maximise national wealth 
(Robinson 1966; Stern and Wennerlind 2014). 
Neomercantilism offers an alternative paradigm that challenges the philosophical 
underpinnings of neoliberalism (Robinson 1966). Neomercantilism can be 
conceptualised as the contemporary pursuit of current account surplus and export-led 
economic growth (a persistent excess of exports over imports) with states utilising and 
manipulating markets to facilitate national wealth and power (Robinson 1966; Stern and 
Wennerlind 2014). Neoliberalism depicts ‘free markets’ and free trade as a ‘positive 
sum game’ with increasing prosperity for all, and it is underpinned by methodological 
individualism (Ervine and Fridell 2015). In stark contrast, neomercantilism is a state-
centric paradigm that is sceptical and wary of so-called free markets. It portrays market 
relations as potentially negative and exploitative: a ‘zero sum game’ in which some 
states and firms lose access to markets, wealth and power while others gain (O’Brien 
and Williams 2011).  
Neomercantilism can be conceptualised as a new form of economic nationalism 
— states seek to protect national interests and security and pursue political objectives 
through controlling the ‘commanding heights’, the largest and most strategic sectors of 
the global political economy, with the goal of trying to shape the mechanisms of 
national and global markets and secure global supply chains for strategic 
commodities, vital raw materials and natural resources including food, feed and fuel 
(Cho 2000; Rodrik 2013; Xu and Bahgat 2010). States craft economic policies to 
maximise national wealth and use their governmental apparatus to try to overcome, or at 
least limit, market outcomes that could constrain the development of national 
champions — key corporations and firms deemed central to the state’s power—and 
utilise SOEs and SWFs to gain privileged access to essential raw materials and markets 
(Cho 2000; Xu 2009; 2012;  Xu and Bahgat 2010).  
3.8 The paradox of state-led capitalism and neomercantilism in the neoliberal 
corporate food regime 
The paradox of the emergence of state-led capitalism and neomercantilism in the global 
food system is that it both challenges and confirms the neoliberal corporate food 
regime. Arguably, this apparent contradiction is consistent with the internal 
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contradictions of neoliberalism (Brohman 1995; Chang 2008; Harvey 2005; McNally 
1998; Polanyi 1944). Polanyi (1944: 146) describes the inherent contradictions in 
economic liberalism in relation to the so-called ‘free market’, explaining that ironically 
‘the road to the free market was opened by and kept open by an enormous increase in 
continuous centrally organized and controlled interventionism’. Polanyi (1944) argues 
that laissez-faire is in fact a ‘utopia’ and has never really existed.11 According to 
Polanyi (1944), the free market mechanism was nothing if not planned, and required 
from its inception an enormous amount of continuous state intervention in the market to 
ensure its stability and continuity. 
This Polanyian argument finds support in Ervine and Fridell’s (2015) recent analysis 
of the myth of free trade and alternative approaches to trade, politics and power. Chang 
(2008) also articulates this paradox as a form of ‘organized hypocrisy’ in his seminal 
work on the myth of free trade, arguing that while states in the Global North — in 
particular the United States and European Union (EU) — have often advocated ‘free 
trade’ in food and agriculture and neoliberal policies through the WTO they have rarely 
practised such a doctrine. Rather, at a national level they have often practised a not-so-
subtle form of protectionism and neomercantilism with large subsidies for the national 
agri-food sector and agri-food corporations in the form of the US Farm Bill and the EU 
CAP. As Pritchard (2009: 302) indicates:  
Seen through the world-historical prism of food regimes analysis, the period from the 
inception of the Uruguay Round in 1986 until the Seattle meeting of 1999 represents a 
global politics of food in which elite northern interests strategized to create and use the 
WTO as a tool to preserve their own subsidy regimes, while at the same time enforcing 
liberalization on the rest of the world. 
The US Farm Bill system subsidised ‘large-scale producers and downstream 
processors, rather than serving the interests of farm families’ (Pritchard 2009: 300). 
From the perspective of countries in the Global South, this protectionist system of 
subsidies in the US agri-food sector undermined the lives and livelihoods of domestic 
farmers and food producers and increased food insecurity. Food producers and farmers 
in the Global South were forced to compete with subsidised cheap imports in domestic 
                                                
11 The French term laissez-faire literally means ‘let do’, or broadly translated, means ‘let [them] act’. The term also generally 
implies ‘leave it alone’. It is a doctrine that extols ‘free trade’ and essentially opposes all forms of regulation of the market 
mechanism, including any restrictions on labour, land or money. The doctrine of laissez-faire is intrinsically intertwined with the 
classical notions of economic liberalism (Blyth 2002; Polanyi 1944; 1947). 
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markets and subsidised exports in global markets, which restricted their capacity to 
compete on global export markets (Pritchard 2009; Rosset 2006). From a critical IPE 
perspective, it is important to reflect on Strange’s (1986, 1988, 1991) insightful maxim: 
‘In whose interests or ‘who benefits’? In other words, who are the principal beneficiaries 
of the US Farm Bill subsidy system? Rosset (2006) points out that domestic farmers in 
the US are not the principal beneficiaries of the subsidy scheme; in fact, farmer incomes 
in the US have been declining due to low commodity prices. According to Rosset 
(2006: xv):  
The US touts the benefits and professes the obligations of ‘free trade’, while at the same 
time scheming to continue subsidy programs to keep the US farm economy functioning in 
the face of disastrously low commodity prices for farmers…US farmers take the rap as 
being ‘subsidised’, while it is actually the corporations buying cheap commodities that reap 
the benefits of the US subsidy scheme and of further trade liberalisation.  
This critical analysis of the US subsidy scheme known at the US Farm Bill has 
important implications for the analysis presented in Chapter 5 of the state-led rice 
pledging subsidy scheme in Thailand. Akin to the US subsidy scheme, the Thai rice 
pledging scheme claimed to benefit rice producers and farmers; however, the main 
beneficiaries were the large rice exporting companies and rice millers — many of whom 
had links to the ruling political party and business elites in Bangkok. Paradoxically, 
instead of supporting livelihoods and reducing inequality for small-scale and peasant 
rice farmers as proposed, the scheme has routinely reproduced enduring social 
inequalities, and increased the hardships faced by rural rice farmers. Ironically, the 
scheme exacerbated food insecurity by stockpiling mountains of rice, much of which 
was destined to simply rot in government warehouses. The rice pledging subsidy 
scheme will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5. 
Both the US and Thai state-backed subsidy schemes provide interesting examples of 
varieties of state-led capitalism in agri-food sectors, and neomercantilist agricultural 
policies in both the Global North and the Global South. In both cases, the main 
beneficiaries of the state-led subsidy scheme have been large agri-food corporations, 
rather than small-scale farmers. The same large corporate actors that benefit from state-
led capitalism in domestic markets are also the major beneficiaries of agricultural 
liberalisation in international markets. Returning to the opening argument presented at 
the beginning of this section, these examples of state-backed agri-food subsidy schemes 
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appear to lend support to the proposition that state-led capitalism and neomercantilism 
in the agri-food sector both contradict and reaffirm a neoliberal corporate food regime.  
While there is some substantive academic literature on neomercantilist agricultural 
policies in the Global North, there is little literature to date that examines state 
capitalism and neomercantilism in China’s agri-food sector and the role of Chinese 
SOEs in restructuring the regional and global food system (OECD 2015). State-led 
capitalism and neomercantilism are having a profound transformative effort on the 
global food system, with SOEs and SWFs becoming increasing significant and powerful 
actors in the global agri-food, feed, fuel and finance complex. Since the Global 
Financial Crisis of 2008, SOEs have become important sources of international 
investment in emerging economies. Emerging markets in the Middle East and East 
Asia, as well as resource-rich industrialised countries such as Norway, have become 
increasingly active international investors (Bazoobandi 2014). In 2007, when annual 
flows of foreign direct investment by multinational enterprises reached a record US$2 
trillion, state-owned enterprises accounted for only 3–4 per cent of international mergers 
and acquisitions (OECD 2015). By 2009, state-owned enterprises accounted for 20 per 
cent of international mergers and acquisitions (OECD 2015).  
Much of the critical agri-food literature to date has focused on the neoliberal 
characteristics of the corporate food regime. However, this literature has often 
overlooked the nuances in varieties of capitalism in East Asia, largely ignoring the rise 
of state capitalism and neomercantilism. There are some important and notable 
exceptions, such as the classic study by Prasartset (1979) of state capitalism in 
Thailand’s development process from 1932–1959, and the seminal study by Burch et al. 
(1994) that investigated the relationship between the state and agribusiness and 
examined the role of the Thai state in promoting a ‘contract farming system’ and 
export-oriented agriculture. There is also the pioneering study of Japan’s dairy sector 
restructuring by Pritchard and Curtis (2004). Pritchard and Curtis (2004: 177) argue the 
East Asian agri-food regime departs strongly from neoliberal ideals with the ‘highly 
visible hand of the state’ intervening in agri-food markets to achieve domestic goals of 
food security. Pritchard and Curtis (2004: 177) contend:  
Asian agro-food markets depart strongly from neoliberal ideals. Traditionally, East Asian 
agro-food regimes have been dominated by extensive state institutional activity. 
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Governments have implemented highly protectionist policies for the stated domestic goals 
of addressing food self-sufficiency and security, the need to protect the social and economic 
position of small farms, and the maintenance of rural cultures for reasons of national 
identity. And whereas these policies have been challenged in recent years through the 
imperatives of WTO compliance and the implementation of structural adjustment programs 
following the 1997 Asian economic crisis, much of their broad character and thrust remains 
intact. 
The concept of a global neoliberal/corporate food regime does not properly account 
for the agri-food sector in the East Asian region, nor does it capture the unique 
historical and cultural context of the region. Many states in the East Asian region, 
including China and Thailand, employ state-led capitalist and neomercantilist strategies 
in the rice sector. This argument will be outlined in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5 in 
case studies of the political economy of rice and food insecurity in China and Thailand. 
Chapter 4 outlines state capitalism with Chinese characteristics in the agri-food sector. 
It provides a detailed study of COFCO, China’s largest SOE in the agri-food sector. 
Chapter 5 discusses Thai state capitalism in the agri-food sector with a detailed study of 
the state-led rice pledging subsidy scheme. One case study focuses on Northeast Asia 
(China) and the other on Southeast Asia (Thailand). Together, these case studies 
provide insights into the political economy of rice and, more broadly, the political 
economy of the East Asian food system. These case studies reveal some of the contours 
of the ‘visible hand of the state’ intervening in national, regional and global agri-food 
markets to achieve the domestic socio-political and economic goals of national food 
security agendas.  
3.9 Conclusion  
This chapter has examined the presence of neomercantilism in an evolving global food 
regime. It is argued that the analytical contours of this emergent third food regime 
cannot be adequately understood without recognising the incipient importance of state 
capitalism and neomercantilism and how this paradigm shift is reshaping the dynamics 
of the global food system. This transition is typified by the proliferation of SOEs and 
SWFs that are intensifying the competition for natural resources across the globe. The 
concept of neomercantilism provides important insights into understanding the so-called 
changing contours of a third food regime. 
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It is also crucial to comprehend the constitutive role that mercantilism has played in 
the evolution of the first and second food regimes. This chapter has examined the 
emergence of neomercantilism and its role in the reconfiguration contemporary global 
food system. It is posited that neomercantilism both contradicts and reaffirms the 
neoliberal characteristics of the third food regime.12 An analysis of contemporary 
conjecture in the global food regime has been situated within the context of a transition 
to polycentric/multipolar global food, feed, fuel and finance complex. This transition is 
characterised by the rise of the BRICS, and the advent of state capitalism and 
neomercantilism with the subsequent proliferation of SOEs and SWFs. 
In Chapter 4, a case study of China will investigate the dynamics of the proliferation 
of SOEs and SWFs and their emergent role in securing global supply chains of food, 
feed and fuel through the acquisition foreign land and natural resources. Chapter 4 will 
analyse how China’s largest state-owned food company, COFCO, is reshaping the 
global food system. 
                                                
12 As mentioned earlier in section 3.5, this contention is supported by McMichael’s (2013a: 48) 
arguments in his seminal article; however, it differs in the way that neomercantilism is conceptualised and 
its relationship to state-led capitalism which is not discussed in detail in McMichael (2013a) article. 
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4 The political economy of rice and food insecurity in China 
4.0 Introduction  
This chapter opens with a discussion of the historical and cultural origins and 
importance of rice in China. The following section provides an analysis of the 
contemporary food insecurity in China. After many years of pursuing a policy of 
national self-sufficiency in rice, China has recently become a major importer of grains 
and vegetable oils. In the context of increasing ecological degradation, some scholars 
contend that China is increasingly food insecure. Comprehending these emergent food 
insecurities is crucial to an understanding of state-led capitalism with Chinese 
characteristics and nascent neomercantilist strategies in the agri-food sector — 
including rice. While the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) is pursuing varied degrees 
of economic liberalisation in some agri-food sectors, it is implementing new forms of 
mercantilism in some strategic commodity sectors, including rice, due to the perceived 
linkages between rice, socio-political stability and national food security. The 
succeeding sections examine the role of China’s largest state-owned food company, 
COFCO, and its emergent role in the global food system. COFCO plays a central role is 
the entire rice commodity chain in China —including, production, processing, 
distribution, and exports and imports. In the final sections of the chapter, the dynamics 
of COFCO’s evolving role in securing global supply chains of food, feed and fuel will 
be analysed. 
The argument advanced in this chapter is that recent acquisitions by China’s largest 
state-owned agri-food companies and grain traders need to be comprehended — not just 
in the context of profit maximising — but also in the milieu of the CCP’s domestic food 
security considerations. Arguably, the Chinese Government is utilising its influence in 
its largest state-owned agri-food company and grain trader, COFCO, to ensure national 
food security by directly securing global grain and food supplies. In doing so, China is 
pragmatically reducing its reliance on imports of grain from international grain traders 
and is reconfiguring the relations of power in both the grain trade and the broader global 
food system. The implications of this restructuring of the contemporary global food 
system for the nascent third food regime will be discussed in the final section. 
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4.1 The historical context: rice domestication in China 
There is much scholarly debate about the historical origins of rice domestication, yet the 
prominence of rice as a staple food and cultural symbol in the development of the 
Chinese civilisation is well recognised in scholarly literature (Fuller 2011; Guedes 
2011). The earliest forms of rice cultivation can be charted from two directions: one 
from domestication in India and the other from domestication in China — ‘with 
selection for domestication traits in early Yangtze japonica and a non-domestication 
feedback system inferred for proto-indica’ (Guedes 2011; Fuller 2011: 78). The 
prolonged development of domestication methods ‘finished around 6,500–6,000 years 
ago in China and about two millennia later in India, when hybridization with Chinese 
rice took place’ (Fuller 2011: 78). Afterwards, farming populations growing 
domesticated rice developed and enlarged by migration and integration of pre-existing 
populations (Fuller 2011). Archaeologists such as Fuller (2011) have studied the origins 
of the domestication of rice and posit that rice was central Chinese civilization and 
many of the civilizations of East Asia. According to Fuller (2011: 78, 89):  
Rice is central to the civilizations of monsoon Asia in two senses. For many Anglo-
American archaeologists and anthropologists, ‘civilization’ refers to hierarchical, complex 
societies of states and rice has been part of agricultural production of most of these from the 
Ganges to the Mekong to China’s central plains…Other anthropologists, such as those from 
the French Maussian tradition, use civilization in the sense of a larger regional shared core 
of cultural ideas, within which many states and smaller societies may be grouped…There 
can be no doubt that the civilizations of Asia have histories in which rice has been a key 
component, both as staple foodstuff and as salient cultural symbol. 
Akin with Fuller (2011), scholars such as Guedes (2011: 104) asserts that ‘Southwest 
China played a pivotal role in the spread of agriculture across East and Southeast Asia’. 
The domestication of rice and millet had ‘important consequences for spurring 
population growth, facilitating expansion into new territories and the development of 
social complexity’ (Guedes 2011: 104). For many centuries, rice has played a 
significant role as a staple food, and cultural symbol, and has long historical links to 
politics and power in China.  
4.2 Contemporary food insecurity in China 
The Chinese interpretation or equivalent of ‘food security’ is liangshi anquan — in 
relation to official policy, this word is generally referred to as ‘grain security’ (Zhang 
2011a: 78). Hence, rice and grain security epitomises food security in China. China is 
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the world’s largest consumer of soy, rice, and wheat. China consumes 25 per cent of the 
world’s soybeans, 20 per cent of the world’s corn and 16 per cent of the world’s wheat 
(Morton 2012). China has recently become a major importer of grains and vegetable 
oils. After many years of pursuing a policy of national self-sufficiency in rice, it became 
a net importer of rice in 2011 (Timmer 2013). China is also the leading importer in the 
world of palm oil, and has been importing rice from Vietnam and Thailand (Timmer 
2013). Some scholars take a longer-term perspective, arguing that China is increasingly 
food insecure. As Zhang (2011a: 79) affirms, ‘the importance of grain to the Chinese 
can never be overemphasised. Self-sufficiency of grain supply is vital for China’s 
liangshi anquan’. National indicators that measure the key sources of agricultural 
production — land, water, and labour — suggest that the task of sustaining self-
sufficiency in the future will be enormously challenging. The Chinese are consuming 
less grains and vegetables and more meats, seafood, eggs, fruits and diary (Zhang 
2011a). A momentous challenge facing the CCP and the Chinese people is finding 
sustainable methods of feeding 22 per cent of the global population on less than 9 per 
cent of the world’s cultivated land (Morton 2012).  
CCP modelling has predicted that a minimum of 120 million hectares of agricultural 
land is required to protect national food security and feed the population. For planning 
purposes, the Chinese Government has instituted a red line policy, outlining that 1.8 
million mu (120 million hectares) of arable land represents a critical red line, below 
which producing enough food to meet the demands of a rising population will arguably 
not be possible (Zhang 2011a, 2011b; Morton 2012). This is a major concern for the 
CCP. According to some scholars, China’s arable land is in a rapid state of decline. 
Between 1996 and 2007, the total area of arable land declined almost 7 per cent from 
1.951 million mu (130 million hectares) to 1.826 million mu (121.7 million hectares) 
(Zhang 2011b; Morton 2012). Taking into account population growth of roughly 7.3 per 
cent during the same time, arable land per capita declined by approximately 14 per cent. 
As a consequence of natural disasters, urbanisation, severe ecological degradation and 
environmental pollution, around two-thirds of available land in China is now classified 
as either barren or with low agricultural potential (Morton 2012).  
To feed its 1.3 billion population, China is already facing a great challenge of land 
scarcity. China suffers from serious land degradation, with more than 40 per cent of its 
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land area increasingly affected by soil degradation, salinisation and desertification 
(Chen 2007). Increasing concern over land scarcity expressed in terms of soil 
availability for agricultural production has worsened due to rapid population growth and 
accelerated urbanisation and industrialisation over the past two decades (Chen 2007). A 
rapidly urbanising China faces intensified resource scarcity and environmental 
degradation. The process of urbanisation is dependent on a steady supply of natural 
resources, including fresh water, fuel, land, food and all the raw materials (Chen 2007).  
Concerns over impacts of acid deposition on soil quality have emerged since the 
1980s. Due to both lower buffering capacity and higher precipitation acidity, soils 
distributed in south and Southeast China are much more subject to acidification and 
associated damage. According to a report released by the Ministry of Land and 
Resources (MLR), the total cultivated land area in China shrank by 2.01 per cent in 
2003 over the previous year to 123.4 million (Chen 2007). Now only 12.8 per cent of 
total national terrestrial surface is available for agricultural production. It is estimated 
that between 1996 and 2006, China lost 6.5 per cent of its total arable area. This loss in 
good arable land is expected to continue, with total crop land expected to decline from 
135 million hectares in 2003 to 129 million in 2020 (Chen 2007). 
Water scarcity made worse by the effects of climate change further constrains 
China’s capacity to increase agricultural productivity. The Chinese Government predicts 
that water scarcity in the north will worsen in the future as the effects of climate change 
become more pronounced (Zhang 2011a, 2011b). According to the Ministry of Water 
Resources, in 2010, drought led to grain losses of around 16.8 billion kilograms 
(equivalent to 3 per cent of total annual grain output) (Morton 2012). China is the 
world’s largest consumer of grains and expectations are that it will need to import more 
to make up for predicted losses associated with climate change. 
In essence, China’s foreign farmland acquisition strategy is motivated by the 
Government attempting to maximise its options for the country’s long-term food 
supply. In fact, food is starting to rank highly, alongside energy and minerals, in 
China’s overall outward investment strategy (Zhang 2011b; Ping 2008). 
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4.3 State capitalism, neomercantilism and the role of SOEs in reshaping the global 
food system 
In recent decades, China has adopted various market-orientated economic reforms. This 
began in 1978, with Deng Xiaoping initiating what are now referred to as the Deng 
Reforms, which supported his vision of a modernised China (Chan et al. 2007; Cia 
2012; Huang 2008). During the leadership of then-premier Zhu Rongji in the 1990s, 
China began reforming its SOEs. ‘Grasp the large, release the small’ was the rally-call, 
and thousands of the weaker SOEs were either privatised and listed on the stock 
exchange, or eliminated, with millions of workers losing their jobs (He 2014: 3; Hou 
2013).13 The opening of China to foreign trade and investment, with 2001 entry into the 
WTO, was significant, with China agreeing to undertake various reforms to enhance 
transparency and comply with international standards (Huang 2008). Private enterprise 
has been allowed, and Chinese firms are now listed on foreign stock exchanges (Coy 
2012). Despite these reforms, there is still significant government intervention in the 
economy. The Chinese Government does not purport to be capitalist, instead officially 
referring to the state as a ‘socialist market economy’. However, many scholars refer to 
China’s political economy as an exemplar of state-led capitalism with unique Chinese 
cultural characteristics (Bremmer 2010; Chan et al. 2007; Chu 2010; Hou 2013; Huang 
2012; Lin 2013; Szamosszegi 2011; Wooldridge 2012; Yi-Chong 2012; Xing and Shaw 
2013). Drawing on Huang’s (2008) influential work, Cai (2012: 216) contends: 
In the 1980s, China moved toward a form of entrepreneurial capitalism marked by rural 
policy bias, financial liberalization, and security of proprietors. In the 1990s, China 
switched to state-led capitalism marked by substantial urban bias, massive infrastructural 
investment, and preference for large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and foreign direct 
investment (FDI) over indigenous capitalists. 
In China, SOEs have near monopolies in some sectors considered critical to 
economic stability and growth, such as the energy, telecommunications, transportation, 
and financial sectors. The selective protection of industries has facilitated the growth of 
China’s national champions (Cho 2000; Wooldrige 2012). China has the second highest 
                                                
13 It is important to note that land in China has been - to some extent - ‘commoditised’; however, it has 
not been necessarily ‘privatised’. The nature of land tenures in China is a complex issue that has 
important social, political, economic and ecological implications that are outside the scope of this thesis. 
For comprehensive coverage of this issue, refer to Breslin 2007; Chu 2010; Hou 2013; Xing and Shaw 
2013.   
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number of companies on the Fortune 500 companies’ list, with 59 of the listed 61 being 
SOEs. The number of Chinese companies included on the list has grown at an average 
rate of 25 per cent since 2005 (Lin 2013). Overall, there are roughly 100,000 SOEs in 
China, though many of them are smaller entities, such as retailers and restaurants that 
are owned by provinces or cities and compete with private sector firms (Szamosszegi 
2011; Yi-Chong 2012). Critics complain that SOEs receive preferential treatment by 
state-owned banks and are the recipients of a host of subsidies and tax breaks, paying 
dividends at levels well below those of competitors. 
The largest state-owned companies also have ‘implicit advantages’, because of their 
‘closeness to decision makers’ (Szamosszegi 2011; Yi-Chong 2012). There is an 
increasingly blurring distinction between Chinese firms that are public and those that 
claim to be private. Many companies do not disclose clear information on equity 
structures, which makes it difficult for outsiders to be precise about ownership. An 
apparently private company may be controlled by a state-owned, unlisted, parent 
company. In addition, there is likely to be significant state influence over strategic 
private firms, as private companies may flourish because of their formal and informal 
links to key state agencies. Such companies benefit from access to special credit lines, 
tax breaks, and possibly favourable interpretation of regulations and priority in 
allocation of key contracts (Cotula 2012; Li 2008; Szamosszegi 2011;  Xu 2012). 
4.4 China’s state-owned agri-food companies go global 
China’s large SOEs, such as China State Farms Agribusiness Corp, Jiangsu 
Agribusiness Group and China–Africa Agriculture Investment Co, have already carried 
out major agricultural projects in Africa. Chinese SOEs have acquired large amounts of 
farmland in Southeast Asia, South America and Africa. Contrary to some public 
perceptions, the borderlines between the motivations driving private companies and 
SOEs or SWFs are not clear-cut (Cho 2000). The Chinese case illustrates how the 
boundaries between state and non-state enterprises may be blurred. There are two 
aspects to this discussion: state ownership and state influence (Cotula 2012; Li 2008; 
Xu 2012). In China, corporations emerging from the centrally planned economy such as 
the China National Cereals, Oils and Foodstuffs Import and Export Company (COFCO) 
  
83 
are clearly state-owned enterprises: senior staff members are appointed by the state, and 
chief executive officers have ministerial-level ranks (Chu 2010).  
COFCO is China’s largest state-owned agri-food company, and is China’s largest 
food processor, manufacturer and trader, with estimated assets worth US$57 billion 
(COFCO 2014). It can trace its origins to 1949 and the founding of the North China 
Foreign Trade Company in Tianjin, China. In September 1949, the company set up 
several specialised companies, such as North China Grains Company, North China Oils 
Company, North China Eggs Company, North China Pig Bristles Company, North 
China Fur Company and North China Local Product Company. COFCO is one of the 
largest SOEs of the 49 directly administrated by China’s State Council. Between 1952 
and 1987, it was the sole agricultural products importer and exporter operating under 
direct control of the central government (COFCO 2014). 
Besides the foodstuff business, COFCO has developed into a diversified 
conglomerate. COFCO is an investment holding company that specialises in trade and 
processing of oil and foodstuffs, with a fully integrated global agri-food supply chain, 
processing capabilities, manufacturing, logistics and distribution channels. It plays a 
strategic role in the agri-food markets in edible oils and foodstuffs, which includes oils 
and oilseeds, corn, wheat, rice, wine, tomatoes, dairy products, meat, barley, tea, 
chocolate and various other products (COFCO 2014). The company plays a central role 
in the entire process, from cultivation to the distribution of final food products — and 
from farm or field to the plate. The company serves as the main importing and 
exporting channel for bulk agricultural products such as wheat, corn, rice and sugar. 
COFCO is also involved in the development of real estate, hotels, non-grain bio-energy, 
packaging, finance and other industries (COFCO 2014). Its financial services include a 
commodity futures brokerage, a regional bank and an insurance venture with London-
based Aviva Plc (COFCO 2014). COFCO has four companies listed in Hong Kong; 
namely, China Foods, China Agri-Industries Holdings, Mengniu Dairy and COFCO 
Packaging Holdings; and three companies listed in mainland China — COFCO Tunhe, 
COFCO Real Estate and BBCA (COFCO 2014). 
COFCO is an interesting example of an SOE acquiring private companies in China. 
In 2009, COFCO purchased Mengniu Diary, the biggest player and a ‘star’ company in 
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the dairy industry in China. Also in 2009, COFCO absorbed Wugudaochang, a 
significant player in the industry of instant noodles. At the end of 2009, COFCO bought 
Maverick Food Company, a meat supplier (COFCO 2014). In 2013, COFCO acquired 
Longping Hitech, an important firm in the crop seeds industry (COFCO 2014). In 2014, 
COFCO invested US$3 billion in the acquisition of two food trading companies — 
Noble Group’s agricultural products trading unit and Dutch grain trader Nidera. On 
February 28 2014, COFCO announced that it had purchased a 51 per cent stake in 
Dutch grain trader and seed developer Nidera (COFCO 2014). Nidera is a major 
international agribusiness and trading company with an annual turnover in excess of 
US$17 billion (COFCO 2014). On 30 September 2014, it followed up the purchase by 
taking a 51 per cent stake in Noble Agri Ltd., the agricultural processing and trading 
unit of Singapore-listed Noble Group Ltd (COFCO 2014).  
COFCO’s financial partner in the Noble deal was a diverse investment consortium 
consisting of: Chinese private equity firm Hopu Investment Management Co; Singapore 
state-owned asset manager Temasek Holdings Pte. Ltd; Standard Chartered’s private 
equity arm; and International Finance Corp, the for-profit investment arm of the World 
Bank (Silk and Yap 2014; Tsang 2014). COFCO provided 60 per cent of the funding for 
the Noble and Nidera investments, with the remaining 40 per cent financed by the 
investment consortium (Silk and Yap 2014; Tsang 2014). Noble Agri Ltd., is a 
company set up in 1998 to trade and process agricultural products such as grains and 
oilseeds, cotton, cocoa and sugar (Yun and Humber 2014). The two acquisitions created 
a platform for China to source food in the global market and also serve as a distribution 
channel for China’s food products to ‘go global’ (Tsang 2014; Yun and Humber 2014). 
These strategic acquisitions provide COFCO with access around the world to procure 
grain and acquire technological processes (Zhong 2015). Noble Agri’s operations 
include sugar mills in Brazil, soybean crushers in Argentina and grain silos in the 
Ukraine. This acquisition gives the company direct access to South American grain and 
oilseed supplies (Tsang 2014; Yun and Humber 2014). Nidera is mostly known for 
grain trading, but is also develops yield-boosting seed technology. COFCO planned to 
connect large grain-production areas, including those in South America and the Black 
Sea region, to Asia, the world’s largest food market (COFCO 2014; Zhong 2015). 
Gaoning Ning the Chairman of COFCO (cited in Zhong 2015:1) has stated: 
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Only more flexible ‘going global’ strategies can ensure China’s food security, as well as 
meet the rising demand of some countries for high-protein and nutritious food… Chinese 
agribusiness companies should be pioneers in advancing agricultural modernization. We 
cannot just rely on the old ways of expanding production. 
The company’s revenue was US$34 billion for 2012 (COFCO 2014; Silk and Yap 
2014). On an annual basis, its revenue level places it among the world’s largest 
agribusinesses in the world, ahead of the US’s Bunge Ltd., but still trailing Cargill Inc. 
and Archer Daniels Midland Co. (Silk and Yap 2014). COFCO’s strategic goal is to 
form a global food supply chain capable of challenging the dominance of the ABCD of 
the global commodity and grain trade — Archer Daniels Midland Co., Bunge Ltd., 
Cargill and Louis Dreyfus (Tsang 2014; Zhong 2015). The Nidera and Noble deals were 
the largest in China’s food industry and cap seven years of COFCO’s overseas 
expansion, as the company has attempted to build up its portfolio in everything from 
cooking oil to chocolate (Tsang 2014; Zhong 2015). The company’s wine-and-spirits 
division bought France’s Chateau Viaud in Bordeaux in 2011, having made its first 
overseas winery acquisition the year before with a US$18 million bid for Chile’s 
Biscottes (COFCO 2014; Silk and Yap 2014). 
It is important to note that COFCO has been building other overseas alliances, 
including partnerships in its pork operations with private-equity company KKR and in 
milk production with French dairy company Danone (COFCO 2014; Silk and Yap 
2014). COFCO is not alone — the Bright Food Company is China’s second largest 
state-owned food company. In 2012, Bright Food purchased a 75 per cent stake in 
Australia’s Manassen Food for more than US$500 million and a 51 per cent share in 
New Zealand’s dairy producer Synlait. In 2011, it offered US$1.2 billion for British 
company United Biscuits. It has also attempted to take over French yoghurt group 
Yoplait (COFCO 2014; Silk and Yap 2014; Tsang 2014).  
President Xi Jinping proposed two major economic initiatives in 2013 — the Silk 
Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road initiatives (Zhong 2015: 
1). These trade proposals are otherwise known as the Belt and Silk Road Initiatives: the 
purpose of renewing the two ancient trading routes and opening up further markets for 
trade with China (Zhong 2015: 1). COFCO intends to play a major role in these new 
economic trading initiatives. Ning the Chairman of COFCO, has stated that ‘even 
though the initiative is still in its early stages of development, it has strong implications 
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for many nations along the routes that count on agriculture and international 
agribusiness cooperation’ (Zhong 2015: 1). Ning (cited in Zhong 2015: 1) has indicated 
that ‘many countries along the routes are key global grain producers, and that COFCO 
will continue to seek investment and cooperation opportunities with them over the next 
five years’. Therefore, COFCO has a substantive role to play in the CCP’s goals to 
maximise trade and economic growth, in addition to objectives for the country’s long-
term food supply and national food security. As mentioned earlier in this section, It is 
apparent in the COFCO case study that food is starting to rank highly, alongside energy 
and minerals, in China’s overall outward investment strategy (Zhang 2011a, 2011b; 
Ping 2008). This has important implications for the global agri-food system.  
4.5 China’s state-led capitalism and neomercantilist strategies in the agri-food 
sector: restructuring the global food system and emergent third food regime 
The recent acquisitions by China’s largest state owned agri-food companies and grain 
traders need be comprehended in the context of China’s domestic food security 
considerations. Arguably, the Chinese Government is utilising its influence in its largest 
state-owned agri-food company and grain trader, COFCO, to ensure national food 
security by directly securing global grain and food supplies. In doing so, China is 
reducing its reliance on imports from international grain traders and is reconfiguring the 
relations of power in both the grain trade and the broader global food regime. It is 
crucial to note that, in 2004, the Chinese Government took the historic step of 
liberalising some aspects its grain market to international trade.  
China’s assentation to the WTO — and its gradual move towards restructuring and 
liberalising some aspects of its agri-food sector — demonstrate the highlighted paradox 
of state capitalism and neomercantilism in both challenging and conforming with the 
neoliberal dominance of an emerging third food regime. As stated in the previous 
chapter, this apparent contradiction is arguably consistent with the internal 
contradictions of neoliberal capitalism (Brohman 1995; Harvey 2005; McNally 1998; 
Polanyi 1944). This apparent paradox can be historically contextualised through a 
nuanced understanding of how states — both in the Global North and in the Global 
South — have long intervened in domestic agri-food markets to achieve socio-political 
and economic objectives (Chang 2008; Potter and Tilzey 2005). Returning to the 
arguments outlined in Chapter 3, scholars have asserted that a form of mercantilism or 
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agri-food protectionism is evident in the European Union’s CAP and the Farm Bill in 
the United States — legislation that contains significant subsidies to support the 
corporate agri-food sector (Chang 2008; Graz 2004; Potter and Tilzey 2005). For this 
reason, the agricultural liberalisation policies advocated by the WTO have long been 
contested by some states in the Global South as a form of ‘organised hypocrisy’ (Rosset 
2006). From this world-historical perspective, Chinese state-led capitalism and 
neomercantilism in the agri-food sector may be a newly-emergent paradigm in the 
global food system; however, it can also be situated historically within a global political 
economy that has long tradition of state-led intervention in agri-food markets.  
4.6 Conclusion  
This chapter has examined a case study of China and analysed how China’s largest 
state-owned food company, COFCO, is reshaping the global food regime. This chapter 
has contended that the recent acquisitions by China’s largest state owned agri-food 
companies and grain traders need to be comprehended — not just in the context of 
profit maximising, but also in the milieu of the CCP’s domestic food security 
considerations. Arguably, the Chinese Government is utilising its influence in its largest 
state-owned agri-food company and grain trader, COFCO, to ensure national food 
security by directly securing global grain and food supplies. In doing so, China is 
pragmatically reducing its reliance on imports of grain from international grain traders 
and is reconfiguring the relations of power in both the grain trade and the broader global 
food system. 
It has been argued that the analytical contours of this emergent food regime cannot 
be adequately understood without recognising the incipient importance of Chinese state 
capitalism and neomercantilism in the grains sector and how this paradigm shift is 
reshaping the dynamics of the global food system. China’s ascension to the WTO — 
and its gradual move towards restructuring and gradually liberalising some aspects of its 
agri-food sector — demonstrate that state capitalism and neomercantilism both 
contradict and reaffirm the neoliberal characteristics of a corporate food regime. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, from this world-historical perspective, state-led intervention in 
agri-food markets is not fundamentally new —rather, it has a long historical legacy in 
the global political economy, and was evident in the first and second food regimes.  
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5 The political economy of rice and food insecurity in Thailand 
5.0 Introduction  
Thailand provides a substantive contemporary example of state intervention in the rice 
market and the relationship between rice, politics and power in the region. Thailand is 
Southeast Asia’s second largest economy after Indonesia (Dawe et al. 2014). Prior to 
2012, Thai rice exports accounted for around one-third of global sales (Dawe et al. 
2014). The Thai Government’s intervention in the rice market to provide a political and 
social outcome exemplifies the notion of rice as more than merely an agricultural 
commodity. It demonstrates that rice has profound social significance, with deep 
cultural dimensions. 
The opening section explores these cultural dimensions and discusses the historical 
legacies of rice, politics and power in Thailand. The following section provides a 
historically contextualised analysis from a world-historical perspective of Thailand’s 
agri-food system in the first and second food regime. It also discusses the implications 
for Thailand of a nascent third food regime. The subsequent sections outline the 
political economy of rice and food insecurity in Thailand, as well as the impact of the 
Global Food Crisis of 2007–08. The succeeding section provides an analysis of the key 
stakeholders and structural power in the Thai rice industry. The final major section 
examines a case study of rice pledging subsidy scheme in Thailand, advancing the 
argument that this is an insightful example of state-led capitalism in the rice sector, with 
unique Thai socio-cultural characteristics. 
The story of Thailand’s state-backed rice pledging scheme is an insightful and 
complex narrative about the rise, fall and re-emergence of the world’s largest exporter 
of rice. It is also a compelling case study that explicates the dynamics of the political 
economy of rice in Thailand and the critical interconnections between rice, politics and 
power. This chapter historically situates this contemporary case study with a long 
history of the Thai state guaranteeing capital investment, and in attempting to mobilise 
peasant farmers to participate in commercial export-oriented agriculture.  
5.1 The historical legacies of rice, politics and power in Thailand 
Rice is estimated to have entered Thailand in the first millennium AD. The story of rice 
is intimately intertwined with the story of the Kingdom of Siam (Thailand), Thai culture 
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and civilisation (Falvey 2000; Hamilton 2003). Rice has an important religious, 
ritualistic and relational role in Thai society. From a religious perspective, rice is 
believed to embody a soul, and is worshiped as a symbol of a (female) deity or goddess. 
The deity is a maternal figure, known as ‘the rice mother’ or Mae Phosop (Hamilton 
2003). In Thailand, ‘rice is life’: it is an integral aspect of Thai culture and many 
people’s lived experiences. It is a central motif in folk songs and dance and the subject 
of various other arts, from poems to paintings and sculptures (Vanichanont 2004). The 
harvest rituals, symbolisms and mythology of rice have been central to the motif in the 
notion of social status, hierarchy and the supremacy of civilised cultures in Southeast 
Asia.14 The rituals and mythology of rice have played a crucial role in Thai society and 
the cultural political economy of Thailand for centuries (Hanks 1972). 
The rituals of cultivation, consumption and later the shipment and exportation of 
rice have long been intertwined with Thai politics and power — in particular, in relation 
to the Monarchy and the ruling elite and notions of legitimacy and authority in Thailand 
(O’Connor 1996). The Thai King has historically participated in harvest rituals and 
offerings to ensure a bountiful rice harvest. The symbolic significance of these rituals 
contributes to the popular perception of the Monarchy’s legitimacy, authority and right 
to rule. Rice plays a significant role as a staple food, cultural symbol, and resource for 
governance.15 In addition, rice is considered to be crucial to the understanding of 
humankind, including self-hood, kinship, and nation. It also informs an understanding 
of self and society in relation to nature (Hanks 1964; Hanks 1972; Ohnuki-Tierney 
1993). Rice has also been historically and culturally linked to socio-economic and 
political power. It has played a crucial role as a staple food and strategic resource for 
governance and nation building in Thailand through taxes levied on rice (Durrenberger 
1996; Falvey 2000). Comprehending rice in its historical, cultural, ritualistic, and 
                                                
14 O’Connor (1995) completed an anthropological study of two of Southeast Asia's neighbouring cultural groups, the Tai (one of the 
original cultural groups that would later comprise the Thai people) and Mon-Khmer. O’Connor’s (1995) findings indicated that the 
development of wet-rice agriculture and the resulting complex political and social structure required to sustain the irrigation system 
eventually resulted in Tai dominance over the Mon-Khmer. 
15 In the contemporary context, it is important to note that the Thai Government has a ‘Department of Rice’ that is part of the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives. In 2015, when the Deputy Director General of the Department of Rice in Thailand 
welcomed new staff, the welcome included sacred worship and offerings to Mae Phosop to ensure blessings on the new staff and the 
rice harvest (Rice Department 2015). This demonstrates the contemporary significance of these rituals.  
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relational contexts is crucial in any analysis and understanding of the contemporary role 
of rice in Thailand’s economy and politics. The contemporary political economy of rice 
is discussed later in the chapter.  
5.2 First food regime 
The integration of Thailand into the global agri-food system and economy has a long 
historical legacy. During the colonial period, under the first food regime or the 
‘colonial’ food regime, Thailand was encouraged to export agricultural commodities to 
meet world market demands (Bello et al. 1998). During this period, Britain was in 
search of cheap grains and raw materials for its colonies. 
In 1855, the King of Siam (Thailand), King Mongkut (Rama IV), signed the 
Bowring Treaty with Britain. The treaty spared the country from British military 
incursions and enabled Siam to avoid formally becoming a colony of the British 
Empire; however, the treaty enabled Britain to achieve certain commercial and political 
aims that earlier British missions had failed to gain — it lifted the restrictions imposed 
by the King of Siam on foreign trade, and enabled British subjects to trade in all ports 
and own land in Bangkok. In essence, the treaty opened up the Kingdom of Siam to 
Western influences and trade (Bello et al. 1998). The treaty put a 3 per cent duty ceiling 
on all exports, including rice. The treaty, in effect, imposed a ‘free trade’ policy on 
Siam and was maintained under the influence and coercion of British hegemony (Bello 
et al. 1998). This treaty facilitated and hastened the process of export-oriented 
commercialisation of agricultural production in Thailand, including export-oriented rice 
production (Bello et al. 1998). The treaty, in many ways, symbolised the unequal 
relations of power that characterised the first food regime. The treaty itself is a 
compelling historical exemplar of interconnections between rice, politics and power in 
Thailand.  
5.3 Second food regime 
After the Second World War, Thailand was co-opted into the second food regime under 
US hegemony. The industrial infrastructure of Europe needed to be rebuilt after the 
devastation of the Second World War. With the Soviet Union (USSR) occupying much 
of Eastern Europe — and concerned with containing the spread of Communism — the 
United States devised the Marshall Plan to provide the finances to rebuild and 
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(re)industrialise Western Europe (Ravenhill 2014). European agricultural production 
had been disrupted during the war, and Western Europe desperately needed grains. In 
particular, cheap food and grains were needed to feed the working class in the cities, 
urban centres and factories. 
Thailand expanded its plantations of certain agricultural commodities to meet these 
demands (Bello et al. 1998; Chiengkul 2015). This expansion occurred under the advice 
of the FAO in 1947 and was financed by the World Bank, which provided large loans to 
the Thai Government in 1952 to invest in the commercialisation of agricultural 
production and export-oriented agricultural infrastructure (Chiengkul 2015). The 
transformation of Thai agriculture and the Thai Government ’s agricultural policies after 
the Second World War were influenced by the discourses and practices of the Green 
Revolution. The discourses, technology and practices of the Green Revolution were 
strongly advocated by the United States and promoted by private institutions such as the 
Rockefeller and Ford Foundations (Bello et al. 1998).  
By the early 1950s, the structural transformation of the agri-food system in Thailand 
was intensifying as Thai agriculture and rice production became more integrated into 
the second food regime. In 1953, rice exports had become such a significant part of the 
Thai economy that revenues from rice exports represented 32 per cent of total annual 
government revenue (Bello et al. 1998). By the 1960s, rice production was expanded in 
the Chaopraya River Delta in the Central Plain, while mono-cropping of other strategic 
export cash crops was encouraged in the north-east (Chiengkul 2015). With loans from 
the World Bank, the Thai Government started to invest heavily in export-oriented 
agricultural infrastructure, such as large-scale irrigation projects that could help 
facilitate exporting rice and other key agricultural commodities to global markets.  
5.4 An emergent third food regime? 
The agri-food system in Thailand, like much of Southeast Asia, is being transformed 
and increasingly integrated into the contemporary global food system. The mainstream 
agri-food production–distribution practices in Thailand increasingly reflect many 
characteristics of the corporate/neoliberal agri-food production–distribution practices 
(Chiengkul 2012, 2013, 2015). A growing movement of peasant farmers and rural 
people are contesting and resisting mainstream agri-food practices and advocating for 
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sustainable social and agro-ecological modes of production–distribution, opposing these 
globalising processes and mainstream corporate/neoliberal agri-food production-
distribution practices (Chiengkul 2012, 2013, 2015; Rosset et al. 1999). In many ways, 
these opposing movements resemble Polanyi’s (1944: 76) concept of a ‘double 
movement’:  
While on one hand, markets spread all over the face of the globe and the amount of goods 
involved grew to unbelievable proportions, on the other hand a network of measures and 
policies was integrated into the powerful institutions designed to check the action of the 
market in relation to labor, land and money... a deep-seated movement sprang into being to 
resist the pernicious effects of a market-controlled economy. Society protected itself against 
the perils inherent in a self-regulating market system. 
Although corporate/neoliberal agri-food production–distribution practices and 
markets are spreading throughout Thailand, a network of actors and institutions have 
formed a ‘deep-seated movement’ that is contesting and resisting the global 
corporate/neoliberal agri-food regime and what are considered to be unsustainable 
industrialised production methods and advocating for traditional farming methods and 
sustainable social and agro-ecological modes of production–distribution (Chiengkul 
2012, 2013, 2015; Rosset et al. 1999).  
The Thai state has a long history of underwriting capital investment and in 
mobilising peasant farmers to participate in commercial export-oriented agriculture 
(Burch 1996; Burch et al. 1994; Goss and Burch 2001; Goss et al. 2000; Pritchard and 
Burch 2003). Historically, attempts have been made by the Thai state and agri-business 
to co-opt peasant farmers and rural people into the process of transforming the agri-food 
system towards a more commercial/industrial export-oriented agriculture; however, this 
has often been contested and resisted (Rosset et al. 1999). State-led capitalism in the 
agri-food sector in Thailand has a long and complex history. For example, Burch et al. 
(1994) investigated the relationship between the state and agribusiness and examined 
the role of the Thai state in promoting a ‘contract farming system’ and export-oriented 
agriculture. State-backed capitalism in the rice sector will be discussed in more detail in 
the later part of this chapter. Firstly, it is important to outline the political economy of 
rice and food insecurity in Thailand.  
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5.5 The political economy rice and food insecurity in Thailand  
Rice is essential to food security and the lives and livelihoods of farmers in Thailand. 
Rice is a crucial staple in the Thai diet — the average annual rice consumption is 133 
kilograms of milled rice per person (GRiSP 2013). In relation to livelihoods, the 
agricultural sector contributes 12 per cent to total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the 
country and employs 42 per cent of the total workforce (GRiSP 2013). Hence, a large 
share of the population still depends on the agricultural sector for their income and 
livelihoods. Another important aspect of the political economy of Thailand is that the 
economy is heavily export dependent — exports, including rice, account for half the 
GDP of the country (GRiSP 2013).  
Thailand is not only one of the world’s largest rice producers: it was the world’s 
largest rice exporter in 2014 (Suwannakij 2014). Since the 1980s, Thailand has 
consistently been the world’s largest exporter of rice. Thai rice production has increased 
from 22 million tonnes in 1995 to about 32 million tonnes in 2010 (GRiSP 2013). Thai 
rice exports have grown from around 6.2 million tonnes in 1995 to 10.6 million tonnes 
in 2014 (Thai Rice Mills Association 2015). Thailand has the largest share of the 
international rice market, controlling approximately 30 per cent of the global market for 
rice (GRiSP 2013). Table 116, featured on the next page, indicates Thailand’s key rice 
export destinations and quantities from 2009 to 2014. 
                                                
16 It is acknowledged that the Philippines is incorrectly spelt in the original table in the ‘Destination’ 
column. 
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Table 1 Thailand’s rice exports: Key destinations and import quantities of 2009–14
Source: Thai Rice Mills Association (2015: 1). 
As outlined in Table 1, Benin and Nigeria are the largest importers of Thai rice, with 
each country importing over a million tonnes in 2014 — Benin imported 1,187,159 
million tonnes while Nigeria imported 1,057,941 million tonnes (Thai Rice Mills 
Association 2015). This is an indication of how dependent on rice imports these 
countries in Africa have become in recent years. 
Figure 1, featured on the next page, provides an FAO chart based of data of rice 
imports by region in 2014 and 2015. Figure 1 indicates that the African region is the 
largest importer of rice in 2014 and 2015, approaching 15 million tonnes of imported 
rice annually.  
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Figure 1 Rice imports by regions in 2014 and 2015 
  
Source: FAO (2015b: 1). 
The statistics are also indicative of a cultural shift in diet of many people in African 
countries towards consuming more calories from rice, which is a cheap staple food. 
Increased consumption of rice in Africa can be attributed to many factors, including the 
availability of affordable imports from Asia. In the East Asian region, China is a major 
importer of Thai rice, importing just over half a million (596, 281) tonnes of Thai rice in 
2014 (Thai Rice Mills Association 2015). China is a net importer of rice. Despite being 
the world’s largest producer of rice, China’s domestic consumption is greater than its 
production capacity (GRiSP 2013).  
Rice has the largest cultivation area among all crops in Thailand. The total rice 
planting area of Thailand, as of 2013, was 12,657 million hectares (Rice Department 
2015). Rice cropping in Thailand consists of five stages: land preparation, crop 
establishment, harvesting, post-harvesting (threshing, drying and cleaning) and storage 
(Thongrattana 2012). Irrigation infrastructure covers only 21.82 per cent of the entire 
agricultural area of the country, leaving 78.18 per cent of the area without irrigation 
(Arunrat and Pumijumnong 2015). Rice accounts for as much as 55–60 per cent of the 
country’s agricultural area, and most rice growing areas are in the north-eastern region 
of Thailand, which is very reliant on rainfall during the growing season (Isvilanonda 
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and Bunyasiri 2009). Normally, rice grown in irrigated areas in Thailand has a higher 
yield rate than rice grown in non-irrigated areas, where the harvest and yield depend 
predominantly on the amount of rainfall during the growing season (Clayton 2010).  
A recent study by Arunrat and Pumijumnong (2015) has indicated that 
environmental change and climate change will have a significant impact on rice 
production in Thailand, particularly in non-irrigated areas. The study revealed that 
change in weather patterns is one of the most influential factors, and could result in 
smaller amounts of rain falling in most of the regions in Thailand. The north-eastern 
region was found to be the most susceptible and vulnerable area to weather change, 
while the eastern and southern regions may be less affected (Arunrat and Pumijumnong 
2015). Beyond the ecological impacts, the study also investigated the socio-economic 
repercussions of climate change (Arunrat and Pumijumnong 2015). Essentially, the 
lives and livelihoods of small-scale rice farmers in the non-irrigated areas of the north-
eastern region — where most of Thailand’s rice is currently produced — are 
significantly vulnerable to climate change, particularly changes in weather and rainfall 
patterns. Overall, the study found that climate change would have a substantive socio-
economic impact on the lives and livelihoods of these producers (Arunrat and 
Pumijumnong 2015).  
These impacts will have important consequences in relation to food insecurity in 
Thailand, as well as social and political implications. Many of the so-called red shirt 
supporters of the former Prime Minister, Yingluck Shinawatra, and her Pheu Thai Party 
(and previously Thaksin Shinawatra's Thai Rak Thai Party) are based in the more rural, 
northern, region of the country: the area that produces most of the country’s rice, and 
the region most vulnerable to climate change (Arunrat and Pumijumnong 2015). As 
climate change affects the rice producing regions in the north, it is anticipated that there 
will be important political repercussions in the south. For example, in July 2015, a deep 
drought adversely affected the crucial rice-producing region of Bang Pla Ma district, in 
Suphanburi province, a two-hour drive north of Bangkok, Thailand, devastating local 
rice farmers. A news article by France-Presse (2015:1) in The Straits Times 
provocatively declared that, ‘Thailand’s vital rice belt is drying up’. Many peasant 
farmers had little choice but to go into debt due to the drought and loss of their vital 
incomes and livelihoods (France-Presse 2015). Some reports indicated that water levels 
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in reservoirs were at the lowest level recorded in the last two decades — with little to no 
rain. Rice paddy fields that would normally be covered in knee deep water were dry 
(France-Presse 2015). This is just one recent example of the potential for climate 
change and changes in weather patterns to have a substantive socio-economic impact on 
the lives and livelihoods of rice producers, particularly in the north. The social and 
political dynamics between the largely rural north and more urban south of the country 
are discussed in detail in the later part of this chapter, as they are critical for 
understanding the intersections between rice, politics and power in Thailand.  
5.6 Impact of the Global Food Crisis of 2007–08 on Thailand 
Historically, due to the integration of the national rice market with the global markets, 
domestic price movements in Thailand have correlated closely with global market 
prices for rice (Isawilanont and Santithamrak 2011; Chiengkul 2015). A comprehensive 
study of rice prices demonstrated that between 2003 and 2007, there was a strong 
correlation between domestic rice prices in Thailand and global rice prices (Dawe 
2008). This trend was disrupted during the Global Food Crisis of 2007–08, as global 
rice prices became increasingly unstable and volatile. In December 2007, global rice 
prices surged from an average of $378 per tonne to more than $700 per tonne by the 
end of March 2008. This international price spike had a significant impact on 
domestic rice prices (Dawe 2008). In Bangkok, domestic rice prices increased 17 per 
cent between January and February 2008 (Dawe 2008). By April 2008, domestic rice 
prices had risen to a record 17,000 baht ($550) per tonne, while rice export prices 
reached an unprecedented $1,038 per tonne in May 2008, after India and Vietnam 
implemented export restrictions (Richardson 2011). In response to the Global Food 
Crisis of 2007–08, the Thai Government intervened in the domestic rice market, paying 
above-market rates, and buying 5.4 million tonnes of rice to boost farmers’ incomes 
(Richardson 2011). 
An increase in rice prices, and rice price volatility, has a substantial effect on food 
insecurity across the country. In particular, there is a significant impact on low-income 
households and poor people in both the urban and rural areas of Thailand, who rely on 
rice as a core staple food (Dawe 2008). Spending on food accounts for around 30 to 50 
per cent of total household income across the country; however, approximately 20 per 
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cent of households in rural areas spend more than 80 per cent of their incomes on food 
(Chiengkul 2015). The affordability of rice is essential to ensuring food security in 
Thailand, as it is many parts of East Asia. A spike in domestic retail rice prices can have 
a dramatic impact on food insecurity, affecting the ability of low-income households, 
the poor and vulnerable to access this crucial staple food. 
5.7 The political economy of rice: key stakeholders and structural power in the 
Thai rice industry 
The Thai rice supply chain reflects a complex and dynamic interplay between various 
stakeholders: from rice producers, suppliers and millers, to manufacturers, distributers 
wholesalers, retailers and exporters (Thongrattana 2012). Of these, the three core groups 
of stakeholders in the Thai rice industry are the rice producers, the milling sector and 
the marketing sector (wholesalers, retailers and exporters) (Thongrattana 2012; 
Vanichanont 2004). An analysis of the unequal relations of power between the three key 
groups of stakeholders in the Thai rice industry is crucial for understanding ‘structural 
power’ and the concentration of power in the industry. 
5.7.1 Rice producers 
There are approximately 30 million rice producers in Thailand — this is a diverse group 
that includes both large-scale and small-scale farmers and their extended families 
(GRiSP 2013). These farmers employ a variety of production methods, from large-
scale, modern commercial farming with petrochemicals and fertilisers to small-scale 
plots utilising traditional agro-ecological methods of farming. Such traditional 
techniques have been used to produce rice for centuries. A large proportion of these 
farmers have low bargaining power with suppliers and customers (Thongrattana 2012; 
Vanichanont 2004).  
5.7.2 Milling sector 
The milling sector is the second important group of stakeholders in the Thai rice 
industry. This sector is comprised of a diverse group of approximately 800 to 1000 rice-
milling companies (Thai Rice Mills Association 2012). These companies range from 
small to medium enterprises mainly operating domestically and serving local customers, 
to large companies that serve international customers. Large companies wield 
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significant power in the rice trade through their mass distribution channels 
(Thongrattana 2012; Vanichanont 2004).  
5.7.3 Marketing sector (wholesalers, retailers and exporters) 
The third and most powerful group is the marketing sector, which encompasses 
wholesalers, retailers and exporters. This sector is highly concentrated and the large 
companies that dominate have considerable structural power in the industry. This 
structural power is derived from their high bargaining power relative to the rice farmers’ 
bargaining power, and ability to influence market (purchase) prices (Thongrattana 
2012). In comparison to the 30 million rice producers, it is estimated that there are only 
about 150–200 rice export companies in Thailand (Thai Rice Exporters Association 
2012). One example is Capital Rice Co. Ltd. (an affiliate of the STC Group, a Thai 
conglomerate of trading and manufacturing companies in the field of agro-industry). 
The company, which was established in 1977, accounts for about a fifth of Thailand’s 
rice exports. Capital Rice exports jasmine rice, white rice, parboiled rice and other 
varieties to Asia, Africa, America, Europe and the Middle East (FAO 2003). Many of 
the large wholesale, retail and export companies that dominate the rice trade in Thailand 
are owned by a handful of powerful families that have links to the ruling elite in 
Bangkok (Phongpaichit and Baker 2004). 
5.7.4 The concentration of power in the global rice trade 
Due the concentration of power in the rice industry, the economic benefits of higher 
international rice prices or export prices do not necessarily flow directly to domestic 
rice farmers in Thailand. While some rice farmers and producers do financially benefit 
from increased prices on international markets, these benefits are relatively small and 
proportionately less than the increase in export prices (Chiengkul 2015). In comparison, 
most of the financial gains and largest share of the profits are accrued by the 
intermediaries and large-scale companies operating in the rice milling and marketing 
sectors (Chiengkul 2015). According to Chiengkul (2015: 84): 
Rice mills and exporters had the lion’s shares of total profits in the late 2000s. Between 
2005 and 2008, rice mills and exporters’ profits amounted to around 73 to 77 percent of 
total profits of rice exports. Such distribution of profits is likely to be, at least partially, the 
result of monopolistic structures of the paddy and rice markets, as well as the result of the 
paddy-pledging scheme. In 2009, there were various news reports that rice mills often 
hoard rice to bargain for higher prices from exporters when international market prices 
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were expected to be higher. Such actions help to push up prices of rice in Thai domestic 
markets without yielding higher economic benefits to small-scale farmers. 
5.7.5 The social and political dynamics of the rural and urban south 
As mentioned earlier, the social and political dynamics between the largely rural north 
and the more urban south of the country are worthy of further analysis, as they reveal 
much about the politics of rice and state power in Thailand. Durrenberger (1996), an 
anthropologist working in the rural countryside of Thailand, critiqued the existing 
literature on Thai state power as too narrow — arguing it arose primarily from political 
scientists and economists working out of Bangkok. He was interested in understanding 
not just the centre of power — the elites in Bangkok — but also the periphery. He 
studied the people who live far from the centres of power in the rural countryside and 
highlands of Thailand. Durrenberger (1996) argued that by conducting research in sites 
situated in the periphery, researchers could gain a more accurate and inclusive 
understanding of Thai state power in its entirety and its relationship to local culture. He 
was particularly interested in the evolution of state power and its relationship with the 
local culture in the rural countryside and highlands of Thailand.  
Durrenberger (1996) contends that the complex relationship of power between the 
core and periphery should not merely be characterised by the simple narrative of the 
‘ruler and the ruled’ — the subordination of the ‘subjects’ in the countryside to the 
hegemony of the elites in Bangkok. While aspects of this narrative hold true, he asserts 
that the relations of power are far more complex, nuanced and in some ways 
‘reciprocal’: underpinned by local cultural notions of ‘legitimacy’ in relation to the 
ruler. Durrenberger’s (1996) seminal research is an admonition against underestimating 
the power of the peasants and the people of the rural countryside and highlands of 
Thailand. While the Thai economy is largely industrialised, it is critical to remember 
that a majority (66 per cent) of the population is still rural (GRiSP 2013). It is the rural 
majority who often determine the outcome of democratic elections (Farelly 2014; 
Phongpaichit and Baker 2004). It is precisely this political power of the rural peasants, 
rice producers and people of the countryside that is evident in the case study of the 
state-backed rice pledging subsidy scheme. This scheme contributed to the rise and fall 
from power of Thailand’s former Prime Minister, Yingluck Shinawatra, and her Pheu 
Thai political party.  
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Exploring the commodity complex of rice in Thailand reveals that rice is far more 
than merely an economic commodity — it is a site of social and political contestation 
that provides an elucidation of the broader politics of food and its relationship to power 
in Thailand. The production, circulation and consumption of rice in Thailand are 
culturally embedded in broader social relations and are, therefore, intimately political. 
The historical and cultural significance of rice is woven into the very fabric of Thai 
society and is deeply interrelated with the lives and livelihoods of rural farmers and 
urban consumers across the country. Thailand’s domestic rice policy has significant 
implications for the regional and political economy of rice in the region. The politics of 
rice and its relationship to power will be explored further in the next section of state-led 
capitalism in the rice sector with Thai characteristics.  
5.8 Thailand’s state-led capitalism in the agri-food sector: the rice pledging 
subsidy scheme 
As mentioned in the introduction, the story of Thailand’s state-backed rice pledging 
scheme is an insightful and complex narrative about the rise, fall and re-emergence of 
the world’s largest exporter of rice. The state-backed rice pledging subsidy scheme 
provides a notable case of state-led capitalism in the agri-food sector. It is also a 
compelling case study that explicates the dynamics of the political economy of rice in 
Thailand and the critical interconnections between rice, politics and power. 
Prior to the rice pledging subsidy scheme, Thailand was the exporter of rice, 
exporting roughly between 9–10 million tonnes of rice annually to global markets (Thai 
Rice Mills Association 2015). In 2010, Thailand exported 9.1 million tonnes of rice to 
the global market. This rose to 10.6 million tonnes in 2011. With the introduction of the 
state-backed rice pledging subsidy scheme in 2012, rice exports fell dramatically to 6.9 
million tonnes in both 2012 and 2013. During this time, Thailand was replaced by India 
and Vietnam as the world’s largest exporters of rice (Thai Rice Mills Association 2015). 
With the decline of Thai exports, India and Vietnam increased rice production and 
exports to meet global demand. In 2012, India exported 9.75 million tonnes of rice and 
Vietnam exported 7 million tonnes (Chiengkul 2015). In 2014 — after the abandonment 
of the state-led rice pledging subsidy scheme and the selling off of rice stored in 
warehouses — Thailand remerged as the world’s largest exporter of rice, exporting 10.6 
millions tonnes of rice in 2014 (Suwannakij 2014; Thai Rice Mills Association 2015). 
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In order to analyse the implementation and demise of the rice pledging policy, it is 
crucial to situate the scheme in the context of domestic Thai politics and the 
contemporary struggle for power. 
5.8.1 Domestic politics and the struggle for power in Thailand 
The contemporary politics in Thailand must be understood within the historical context 
of Thailand’s turbulent political past and the ongoing struggles to delineate power 
among the country’s social, political and economic elite (Farrelly 2014). As the end of 
King Bhumibol Adulyadej’s reign looms, power struggles are ensuing among the 
country’s elite over the division of power and consolidation of political control (Farrelly 
2014). As Farrelly (2014: 305) argues:  
Thailand in 2013 once again faced the ghosts of its recent and turbulent past. As Prime 
Minister Yingluck Shinawatra sought to further consolidate the political control her Pheu 
Thai Party achieved at the 2011 election, struggles to determine the distribution of power 
among the country’s social, political and economic elite intensified. In the long-running 
battle to define the future of Thailand — and the role of popular electoral mandates in the 
country’s governance — the aggressive tactics of anti-government forces broke an uneasy 
and unstable stalemate. 
These ongoing struggles for power are also taking place between the core centres of 
power and the periphery: the political and economic elite in Bangkok and other major 
cities and their urban yellow shirt supporters in the South, and the peasant farmers and 
rural people of the ‘red’ groups in the northern countryside of Thailand (McCargo 
2003). These generalised distinctions are not clearly demarcated and are often the 
struggle for power is blurred with both pro-Thaksin ‘red’ and anti-Thaksin ‘yellow’ 
groups scattered across the country (Farrelly 2014; Phongpaichit and Baker 2004; 
Walker 2008).  
The former Prime Minister, Yingluck Shinawatra, and her Pheu Thai Party, came to 
power in the July 2011 elections. Large-scale anti-government protests occurred at the 
end of 2013, with an attempt by so-called yellow groups who supported the Democrat 
Party (DP) and opposed the Pheu Thai Government to remove what some critics have 
labelled the ‘Thaksin Regime’ from power (Farrelly 2014; Walker 2008). Opponents of 
the former Prime Minister, Yingluck Shinawatra, claim that the Pheu Thai Government 
was really being controlled by Thaksin Shinawatra. The powerful former Prime 
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Minister and business magnate, Thaksin Shinawatra, was forced into exile after a 
military coup in 2006 (Walker 2008).  
The critics of the Pheu Thai Party argue that the party was being used as a front or a 
proxy to further Thaksin’s political ambitions to undo the 2006 military coup, return to 
Thailand and regain power (Farrelly 2014). Some scholars have asserted that Thaksin’s 
political interests and ambitions are exemplified in the contentious rice pledging policy 
by Yingluck Shinawatra (Farrelly 2014). Farrelly (2014: 308) argues that the rice 
pledging scheme was one of a popular suite of policies designed to sure up support from 
the Party’s political ‘base’ and consolidate its power. Ironically, in the end, this 
contentious policy further polarised the country and contributed to the downfall of the 
Pheu Thai Government. Farrelly (2014: 308) contends: 
Among the policies that it (the Pheu Thai government) sought to implement, the rice-
pledging scheme was the most contentious. Many economists have expressed deep concern 
about the way that the rice-pledging scheme has distorted the national economy, and 
shunted astounding benefits towards some farmers. Early in 2013 there were concerns that 
the programme was unsustainable. The stockpiling of rice, some of which has reportedly 
mouldered under tarpaulins, is a sensitive issue, and one that has serious implications for a 
government struggling to support its base in the rural north and northeast of the country… 
Ensuring that rice farmers are able to secure adequate returns on their crops goes beyond 
economic matters, and intrudes on the electoral viability of the Yingluck government. 
The state-backed rice pledging policy, in many ways, exemplifies the politics of rice 
and the struggle for power in Thailand. The Pheu Thai Government was claiming to 
guarantee an adequate income for rice farmers — by paying above market prices for 
their crops — and by safeguarding their livelihoods and the welfare of their families and 
communities. This guarantee of the lives and livelihoods of peasant farmers and rice 
producers conferred ‘legitimacy’ on the ruling Pheu Thai Government, and solidified 
support from the political base of the party in the north with the so-called red shirts or 
pro-Thaksin supporters (Walker 2003, 2008). However, this rice pledging policy 
encompassed more than an agricultural or economic policy — it formed part of a 
broader political struggle by the ‘Thaksin regime’ to consolidate power and ensure the 
electoral viability of the Yingluck’s Pheu Thai Government (Farrelly 2014; Walker 
2003, 2008).  
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5.8.2 The political economy of the rice pledging subsidy scheme 
Rice subsidy schemes have in existence for many decades in Thailand, starting in the 
1980s. The first rice paddy-pledging program was introduced in the 1981 cropping 
season to provide soft loans for farmers who wanted to delay sales of their crops. Since 
2001, the scheme was primarily used to support the rice price for farmers and to 
increase farmer’s incomes (Chiengkul 2015). In the July 2011 elections, when Yingluck 
Shinawatra and her political party came to power, it was with the explicit support of 
Thailand’s rural rice farmers (Richardson 2011). The Pheu Thai Government gave a 
strong commitment to continue to support and enhance the rice paddy subsidy scheme. 
The Government committed, during the electoral campaign, to ‘alleviate poverty in the 
countryside and raise rural income levels by buying unmilled rice, known as paddy, 
from Thailand’s eight million rice growers at 15,000 baht ($480) per tonne — double 
the pre-election price’ (Richardson 2011: 1).  
The program to increase the minimum guaranteed price for farmers was strategically 
designed to ensure more supply in the domestic market and to increase the export price 
(Richardson 2011). Having spent 300 billion baht on its rice pledging scheme in 2012, 
the Pheu Thai Government earmarked an additional 405 billion baht for 2013: a 
combined roughly U.S. $33 billion (Finch 2012, 2014; Pratruangkrai 2012). The Pheu 
Thai Government struggled to sell rice on international markets at cost price. At an 
average price of 15,000 baht a tonne, some analysts suggested that Thai rice had simply 
become too expensive during this period (Finch 2012, 2014; Pratruangkrai 2012; 
Richardson 2011). The main problem faced by the Pheu Thai Government in 2012 and 
2013 was that the rice-pledging scheme had purchased the rice from producers at the 
much higher subsidised price, which was well above the international market prices for 
high-grade rice in 2012 and 2013. The Pheu Thai Government had two options in 
handling the surplus rice: it could either have stockpiled the rice to restrict supply in 
global markets and hope that demand would cause the global price to rise, or it could 
have attempted to sell it on international markets at a substantial loss. The Government 
decided to pursue the former option rather than the latter (Richardson 2011). 
As discussed earlier, this policy also had important implications for the Thai 
economy and for the global rice trade. The stockpiling of rice purchased from the rice 
subsidy scheme caused rice exports to fall dramatically in both 2012 and 2013. By 
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stockpiling the rice in warehouses, the Pheu Thai Government was attempting to utilise 
Thailand’s position in the global rice trade — as the world’s major exporter of rice — to 
restrict supply in the international market and wait for demand to drive up international 
rice prices.  
This notion of restricting supply to influence international rice prices was not too 
dissimilar to the logic of the proposed OREC, which would, in theory, operate in a 
similar way to OPEC. The OREC proposal never eventuated, and was firmly rejected by 
major rice exporting countries (Trethewie 2012). During 2012 and 2013, the Thai 
Government stockpiled rice purchased from the rice-pledging scheme and began to 
restrict exports; however, in response to declining Thai exports, India and Vietnam 
increased rice production and exports to meet global demand, replacing Thailand as the 
world’s largest exporters of rice. In 2014 — after the abandonment of the state-led rice 
pledging subsidy scheme and the selling off of rice stored in warehouses — Thailand 
remerged as the world’s largest exporter of rice (Thai Rice Mills Association 2015). 
Chiengkul (2015), a Thai political economist, recently completed a comprehensive 
study about the rice subsidy scheme. The study outlined a systemic critique of the Pheu 
Thai Government’s rice subsidy scheme. Chiengkul (2015: 169) argued that the 
‘Government’s plan to speculate with international prices of rice and to benefit from its 
monopoly control over Thailand's rice supply is problematic’. The plan was problematic 
due to the nature of the global rice trade and international rice markets. When 
international prices rise, it often creates an incentive for other countries to increase their 
rice production — this is precisely what occurred in 2012 and 2013 with India and 
Vietnam increasing their rice production and international exports of rice to the global 
market (Chiengkul 2015). This is part of the reason why India and Vietnam became the 
largest exporters of rice in 2012–13. The second major problem with the plan is that by 
stockpiling rice, buyers and rice traders naturally expect that the Thai Government will 
have to sell those stockpiles at some point, or risk the rice rotting in the warehouses. 
This often causes prices to decrease, rather than increase, as buyers, rice traders and 
merchants pragmatically factor in the stockpiled rice into the price, with the expectation 
that when the rice is sold it will create extra supply in the market (Chiengkul 2015). 
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In relation to supporting the lives and livelihoods of rural rice farmers, Chiengkul 
(2015: 169) contends that while the rice subsidy scheme claims to assist farmers, in 
reality it ‘intensifies problematic industrial production methods, (and) increases power 
of monopolies and large capital in rice commodity chains’. Chiengkul (2015: 150) 
concludes that the scheme ‘encourages crony and patron-client relationships, and might 
also help to increase the scale of dispossessions of small-scale farmers’. This is an 
important insight and critique about the scheme in the context of the concentration of 
power that exists in the Thai rice industry.  
This critique was supported by the findings from the Senate Committee on 
Economics, Commerce and Industry that was tasked to provide a report of the rice 
subsidy scheme (Pratruangkrai 2012). The Senate Committee’s final report blamed the 
rice subsidy scheme for facilitating ‘rampant corruption’ and ‘a rising mountain of debt 
as big as the piles of unsold rice fill warehouses across Thailand’ (Finch 2012: 1). The 
report also indicated that, overall, small-scale rural farmers were not benefiting from the 
scheme as intended; rather, the economic benefits were accrued by medium to large 
producers and rice traders (Pratruangkrai 2012). Instead of supporting livelihoods and 
reducing inequality for small-scale and peasant farmers as proposed, the scheme has, to 
some extent, been routinely reproducing enduring social inequalities (Pratruangkrai 
2012).  
The contemporary politics in Thailand must be understood within the historical 
context of Thailand’s turbulent political past and the ongoing struggles to delineate 
power among the country’s social, political and economic elite. The state-backed rice 
pledging policy, in many ways, epitomises the politics of rice and the struggle for power 
in Thailand. Darren Cooper (cited in Finch 2014: 1) from the International Grains 
Council describes the neomercantilist strategy behind the Pheu Thai Party’s rice 
pledging subsidy scheme:  
The idea was that the bulk of revenues would be passed on to the people that grew rice in 
Thailand – then the world’s largest exporter – while the government stockpiled in a bid to 
push up prices, releasing rice onto supply-starved markets when the price was right. But the 
gamble began to backfire before Yingluck’s government had even started to play its hand, 
partly through bad luck and the rest through poor design. A month before, India lifted 
restrictions on exports of its basmati rice, which partly filled the supply shortage on global 
markets created by Thailand’s new policy. Prices rose, but not enough and suddenly 
Thailand was priced out of the global market as rice exports plummeted by 45.8 per cent in 
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the first half of 2012. For the first time in more than 20 years, Thailand accounted for less 
than 20 percent of the world’s total rice exports. 
The state-led rice pledging subsidy scheme highlights the dynamic interplay 
between socio-political and economic spheres in the agri-food system, and the 
interconnections between domestic and international realms and the political economy 
of agricultural trade policy (Graz 2004). However, to what extent can the Pheu Thai 
Government’s rice pledging subsidy scheme be classified as an example of 
neomercantilism in the rice and agri-food sector? To provide an analysis of the potential 
neomercantilist dimensions of this scheme, it is important to return to the definitions of 
classical mercantilism and neomercantilism outlined in Chapter 3. In Chapter 3, 
classical mercantilism was synonymous with a ‘strong state’ capable of structuring the 
country’s commercial activities so as to produce continual trade surpluses — the use of 
tariffs, quotas and subsidies (Levi-faur 1997; Magnusson 1993, 1994, 1995). The Pheu 
Thai Government’s neomercantilism can be conceptualised as the contemporary pursuit 
of current account surpluses and export-led economic growth (a persistent excess of 
exports over imports) with states utilising and manipulating markets to facilitate 
national wealth and power (Robinson 1966; Stern and Wennerlind 2014).  
Neomercantilism can be conceptualised as a new form of economic nationalism — 
states seek to pursue political objectives through controlling the ‘commanding heights’, 
the largest and most strategic sectors of the economy, with the goal of trying to shape 
the mechanisms of national and global markets (Cho 2000; Rodrik 2013; Xu and Bahgat 
2010). The Pheu Thai Party’s use of subsidies in the rice sector was an example of state-
led capitalism, in which the state intervened in the domestic rice sector and restructured 
commercial activities to control this politically and economically important and 
strategic sector to ‘commanding heights’. The Pheu Thai Government’s goal was to 
manipulate and shape export prices in global rice markets, and to increase trade 
surpluses and secure domestic support from rice farmers. Based on the definitions 
outlined in this study, the Thai rice pledging subsidy scheme is arguably an insightful 
example of state-led capitalism and neomercantilism in the rice sector.  
It is now relevant to reflect on Aldo and Lazzarini’s (2014: 2) definition of state 
capitalism as ‘the widespread influence of the government in the economy’. According 
to this definition, influence can take many forms, including ‘either by owning majority 
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or minority equity positions in companies or by providing subsidized credit and/or other 
privileges to private companies’ (Aldo and Lazzarini 2014: 2). Alternatively, as Nolke 
(2015:1) depicts, a ‘variety of formal and informal cooperative relationships between 
various public authorities and individual companies’ can be nurtured. As outlined in the 
case study, The Thai rice pledging scheme claimed to benefit rice producers and 
farmers; however, the primary beneficiaries were the large rice exporting companies 
with links to the Pheu Thai Party or the Shinawatra family and rice millers — many of 
whom had links to the ruling political party and business elites in Bangkok. 
The Pheu Thai Government attempted to provide a guarantee of the lives and 
livelihoods of peasant farmers and rice producers in exchange for political support. 
However, this rice pledging policy encompassed more than an agricultural or economic 
policy — it formed part of a broader political struggle to consolidate power and ensure 
the electoral viability of the Yingluck’s Pheu Thai Government. In the end, the Pheu 
Thai Government’s rice subsidy policy further polarised the country and was one of the 
political and economic factors that contributed to the downfall of the democratically 
elected government and the re-emergence of military junta rule in Thailand.  
The rice subsidy scheme has demonstrated that governments and the ruling elite in 
many parts of East Asia are acutely aware of the cultural significance and socio-political 
power of rice farmers and producers, traders and consumers. This modest grain that 
played such a substantive role historically in the establishment and expansion of much 
of Thai civilisation and state building nationally continues to hold special cultural 
significance in the lives and livelihoods of the Thai people. The story of the rise and 
demise of the Pheu Thai Party and the Thai rice pledging subsidy scheme demonstrate 
that political power in Thailand can literally rise and fall with the price of rice.  
5.9 Conclusion 
Thailand’s rice subsidy scheme is an exemplar of the relationship between rice, politics 
and power. Contextualising the scheme historically, it represents a crucial contemporary 
conjecture in the long historical trajectory of the cultural political economy of rice in 
Thailand. State-led capitalism in the agri-food sector in Thailand has a long and 
complex history. The Thai state has a long history of guaranteeing capital investment, 
and in attempting to mobilise peasant farmers to participate in commercial export-
  
109 
oriented agriculture. The state-backed rice subsidy scheme provides a notable case of 
state-led capitalism with Thai characteristics in the rice sector. This chapter discussed 
the Global Food Crisis of 2007–08 and its implications for Thailand. The next section 
will examine this important event in more detail to try to comprehend the role of rice in 
the crisis.  
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6 The 2007–08 Global Food Crisis 
6.0 Introduction  
The spike in global food prices in 2007–08 has been identified as a major event in the 
ongoing crisis in the global food system. Scholars and researchers have often referred to 
this event as the Global Food Crisis of 2007–08 (Ananta and Barichello 2012; Clapp 
and Cohen 2009; Dawe 2010). A number of scholars have identified the 2008 food price 
crisis as a ‘critical conjuncture’ in the long historical trajectory of the global food 
system, and one that requires further research (Clapp 2009; Lawrence et al. 2010; 
McMichael 2009a; Rosin et al. 2012). This critical event is worthy of further 
consideration and study in relation to comprehending the causes and consequences of 
food insecurity and ongoing price volatility. In particular, questions that can be asked 
include: What caused the dramatic rise in price volatility in 2007–08 and what impact 
did this have on food insecurity in East Asia? What role did rice play in the crisis? More 
broadly, what are the lessons learned from this event, and are we currently in a new era 
of food insecurity and price volatility? This chapter will analyse these critical questions 
and their implications for understanding the contemporary global food system and East 
Asian food system. 
This chapter will focus on the food price spike in order to gain a deeper 
understanding of the implications for governance and food insecurity in the East Asian 
region. This event has contemporary significance as many underlying systemic issues 
that produced the surge in food prices between 2007 and 2008 continue to exist today 
— contributing to ongoing food price volatility and global food insecurity. These socio-
political and economic issues will be discussed in more detail throughout this chapter. 
First it is important to situate the crisis with a broader historical context of a food 
system that has long been in crisis.  
6.1 The historical context of food crises 
The spike in global food prices in 2007–08 attracted much attention from international 
institutions, agri-food scholars, news media and policy makers around the world — 
serving as a stark reminder of the fragility and inherent inadequacies of the global food 
system. The 2008 food price crisis did not occur in isolation — the causes and 
consequences have a long legacy and need to be historically contextualised. In the 
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contemporary context, deepening inequalities and social injustices coupled with 
ongoing environmental degradation have contributed to an acknowledgment by some 
scholars that the global food and agricultural system is indeed in crisis (Bello 2009; 
Holt-Giménez et al. 2009; Lawrence et al. 2010; Magdoff and Tokar 2010; McMichael 
2013a, 2013b; Rosset 2006; Shiva 2009; Weis 2007). Figure 2 provides a graph of the 
FAO Food Price Index from 1961–2015 that highlights — in both nominal and real 
terms — the food price crisis of 1974 and the spike in global food prices in 2007–08 
and 2010–11. 
Figure 2 FAO Food Price Index in nominal and real terms 1961–2015
Source: FAO (2015a: 1). 
The 1974 and 2008 food price increases were two crucial contemporary junctures in 
this ongoing crisis (Clapp and Cohen 2009). While there are some important 
continuities and similarities between the two events, there are also some significant 
differences. Firstly, there is the issue of global grain reserves and stocks (the stock-to-
use consumption ratio) being at historically low levels leading into both food price 
crises. Global, regional and national grain reserves and buffer stocks can be released to 
ease food price spikes during emergencies or crises. When global grain reserves and 
public and private grain stocks are low, the global food system is more susceptible to 
food price spikes and price volatility (Clapp and Cohen 2009).17 Historically, the 
stockpiling of agricultural commodities — particularly staple grains — has played an 
                                                
17 The issue of global/regional and national food reserves is examined in more detail in Chapter 7. In 
particular, this chapter provides an in depth analysis of the role of regional food reserves in reducing food 
price volatility. Chapter 7 also examines a case study of regional rice reserves in East Asia.  
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important role as a buffer to natural disasters, calamities, seasonal discrepancies and 
market turbulence (Murphy 2009). Grain reserves were traditionally promoted and 
supported to ensure governments could intervene to stabilise markets during periods of 
food price volatility and to ensure domestic food security, especially in food import-
dependent countries (Braun and Torero 2009; De Castro 2013). 
Leading into both 1973 and 2007, global wheat stocks were low (that is, there was a 
low stock-to-use consumption ratio) and global grain reserves were at historically low 
levels. This contributed to increased vulnerability in the global food system and 
volatility in global food prices (Horton 2009). In the decades since the 1973–74 crisis, 
public policy makers and private sector actors have been accused of having become 
complacent. Due to the bulky and perishable nature of agricultural commodities, it is 
expensive to hold food stocks or reserves and, after decades of cheap food with 
aggregate declining food prices, it became increasingly costly to hold high levels of 
food stocks and reserves (Horton 2009). This was coupled with low trust and 
confidence in the global food markets and the market mechanism to source relatively 
inexpensive food at stable prices over the long-term.  
Some critical agri-food scholars have argued that liberalised trade settings and 
reduced food reserves produce ‘inherent uncertainty’ in global commodity markets 
(Bello 2009; Borra Jr. et al. 2011; Rosset 2006; Walton and Seddon 1994). The 
Washington Consensus was a term used to encapsulate the neoliberal policy settings 
advocated by the Bretton Woods institutions — the World Bank, the IMF and the WTO 
— in the 1980–90s. The Washington Consensus was characterised by economic 
liberalisation, privatisation, neoliberal fiscal and monetary policy, along with an 
opening up of domestic markets to so-called free trade and the integration of domestic 
markets with world markets through neoliberal reforms (Rosset 2006; Walton and 
Seddon 1994). Walton and Seddon (1994), for example, argue that food riots witnessed 
in the 1980s in many countries in the Global South were intrinsically linked to protests 
against neoliberal austerity measures, agricultural liberalisation and structural 
adjustment programs imposed in exchange for loans by the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund under the auspices of the Washington Consensus.  
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Some critical agri-food scholars posit that the historical legacy of economic 
liberalisation of the agricultural sector since the 1980s under the structural adjustment 
programs (SAPs) of the Washington Consensus and in the 1990s with poverty reduction 
strategy papers (PRSPs) under the post-Washington Consensus is a critical socio-
political and economic factor in the food crisis of 2007–08 (Bello 2009; Holt-Giménez 
et al. 2009; Magdoff and Tokar 2010).  
These food-import dependent countries have become increasingly reliant on 
sourcing relatively inexpensive food from the subsidised export complexes and 
granaries in the Global North (Rosset 2006; Shiva 2009; Weis 2007). Low-income, 
food-import dependent countries in the Global South are particularly vulnerable to 
global food price spikes and volatility (Clapp 2009). This critical argument is examined 
in more detail in the following section. In contrast to the critiques of economic 
liberalism, there are some scholars that content that economic nationalism and 
protectionism played a significant role in the Global Food Crisis of 2007–08, with many 
traditional exporting countries implementing export bans and restrictions, contributing 
to further increases in international food prices (Dawe 2010; Timmer 2010). These 
arguments are also now examined. 
6.2 Causes and consequences of the Global Food Crisis 
According to Loewenberg (2008) global food prices rose by 83 per cent between 2006 
and 2008. Over 850 million people were already considered food insecure when prices 
began to rise in late 2007. During the first half of 2008, commodity prices doubled, the 
number of hungry people exceeded one billion by some estimates, and food riots and 
protests erupted in over forty countries (UNESCAP 2009, 2010). By July 2008, 
domestic wheat and maize prices were each, on average across countries, about 40 per 
cent higher than they were in January 2007 (FAO 2009b). The global price of rice 
increased by 149 per cent between 2007 and 2008, placing this crucial staple food out of 
reach for many of the most vulnerable in Asia and across the globe (UNESCAP 2009). 
Comparatively, this increase was significant against increases observed with the 
previous world food crisis of 1973–74. During this earlier crisis, world rice prices did 
not double within six months, let alone rise this markedly over such a short period of 
  
114 
time (Dawe 2010). Magdoff and Tokar (2010: 10) provide an apt description of the 
extraordinary spike in food prices in 2008:  
In 2008, the world woke up to an apparent tsunami of hunger sweeping across the globe. 
Although the prospect of rising hunger has loomed on the horizon for years, the 2008 crisis 
appeared to many as if it came without warning. Prices in basic foodstuffs doubled or 
tripled in a short period and food riots spread across many countries in the Global South. 
People were desperate to obtain a portion of what appeared to be a rapidly shrinking supply 
of food and many governments were destabilised.  
The Global Food Crisis of 2008 and ongoing food price volatility have drawn 
attention to the importance of food insecurity as a regional challenge in East Asia 
(Arase 2010; ASEAN 2008; Chandra and Lontoh 2010; Elliott 2011; Mathur 2010; 
Morton 2012; Mukherjee 2008, 2009). High prices impacted on many marginalised 
groups, including the rural landless and the urban poor, who tend to spend half or more 
of their family budgets on food (Clapp and Cohen 2009). This figure can be as high as 
spending 70 to 80 per cent of personal income on food staples such as rice (FAO 2011). 
It is important to note that small-scale rice producers are often not the beneficiaries of 
higher international rice prices. Clapp and Cohen (2009: 5) argue that rising 
international prices in 2008 ‘did not necessarily lead to rising incomes for small-scale 
food producers’. This is due to higher production costs (e.g. irrigation pumps, 
machinery, fertilizer and transport costs as a result of higher prices for petroleum), weak 
infrastructure and concentration of power in the domestic markets and retail sectors 
(Clapp and Cohen 2009). Smallholder farmers are also often net purchasers of food, and 
so are adversely affected by higher food prices (Clapp and Cohen 2009). Considering 
the crisis, there has been a fundamental need to rethink the causes and consequences of 
food insecurity, as they have become more complex, multi-scale and interconnected. 
There is also a need to critically evaluate networks of food governance (private, public 
and civil society) as well as institutions and structures at local, national, regional and 
global levels (Elliott 2011).  
Many underlying systemic issues that produced the surge in food prices between 
2007 and 2008 continue to exist today (Bassett and Winter-Nelson 2010; Brown 2012; 
Carolan 2013; Clapp 2012; DeCastro et al. 2013). These underlying socio-political, 
economic and ecological issues include: increasingly unpredictable crop-growing 
conditions as a result of the impact of climate change, such as droughts and changes in 
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rainfall; rapid urbanisation; competition for land use and declining arable land; 
ecological damage caused by industrialised, chemical and fossil fuel intensive 
agriculture; systemic soil degradation, water scarcity and loss of biodiversity; reduction 
in the quality of river ecosystems; over-exploitation of fish stocks; increased diversion 
of food for animal feed;18 rising energy costs and the increasing diversion of food and 
animal feed for biofuels (as mentioned); critical resource constraints (such as 
phosphorus); an unsustainable amount of global food wastage; a growing global 
population and increasing social inequalities; a reduction in public investment in 
agricultural research and development; and decreasing world grain reserves and 
excessive financial speculation on agricultural derivatives, primarily through over-the-
counter (OTC) commodity index funds (CIFs) (Cribb 2010; Dawe 2010; De Shutter 
2009; Lang and Heasman 2004; Lang et al. 2009; Lawrence et al. 2010; McDonald 
2010; Teng et al. 2011). These multifaceted, transnational issues are contributing to 
ongoing food price volatility and global food insecurity. These issues cannot be 
adequately addressed solely on a local or national basis, but instead require broader 
regional and global cooperation.  
Some scholars argue that while many of these critical factors listed do, in 
combination, affect the availability, access and affordability of food, it is also crucial to 
situate these significant environmental and social issues within the context of 
historically specific socio-political and economic settings and structures that have led to 
the ongoing crisis in the global food system (Lawrence et al. 2010; Magdoff and Tokar 
2010; McMichael 2012a, 2012b). Framing the narrative of the Global Food Crisis in 
this manner foregrounds socio-political and economic issues in the food system, such as 
emerging and enduring inequalities, social injustice and maldistribution. These scholars 
also contend that there are critical historical trends in the global political economy — 
shaped by structures and relations of power — that determine what foods will be 
produced, by whom and where, as well as to whom food will be distributed (McMichael 
2012a, 2012b, 2013a, 2013b; Magdoff and Tokar 2010). These long-term historical 
trends include the legacy of structural adjustment programs and trade liberalisation that 
                                                
18 It is critical to note that the world’s per capita meat consumption doubled from the early 1960s through to 2007 and as much as 95 
per cent of calories are lost in the conversion of grain and soybeans to meat (Magdoff and Tokar 2010: 10). 
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lead, in many instances, to increasing dependency on food imports and vulnerability to 
international price volatility (Rosset 2006). Rosset (2006: xvi) asserts that liberalised 
trade settings and reduced food reserves produce ‘inherent uncertainty’ in global 
commodity markets. Another crucial historical factor is the increasing dispossession of 
small-scale peasant farmers (Magdoff and Tokar 2010; McMichael 2012a).  
The historical context of food and agriculture as a site of contestation and social 
struggle in global political economy is often overlooked or marginalised in orthodox 
economic analyses of the crisis, which focus primarily on supply and demand factors in 
markets. Many orthodox (neo)Malthusian accounts prefer to focus more on supply and 
demand factors that they claim are driving volatility, such as population growth, 
growing demand for meat and dairy in India and China, production shortages, eco-
scarcity, lower yields and natural disasters, among other factors. According to 
(neo)Malthusian focused Brown (2011), scarcity is ‘the new norm’ and policy makers 
must be prepared for a transition from an era of food surpluses to a ‘new politics of food 
scarcity’, ‘resource grabbing’ and ‘social instability’. 
This study outlines the argument that the orthodox economic discourse and analysis 
of the food problem and the causes of the 2008 Global Food Crisis are problematic and 
marginalise alternative perspectives, often resulting in an apolitical and ahistorical 
analysis. The premise of this study is that the role of rice in relation to food insecurity in 
the East Asian region cannot be adequately comprehended from a purely economic 
perspective. Rather, the organisation of rice as a commodity has deep social and 
political connotations which can be more comprehensively understood by adopting a 
critical approach to agrarian and global political economy (Clapp and Helleiner 2012; 
Friedmann 1982, 1993; Lawrence et al. 2010; Lawrence and McMichael 2012; 
McMichael 2000a, 2006, 2013; McMichael and Buttel 1990; O’Brien and Williams 
2011; Shields et al. 2011; Watson 2005, 2007).  
6.3 The role of rice 
The role of rice during the Global Food Crisis of 2007–08 highlights the inherent 
contradictions of state-centric and neomercantilist approaches to food security. Between 
October 2007 and April 2008, world market rice prices for a type of Thai rice known as 
100%B tripled, rising dramatically from US$335 per tonne to over US$1000 per tonne. 
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This resulted in the highest level recorded ever in nominal terms (Dawe 2010). Figure 3 
graphs the rice price spike for Thai 100%B in US dollars per tonne and outlines a 
timeline of the key events in the world rice crisis of 2007–08 (Dawe 2010: 19). 
Figure 3 Timeline of key events in the world rice crisis 2007–08
Source: Dawe (2010: 19). 
In response to the Global Food Crisis, many states in East Asia, and indeed around 
the world, intervened in the market and implemented various protectionist policies in an 
attempt to lessen the impact of soaring international food prices on the most vulnerable 
sections of their populations (Dawe 2010). These state-led policy responses included 
export restrictions, price controls, price subsidies and facilitating imports. The paradox 
of this type of state-centric response was that some of these domestic policy measures 
— in particular, export restrictions — exacerbated the crisis and contributed to soaring 
food prices. During the crisis, exporting countries were willing to abruptly restrict 
exports of rice in favour of protecting their domestic markets and ensuring domestic 
supply.  
Leading up to the global rice price spike of 2007–08, India and Vietnam were the 
world’s second and third largest exporters of rice, while the Philippines was the world’s 
largest rice importer (Dawe 2010). As outlined in Figure 3, during the crisis, exporting 
countries were willing to abruptly restrict exports of food to protect their own 
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consumers. For example, India, Vietnam, China and Indonesia stabilised domestic rice 
prices during the Global Food Crisis of 2007–08 by using export bans (or at least very 
tight controls), thus protecting well over two billion consumers from sharply higher 
prices (Timmer 2013). In responding to these protectionist measures, many importing 
countries — like the Philippines and Indonesia — realised that their domestic markets 
were far too dependent on foreign imports for their national food security, and hastily 
resorted to increasing domestic stockpiles (Timmer 2013). Figure 3 demonstrates that at 
the height of the global rice price surge the Philippines paid US$1200 per tonne at a 17 
April 2008 tender. While these policy responses — to varying degrees — protected 
some domestic consumers in these countries from rising prices, they reproduced and 
intensified food insecurities elsewhere in the region. 
The political economy of rice and the dynamics of power in the region are reflected 
in the domestic rice policies pursued by the Philippines and Indonesia. The Philippines 
and Indonesia are the main net importers of rice in the Southeast Asian region, with the 
Philippines ranked second in the world, and Indonesia third (FAO 2011). During the 
Global Food Crisis of 2007–08, the governments of both the Philippines and Indonesia 
declared that they would pursue policies of food ‘rice self-sufficiency’. Both countries 
have taken significant steps to be less reliant on the world market, pursuing substantial 
rice production initiatives and pledging to be self-sufficient in rice over the long-term 
(Trethewie 2012).  
Returning to the arguments advanced in the previous chapter in relation to 
Thailand’s state-led capitalism in the rice sector with distinctive Thai characteristics, it 
is crucial to note while the Thai Government did not restrict rice exports during the rice 
price surge of 2007–08, that Thailand’s policies and statements contributed to the 
uncertainty in global rice markets (Dawe 2010; Timmer 2013). According to Dawe 
(2010: 22): 
Thai policies and statements also contributed to the uncertainty in the world market. In 
February 2008, the head of the Ministry of Commerce’s Public Warehouse Organization 
called for the newly elected government to auction off half a million tons of its 2.1 million 
tons of stocks. Thai exporters were in favour of this proposal, but the government kept 
almost all of its stocks off the market. In mid-March, the Vice-Minister of Commerce was 
quoted as saying that the government was considering imposition of export restrictions for 
the first time in more than a generation. Then, on 28 March, the Minister urged farmers not 
to sell as he predicted prices would reach $1000/ton by June (he did not specify whether he 
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was referring to prices of Jasmine rice or 100%B). Thailand later insisted that it would not 
restrict exports and, indeed, it did not, but the threat of such action added to market 
uncertainty. 
In October 2007, monthly Thai exports exceeded 1.0 million tonnes. During the 
subsequent four months, monthly Thai exports averaged 914,000 tonnes. In the year 
ending in September 2008, Thailand exported more than 11.7 million tonnes (Dawe 
2010). Had the Thai Government taken the same course of India and Vietnam in 
implementing export restrictions, it would be difficult to predict how high world rice 
prices would have reached. 
As mentioned briefly in the previous chapter, in April 2008, Thailand proposed 
creating a ‘rice exporter cartel’ the Organization of Rice Exporting Countries (OREC). 
The neomercantilist organisation was modelled on the Organisation of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) (Dawe 2010: 22). The Southeast Asian rice export cartel 
would have included Vietnam, Cambodia and Myanmar. Cambodia’s Prime Minister 
endorsed the concept of OREC; however, it faced significant critiques from economists 
and policymakers in international and regional institutions such as the Asian 
Development Bank (Dawe 2010; Timmer 2013; Trethewie 2012). The OREC concept 
was decried as a new type of mercantilism that would distort the market mechanism. It 
is important to note that Thailand’s proposal for a cartel did not include India — the 
second largest exporter of rice in 2008. One week after Thailand proposed OREC, the 
proposition was withdrawn (Dawe 2010). Nonetheless, while the Thai Government did 
not ban exports, the OREC proposal indicated clearly that it had a neomercantilist 
strategy and objectives in relation to the global rice market.  
6.4 Key learnings from the crisis 
While the policy responses taken in East Asia protected some domestic consumers in 
these countries from rising prices, ensuring domestic food security actually reproduced 
and exacerbated food insecurities elsewhere in the region. At times, this underlined the 
logic of a need to move towards a more multilateral approach to regional food security. 
In this regard, the ASEAN member states acknowledged that there was an urgent need 
to develop a robust regional policy framework comprising of a strategic set of measures 
and actions that would ensure sustainable and long-term food security in the ASEAN 
region (ASEAN 2008, 2009). Many food-importing countries in East Asia are highly 
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vulnerable to global food price spikes and increasingly volatile global food prices 
(Huchet-Bourdon 2011). There are many ways policy makers in food-dependent 
countries protect domestic food markets from global food price volatility — including 
the use of buffer reserves as a price control mechanism, which arguably offers a high 
degree of flexibility to respond to price spikes and swings, and has a more direct impact 
on the prices paid by the most vulnerable populations (Murphy 2009). An effective 
system of food reserves is an essential part of the institutional architecture for achieving 
genuine food security. 
The complexity of the transnational issues that led to the Global Food Crisis of 
2007–08 demonstrates that a primary reliance on market mechanisms is not sufficient to 
ensure regional food security in times of crisis. Murphy (2009: 4) argues that ‘markets 
alone are not best placed to ensure that everyone has access to at least a minimum of 
safe, nutritious and culturally appropriate food’ Historically, the primary functions of 
food reserves have been ‘to correct the basic market failure of aggregate food markets’, 
to stabilise volatile prices and to prepare to respond to food emergencies (Murphy 2009: 
4).  
6.5 Is this a new era of food insecurity and price volatility?  
Since the global food price spike of 2007–08, the FAO has revised its methodology for 
measuring hunger, which occurred after a meeting of the Committee on World Food 
Security (CFS) in 2010. In a 2013 report, The State of Food Insecurity in the World, the 
FAO estimated a total of 842 million people, or around one in eight people in the world, 
were suffering from chronic hunger, and regularly not getting enough food to conduct 
an active life. This figure is lower than the 868 million reported with reference to 2010–
12. The total number of undernourished has fallen by 17 per cent since 1990–92, despite 
the previously reported spikes during the Global Food Crisis (FAO 2013). Different 
rates of progress across regions have led to global and regional shifts with the 
distribution of undernourished people. According to the FAO (2013), most of the 
world’s undernourished people are still to be found in Southern Asia, closely followed 
by sub-Saharan Africa and Eastern Asia. In 2015, the FAO (2015) indicated that global 
hunger declined slightly to an estimated 795 million undernourished people. There are 
important trends with the distribution of undernourished peoples across Asian regions, 
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with the regional share of undernourished people declining most in East Asia and 
Southeast Asia, but increasing in South Asia, as well as further afield in sub-Saharan 
Africa and Northern Africa, based on the data. Internationally and in East Asia 
specifically, statistics about food insecure populations across the globe remain a 
significant concern, even with revisions to research methodologies for collecting data. 
This trend of declining undernourishment in East Asia has continued. According to the 
FAO (2015), undernourishment in East Asia declined from 23.2 per cent of the 
population in 1990 to 9.6 per cent in 2014. In contrast, Western Asia has seen an 
increase in the prevalence of hunger from 6.4 per cent of the population in 1990 to 8.4 
per cent in 2014 (FAO 2015).  
 The statistics discussed in this section highlight the importance and value of adopting a 
nuanced and differentiated regional perspective in relation to comprehending 
multifaceted and complex issues, such as food insecurity. Narratives of global food 
scarcity and insecurity often fail to take into account regional differences. From a 
regional perspective, grasping the differences between various regions in the global 
food system include considering subtleties in the cultural political economy of agri-food 
systems and agricultural commodity sectors.  
Some scholars and researchers have framed the narrative of ‘global resource 
scarcity’ and food insecurity in terms of ‘absolute scarcity’, pointing in particular to the 
issue of planetary or ecological (finite) limits (Barrett 2013; Brown 2012). Often, these 
arguments are underpinned by (neo)Malthusian perspectives and assumptions around 
absolute scarcity of finite resources, linked to conflict and socio-political instability 
(Blyth 2002). These scholars argue that the global economy is at the edge of its food 
production capacity. Agriculture is already utilising 70 per cent of the world’s annual 
freshwater, and in many countries arable land is declining (Cribb 2010). Rapid 
industrialisation and the growth in urban populations have contributed to a reduction in 
arable land through competing land use and environmental degradation (Sombilla and 
Hossain 2000).  
The discursive framing often stresses the narrative of the global challenge of feeding 
an expected 9.3 billion people by 2050 (McMahon 2013). This narrative is indeed 
compelling and persuasive when faced with some of the aforementioned facts and latest 
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scientific findings in relation to climate change, such as: droughts and changes in 
rainfall; rapid urbanisation; competition for land use and declining arable land; systemic 
soil degradation, water scarcity and loss of biodiversity; reduction in the quality of river 
ecosystems; and over-exploitation of fish stocks (Cribb 2010; McMahon 2013; 
Sombilla et al. 2002).  
Other scholars, including some neoclassical economists, draw on classical political 
economy and work of Ricardo to frame the issue more in terms of ‘relative scarcity’ — 
arguing that the problem is underproduction due to misallocation of resources, not 
pursuing ‘comparative advantage’, and lack of technology (Rosegrant et al. 1995). 
Some agricultural economists contend that scarcity is relative to demand and that 
physical or ecological limits can be transcended or mitigated through comparative 
advantage, modernisation, the market mechanism and scientific technological 
innovation (Barrett 2013). In other words, there is a significant challenge ahead in 
relation to global resource scarcity and food insecurity; however, these challenges are 
viewed as being overcome through industrialisation and modernisation of agriculture 
(the productivist paradigm) and the application of scientific knowledge and 
technological innovation (Teng 2011).  
Some critical agri-food scholars and researchers have posited a more relational or 
dialectical approach to global resource scarcity and food insecurity (McMichael 2013a, 
2013b). Some have argued that the Global Food Crisis of 2007–08 did not occur in 
isolation and is part of multiple crises — the financial crisis, the energy crisis and the 
environmental and climate crisis (Rosin et al. 2012). These multiple crises can be 
situated historically as part of a broader crisis of neoliberal governance. Hence, the food 
system crisis has a long historical trajectory and must be historically contextualised 
(Arrighi 2007). As highlighted, these multiple crises have been occurring in the context 
of further integration of food, energy and financial markets and the emergence of a 
global food, feed, fuel and finance complex (McMichael 2013b; Rosin et al. 2012). As 
indicated earlier, agricultural commodity markets are often thinly traded markets and 
are vulnerable to price volatility. Arguably, the increasing integration of agri-food 
markets into much larger energy and financial markets has led to much greater risk and 
propensity for global food price volatility, as evidenced in the Global Food Crisis of 
2007–08 and again in the food price spike in 2011 (Borras Jr. et al. 2011a, 2011b). The 
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financialisation of the food and agricultural sector has further increased the vulnerability 
of the global food system to food price volatility and fluctuations — in particular, 
speculation on agricultural commodity prices through the trading of OTC CIFs has been 
linked to increased food price volatility (Clapp 2010).  
The increasing financialisation of food has rendered agricultural commodities as 
simply another commodity or financial instrument for investment (Clapp 2010; 
McMichael 2012b). According to McMichael (2012: 60) the ‘privileging of exchange-
value over use-value (‘ecological capital’ including farming knowledge) subordinates 
agriculture to a financial calculus at the expense of socio-ecological sustainability’. 
Historically, speculation in agricultural futures markets was carefully regulated in 
accordance with social norms. It was recognised as a widely accepted social norm that 
food was different, it was essential for survival and sustenance and, hence, social 
protections were in place to prevent financial speculation in agricultural commodities. 
Even today, the United States is unique in its deregulation of the agricultural futures 
market and it was in the United States that financial institutions and investment banks 
first developed OTC CIFs (Russi 2013).  
Currently, food and agricultural commodities are traded and exchanged on the 
global market in much the same way as any other commodity. From a Polanyian 
perspective, the notion of food as a fungible commodity — as merely another 
interchangeable financial instrument of investment and profit — abstracts food from the 
social relations in which it is embedded and renders invisible its cultural, ecological and 
normative dimensions of food (Polanyi 1944, 1947). Food has deep social and cultural 
significance — the way food is produced, distributed and consumed has critical social, 
political, economic, environmental and ethical implications. However, these crucial 
dimensions of food and agriculture become invisible in an abstractive attempt to 
conceptualise and utilise food as a merely financial instrument and fungible commodity. 
Therefore, the attempts to disconnect the food system from social relations and reduce 
food to merely a fungible commodity are ‘utopian’ and lead to systemic crisis, having 
devastating social consequences. These devastating social implications were evident in 
the 2007–08 Global Food Crisis and continue to be evident with food price spikes. 
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6.6 Conclusion  
In summary, this chapter has analysed the spike in global food prices in 2007–08 and 
posited that this was a significant event in the ongoing crises in the global food system. 
This chapter has focused on this significant event in order to gain a deeper 
understanding of the implications for food insecurity in the East Asian region. This 
chapter has argued that the complexity of the transnational issues that led to the Global 
Food Crisis of 2007–08 demonstrates that reliance on market mechanisms alone is not 
sufficient to ensure regional food security in times of crisis. This chapter has outlined 
the inherent contradictions of state-centric and neomercantilist approaches to food 
security that were manifest in the food price spikes of 2007–08. These state-led policy 
responses included export restrictions, price controls, price subsidies and facilitating 
imports. The paradox of these types of state-centric protectionist and neomercantilist 
responses to the crises was that they only exacerbated and reproduced food insecurities 
in the region, moving these insecurities around geographically. 
Additionally, this chapter has advanced the argument that with the further 
deregulation and integration of agricultural, financial and energy markets, food has 
become an increasingly fungible commodity. The increasing financialisation of food has 
rendered agricultural commodities as simply another commodity or financial instrument 
for investment. From a Polanyian perspective, attempts to disconnect the food system 
from social relations and reduce food to merely a fungible commodity are ‘utopian’ and 
lead to systemic crisis, having devastating social consequences. 
Many underlying systemic issues that produced the surge in global food prices in 
2007–08 continue to exist today. This chapter proposes that these complex and 
interconnected transnational issues cannot be adequately addressed solely on a national 
basis but, instead, arguably require broader regional cooperation. Historically, the 
primary functions of food reserves have been to correct market failures in food markets, 
to stabilise volatile prices and to prepare to respond to food emergencies The next 
chapter will provide an analysis of attempts to undertake regional cooperation in 
relation to food security. It examines the case study of Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations Plus Three Emergency Rice Reserve (APTERR) as an example of a regional 
cooperation scheme.   
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7 Regional governance, rice reserves and food security in East Asia 
7.0 Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 6, many underlying systemic issues that produced the surge in 
global food prices in 2007–08 continue to exist today. A central proposition posited in 
the previous chapter was that these complex and interconnected transnational issues 
cannot be adequately addressed solely on a national basis, but instead appear to require 
broader regional cooperation. This chapter will assess the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations Plus Three Emergency Rice Reserve (APTERR) as an exemplar of 
regional cooperation in relation to addressing food insecurity. It is posited that while 
regional food reserves do have some limitations, they can benefit countries facing food 
emergencies and are an effective way of promoting regional cooperation and mutual 
assistance among countries, amidst the challenges posed by increasing instability and 
price volatility in the contemporary global food system. 
There is increasing scholarly awareness that food insecurity is one of the most 
critical and complex issues facing the East Asian region, and indeed the world (Arase 
2010; Ingram et al. 2010; McDonald 2010). This study acknowledges and argues that 
the causes and consequences of global food insecurity are complex, interconnected and 
increasingly transnational. As such, they cannot be adequately addressed solely on a 
national basis with domestic policy responses, but instead require broader regional and 
global cooperation and a multilateral approach to food security. This argument is 
contextualised with an analysis of the Global Food Crisis of 2007–08 and regional 
implications in East Asia. 
As indicated in the last chapter, the spike in global food prices in 2007–08 caused 
grave concern among many actors and policy makers in East Asia about the possible 
socio-economic impacts in the region and political instability. As briefly highlighted 
earlier in this study, in responding to the Global Food Crisis, the ten member states of 
ASEAN, working in collaboration with Japan, the People’s Republic of China and the 
Republic of Korea (ASEAN+3), established a long-term regional rice reserve 
mechanism — APTERR — that built on an existing pilot project, the East Asian 
Emergency Rice Reserve.  
  
126 
This chapter provides an analysis of APTERR and situates this scheme within the 
broader debates around regional food reserves as a ‘public good’. It is contended that 
despite some technical, financial and institutional limitations, some crucial aspects of 
APTERR include potential for the scheme to increase transparency in the regional rice 
market through the mutual exchange of information. It is argued that, as such, regional 
food reserves can significantly benefit countries facing food emergencies, and 
effectively support regional cooperation and mutual assistance among countries amidst 
challenges posed by increasing instability and price volatility in the contemporary 
global food system. The first section outlines a regional perspective on food insecurity. 
This is followed by a discussion of the role of rice in regional food security. The 
subsequent section engages in the debates in relation to the role and effectiveness of 
food reserves. The second half of this chapter examines APTERR as a case of study in 
multilateral cooperation in relation to rice and addressing regional food insecurity. 
7.1 Food insecurity as a regional challenge 
The global food price crisis of 2007–08 and ongoing food price volatility have drawn 
attention to the importance of food insecurity as a regional challenge (Chandra and 
Lontoh 2010; Clapp 2009; Morton 2012; Mukherjee 2008, 2009). As outlined in 
previous chapters, often it is the most vulnerable in a region — rural landless labourers, 
small-scale farmers and the urban poor — who suffer most from food insecurity, hunger 
and malnutrition. In East Asia, high prices have had a detrimental impact on the lives 
and livelihoods of these vulnerable groups (Dawe et al. 2014; FAO 2009b). As Mathur 
(2010: 1) points out, ‘Food security can only be achieved if food becomes available and 
accessible to the most vulnerable sections of society’. 
The complexity of the transnational issues that led to the Global Food Crisis of 
2007–08 demonstrates that reliance on market mechanisms alone is not sufficient to 
ensure regional food security in times of crisis. Historically, the primary functions of 
food reserves have been ‘to correct the basic market failure of aggregate food markets’, 
to stabilise volatile prices and to prepare to respond to food emergencies (Murphy 2009: 
4).  
In an era of climate change, when disasters and calamities have increased in 
frequency and intensity, multilateral cooperation and maintaining a substantive regional 
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food reserve is an increasingly important aspect of a regional strategy ensuring regional 
food security (Ingram et al. 2010). Ingram et al. (2010) demonstrate how the causes and 
impacts of food insecurity are inextricably linked with global environmental change 
(including climate change). Since disasters and calamities can transcend national 
boundaries, an effective response needs to be multilateral, relying on regional 
cooperation between countries that share common geography, history, cultures and 
increasingly interconnected economies. 
Considering the Global Food Crisis of 2007–08, there is a fundamental need to 
rethink the causes and consequences of food insecurity. As contended in the previous 
chapter, these causes and consequences have become more complex, multi-scale and 
interconnected as food insecurities transcend local jurisdictions and national boundaries 
(Elliott 2011). As Elliott (2011: 4) acknowledges, addressing regional food insecurity 
requires ‘responses that engaged with, and responsive to, the vulnerabilities and security 
needs of local communities’. In order to analyse APTERR, it is important to situate it 
within the broader debates around food reserves as a ‘public good’, as well as to 
consider additional merits and limitations with regional food reserves. 
7.2 Rice and regional food security in East Asia 
According to Timmer (1997: 5) ‘stabilizing the price of a popular staple food is an 
essential element of food security’. Beyond merely being a source of sustenance and 
calories, rice has deep social, political, economic and cultural significance in the region 
(Bello 2005; Dawe and Timmer 2012; Sombilla 2000). Many food-importing countries 
in East Asia are highly vulnerable to global food price spikes and increasingly volatile 
global food prices (Huchet-Bourdon 2011). Many governments in food-import 
dependent countries in East Asia intervene to protect domestic food markets from 
global food price volatility — these interventions include the use of buffer reserves as a 
price control mechanism, which arguably offers a high degree of flexibility to respond 
to price spikes and swings, and has a more direct impact on the prices paid by the most 
vulnerable populations (Murphy 2009).  
For critical emergency situations, national, international and regional food reserves 
have been relied upon to address price volatility, and to assist to stabilise prices during 
food price shocks or surges. An emergency food reserve should be carefully 
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distinguished from buffer stocks that are generally aimed at stabilising prices. Typically, 
buffer stocks target a price band, with the upper and lower limits denoting trigger 
prices. When the market price rises above the price band, buffer stocks are released, in 
an effort to bring the market price back within the band (Briones 2011).  
Regional food reserves are often used to store staple foods that have social, political 
and economic significance, and are culturally appropriate in a particular region (such as 
rice in Asia). As highlighted throughout this thesis, rice is a critical commodity for 
ensuring food security in the East Asian region, as around two-thirds of world rice 
production originates in ASEAN+3 countries (Mukherjee 2008). As discussed in 
Chapter 2, global rice prices are highly susceptible to price volatility (Dawe 2010; Dawe 
and Slayton 2010). The strategic significance of rice is accentuated by price rises and 
volatility being catalysts for political tensions in the region, as evidenced in the 
reactions to tariffs on rice, and in responses to a proposal for a Southeast Asian rice 
cartel (OREC) that excludes the region’s importing countries, as examined in Chapter 5 
and 6 (Teng et al. 2011; Trethewie 2012). Regional rice reserves and multilateral 
cooperation can play a significant role — along with other significant policy measures 
— in helping to stabilise rice prices in the region and ensure adequate rice availability 
and supply during emergencies.  
7.3 Regional food reserves as a public good: assessing the merits and limitations of 
regional food reserves 
Historically, the stockpiling of agricultural commodities — particularly staple grains — 
has played an important role as a buffer to natural disasters, calamities, seasonal 
discrepancies and market turbulence (Murphy 2009). Food reserves were traditionally 
promoted and supported to ensure governments could intervene to stabilise markets 
during periods of food price volatility and to ensure domestic food security, especially 
in food import-dependent countries (Braun and Torero 2009; De Castro 2013). 
In 2009, in the aftermath of the Global Food Crisis in 2007–08, high-level 
discussions involving multilateral cooperation on international food reserves took place 
at the G8 Agriculture Minister’s Meeting, the United Nations General Assembly, and 
the newly convened World Grain Forum held in Russia. These discussions and 
subsequent proposals have focused on two strategic aims — firstly, the need for reliable 
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emergency food supplies during a crisis; and secondly, addressing the systemic 
imbalance between supply and demand that contributed to recent price volatility 
(Willoughby and Parsons 2009). 
Regional food reserves represent a move towards increased multilateral cooperation 
in relation to food security in East Asia. Regional food reserves have an important role 
to play, in conjunction with local and international reserves, in alleviating food 
insecurity in emergency situations and times of crisis (Takashi and Suwunnamek 2011). 
A multilateral approach provides a stark contrast to primarily state-centric approaches to 
food security discussed in the previous chapter. As argued in the previous chapter, state-
centric neomercantilist or protectionist approaches can, at times, spatially and 
temporally reproduce food insecurities and merely move these insecurities around 
geographically within a region. This is not to suggest that national policy measures 
cannot stabilise domestic food prices and provide effective protection for some 
domestic consumers and producers. Rather, it simply infers that state-centric approaches 
to food security often benefit some countries in the region to the detriment of others. 
Due to trade-related concerns and constraints at national and international levels, 
there have been inherent limitations with the effectiveness of food reserves. One of the 
limitations of larger national and regional rice reserves is that storing these stocks is 
expensive, particularly in tropical conditions — and even if well managed to avoid 
deterioration in quality (Timmer 2010). Additionally, orthodox and neoclassical 
agricultural economists have raised concerns that international food reserves have the 
potential to distort the market mechanism and price signals and that public sector or 
state intervention in the food markets should be avoided (Dawe et al. 2014; Timmer 
2013; Trethewie 2013). Such economists prescribe economic liberalisation of 
agricultural markets, greater integration and the adoption of market-based instruments 
and initiatives to deal with price volatility, reproving public food reserves as a form of 
interventionist policy that stifles other forms of risk mitigation such as commodity 
exchanges and producer insurance (Trethewie 2013). Yet, scholars such as Murphy 
(2009) argue food reserves can be effective in limiting the severity and variation of 
international price fluctuations. It is important here to refer the substantive work of 
classical political economists such as Polanyi (1944, 1947) and contemporary critical 
IPE scholars — outlined in Chapter 3 — who point to the contradictions of this type of 
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economic liberalisation. These scholars contend that paradoxically, these markets were 
created and maintained through prolonged and continuous state intervention and a close 
relationship between the state and agri-food corporations (Aldo and Lazzarini 2014; 
Nolke 2015). The scholars have argued that free trade in agri-food markets is an 
illusion, and that states have long intervened in agri-food markets (Chang 2008; Ervine 
and Fridell 2015). These seemingly apparent contradictions are entirely consistent with 
the internal contradictions of neoliberalism (Brohman 1995; Harvey 2005; Potter and 
Tilzey 2005; Robinson 1966).  
 It is now pertinent to return to the debates on food reserves and market intervention. 
Food reserves often serve as the last bastion to supply for domestic markets in times of 
crisis. As Dano and Peria (2006: 2) also contend, regional food reserves in particular 
arguably ‘not only benefit countries facing food emergencies, but are one way of 
promoting cooperation and mutual assistance among countries, especially developing 
ones, amid the challenges posed by globalization’. Regional cooperation can, to some 
extent, play a role in reassuring governments in the region about food availability 
during crises and in dissuading them from pursuing detrimental trade restrictions, export 
bans and panicked hoarding as witnessed during the World Food Crisis of 2007–08 
(Jongskul 2012). 
The spike in global food prices in 2007–08 caused concern among ASEAN member 
states about the possible social and economic impacts in the region and political 
instability. These concerns underlined the logic of a need to move towards a more 
multilateral approach to regional food security. Along this line, the ASEAN member 
states acknowledged that there was an urgent need to develop a robust regional policy 
framework comprising of a strategic set of measures and actions that would ensure 
sustainable and long-term food security in Southeast Asia and the broader East Asian 
region (ASEAN 2008, 2009).  
7.4 The ASEAN Integrated Food Security (AIFS) Framework 
In response to the Global Food Crisis of 2007–08, ASEAN approved the ASEAN 
Integrated Food Security (AIFS) Framework. In August 2008, at the Special Senior 
Officials of the 29th Meeting of ASEAN Ministers of Agriculture and Forestry in 
Chiang Mai, Thailand, delegates discussed the concept of the AIFS Framework. The 
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fundamental goal of the AIFS Framework is to improve and support the livelihoods of 
farmers and to ensure regional food security over the long-term. At this meeting, 
officials also mapped out a Strategic Plan of Action on Food Security in the ASEAN 
Region that outlined six corresponding strategic objectives to the AIFS Framework 
(ASEAN 2009). In March 2009, ASEAN formally approved the framework. One of the 
components is to support establishing a long-term mechanism for APTERR. On 12 July 
2012, the ASEAN+3 intergovernmental agreement establishing APTERR entered into 
force. It is worth noting that it is difficult to analyse the institutional effectiveness of 
APTERR in the short period since its implementation; hence, it is critical to situate 
APTERR within the broader historical context of regional rice reserves in East Asia.  
7.5 Historical context of APTERR 
APTERR builds on previous food reserve mechanisms by ASEAN and ASEAN+3, 
including the ASEAN Emergency Rice Reserve, which was launched in 1979, and the 
more recent East Asia Emergency Rice Reserve. The ASEAN Emergency Rice Reserve 
was launched as part of the ASEAN Food Security Reserve agreement, with member 
states providing voluntary contributions to a stockpile. After a quarter of a century, 
pledges for the ASEAN Emergency Rice Reserve had only reached 87,000 tonnes, 
inspiring the decision to expand membership to the Plus Three countries in 2001. This 
reserve volume represented only four days’ consumption quantity of ASEAN countries 
(an extremely small figure compared to a real food emergency) (Yoshimatsu 2014: 95). 
Yoshimatsu (2014) provides a comprehensive overview of the relations of power 
between various states in the region and between key rice importers and exporters. 
These power differentials and dynamics of state relations in the region are a critical 
political factor in the contestation, formation and evolution of regional institutions and 
mechanisms such as APTERR. 
A team that had Japanese support recommended and then implemented a three-year 
pilot project — the East Asia Emergency Rice Reserve (Dano and Peria 2006) — with a 
Tier 3 program being piloted in Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, and the Philippines. 
From 2005–10, nearly 3,000 tonnes of rice was distributed as food relief. Much of this 
was procured using cash donations from the Japanese Government. A one in-kind 
donation of 520 tonnes of rice was sent from Thailand to the Philippines to assist the 
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victims of Typhoon Ketsana. One pilot test of the Tier 1 release involved a 10,000 tonne 
rice shipment from Vietnam to the Philippines in early 2010. The shipment was 
executed as a purchase agreement between the National Food Authority of the 
Philippines and the Vietnam Southern Food Corporation, which is the largest rice 
exporter in Vietnam. The order was used by the National Food Authority to meet relief 
and rehabilitation requirements after a series of typhoons battered the Philippines in late 
2009 (Dano and Peria 2006). The purchase agreement was negotiated based on 
prevailing international prices and standard rice trade practices. 
7.6 APTERR pledges 
A total of 787,000 tonnes of rice has been pledged towards APTERR. The reserve 
consists mostly of rice stocks that have been designated or earmarked out of national 
reserves by ASEAN+3 countries to meet emergency food requirements in the region, 
plus stockpiled rice that has been voluntarily donated to the reserve. Under the 
APTERR agreement, 13 countries have pledged to make a total of 787,000 tonnes of 
rice available in the case of an emergency to anticipate sudden instabilities in supply 
and production caused by armed conflict, calamities, and natural disasters. China, Japan 
and Korea earmarked 300,000 tonnes, 250,000 tonnes and 150,000 tonnes of rice 
respectively, while ASEAN countries have contributed 87,000 tonnes. Of the ASEAN 
countries, Thailand was the biggest contributor with 15,000 tonnes, while Vietnam and 
Myanmar contributed 14,000 tonnes respectively. Indonesia and the Philippines each 
contributed 12,000 tonnes, Malaysia and Singapore provided 6,000 tonnes and 5,000 
tonnes respectively, and Brunei, Laos and Cambodia provided 3,000 tonnes (ASEAN 
2011).  
7.7 APTERR activation 
The APTERR scheme can be activated during an event that is classified as a food 
emergency. Operational definitions of a food emergency vary. In the context of the 
AIFS Framework, an emergency is defined as ‘the state or condition having suffered 
extreme and unexpected natural or man-induced calamity, which is unable to cope with 
such state or condition through its national reserve and is unable to procure the needed 
supply through normal trade’ (ASEAN 2009: 3). Fundamentally, APTERR is designed 
to be a mutual assistance scheme to provide food assistance and strengthen food 
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security in emergencies, by sharing rice stocks and contributing to price stability in the 
region.  
7.8 APTERR in practice 
Under the APTERR, rice is available through a three-tier system involving: 
• Tier One: special commercial contracts 
• Tier Two: emergency grants and loans 
• Tier Three: delivery of donated rice in times of acute emergency (Briones 2011). 
Various releases of stockpiled rice have occurred under the precursor to APTERR, 
the East Asia Emergency Rice Reserve and APTERR: 
• In 2004, 87 households and students in Vientiane Province received over 13 metric 
tonnes from December 2004 to June 2005 in Laos for the purposes of a poverty 
alleviation program (APTERR 2014). 
• From November 2005 to November 2006, 100 metric tonnes of rice was distributed 
to nearly 10,000 people in Sampang District and over 22,000 people in Jember 
District in Indonesia to help people affected by flood and as part of a rehabilitation 
program (APTERR 2014). 
• In July 2006 to December 2006, over 930 metric tonnes of rice was distributed 
under a relief program to assist people affected by volcanic eruption and typhoons in 
the Philippines. Over 154,000 households in Leyte, Cebu, Davao and Manila City 
were beneficiaries (APTERR 2014). 
• From July 2007 to January 2008, nearly 380 metric tonnes of rice was distributed to 
help people affected by flood and under a poverty alleviation program in Cambodia. 
Over 11,500 households in Kampong Thom, Ratanakiri, Kandal, Kompong 
Chhnang and Takeo were beneficiaries (APTERR 2014). 
• From March 2008 to May 2009, 186.5 metric tonnes of rice was distributed to over 
18,000 householders in Central Java and East Java to help people affected by floods 
in Indonesia (APTERR, 2014). 
• From November 2008 to January 2009, 164 metric tonnes of rice was shared among 
more than 13,000 people in Laputta and Bogalay townships in Myanmar who were 
affected by cyclone Nargis (APTERR 2014). 
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• In 2010, two releases of stockpiled rice occurred under Tier Three, with Thailand 
donating 520 metric tonnes of rice to the Philippines through the APTERR 
Secretariat for humanitarian support with Typhoon Ketsana, Typhoon Megi, La 
Nina and flash flooding, and Japan donating 347 metric tonnes for victims of 
Typhoon Ketsana in Laos (Jongskul 2012). One release occurred under Tier One, 
with 10,000 tonnes transferring from Vietnam to the Philippines (Briones 2011).  
• In late 2011, 50 metric tonnes of milled rice and 31,000 cans of cooked rice were 
distributed among more than 8,000 flood-affected households in the central region 
of Thailand (APTERR 2014). 
• In 2012, fifty tonnes of rice was provided to six drought-affected villages in 
Bojonegoro, Indonesia (Lensa Indonesia 2012). 
• In 2013, Japan contributed 200,000 US dollars to the Philippines in February to 
procure rice with the purpose of assisting the victims of super typhoon Bopha 
(Trethewie 2013). Japan continued its support following the devastation of Typhoon 
Haiyan in the Philippines later in the same year, providing rice worth approximately 
500,000 US dollars through the framework of APTERR (APTERR 2014).  
• In December 2013, a Committee on Disaster Relief Assistance to the Philippines for 
Typhoon Haiyan met to discuss Thailand’s ongoing contributions to the affected 
people for the recent crisis, following initial contributions including thousands of 
airlifted ready-to-use packages. Thailand’s ensuing disaster relief contribution 
included 5,000 tonnes of rice under the APTERR scheme, in addition to financial 
donations from the public and additional relief supplies to be donated by the Thai 
Royal Family (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Thailand 2013). 
• In April 2014, a distribution of the 5,000 metric tonnes of rice donated by the 
Government of Thailand, through the APTERR Tier Three program, to the 
Philippines Government for the victims of Typhoon Haiyan (APTERR 2014). 
• In July 2014, the Government of Malaysia donated 350 metric tonnes or rice to the 
Philippines Government for the victims of Typhoon Haiyan (APTERR 2014). 
7.9 The effectiveness of APTERR 
With the exception of Briones (2011), Briones et al. (2012), Trethewie (2013) and 
Yoshimatsu (2014), limited research has been done to date that assess the effectiveness 
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of APTERR in addressing regional food insecurity. Briones et al. (2012) completed a 
comprehensive review of APTERR, utilising econometric analysis to consider the 
impact of monthly trade flows on domestic prices for large rice-producing and rice-
consuming low- to middle-income countries in the region, including the People’s 
Republic of China, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam. Estimated 
average responses were compared to available reserves, and the authors determined an 
estimated impact on domestic prices that ranged from 7 to 11 per cent on a one-month 
basis. This impact suggested potential for substantive easing of price impacts in the very 
short term, with a caveat: it was acknowledged that this easing effect would be 
temporary, compared to the magnitude of the impact on the market in annual terms. 
These scholars recommended increasing the size of earmarked reserves as a measure to 
improve the effectiveness of APTERR, with feasibility assessments suggesting a 
supplementary contribution of about 1.2 million tonnes as a modest target to provide 
broad perceived benefits for enhanced capacity to offset the impact of calamities 
(Briones et al. 2012).  
Briones (2011: 6) identifies three sets of issues, limitations and challenges in 
relation to the APTERR scheme that need to be substantively addressed in order to 
ensure the effectiveness of APTERR: Firstly, technical issues regarding the volumes 
and timing of storage and release of emergency stocks; secondly, financial issues 
regarding the amount and sustainability of funding for APTERR; and finally, 
institutional issues, such as appropriate organisation structure and linkages with other 
agencies and organisations, whether public or private, at national and international 
levels. 
Another important strategic component of the AIFS Framework is the ASEAN Food 
Security Information System (AFSIS), which was implemented in two stages starting 
from 2003, with the objective of facilitating food security planning, implementation, 
monitoring and evaluation in ASEAN through the systematic collection, organisation, 
management, analysis and dissemination of food security data and information (ASEAN 
2009). AFSIS was proposed as a way to improve transparency through greater regional 
cooperation and information sharing in rice markets.  
  
136 
Scholars like Briones (2011) argue that despite some limitations, there are 
significant strengths with the APTERR scheme. The scheme has the potential to make a 
contribution in easing domestic price impacts, in the short term, by ensuring rice 
availability and supply in the event of a typical disaster scenario or emergency. It can 
also help with availability and supply in times of calamity, reducing regional volatility 
and instability. The APTERR mechanism adopts a multilateral approach to regional 
food security. The scheme fosters greater regional cooperation that has the potential to 
overcome some of the limitations of state-centric policy responses in emergency 
situations. APTERR has potential to provide immediate remedial support to alleviate 
hunger and restore livelihoods and to enhance capacity and strengthen resilience to the 
impacts of future food disasters. 
7.10 Conclusion 
This chapter has advanced the argument that many underlying systemic issues that 
produced the surge in global food prices in 2007–08 — discussed in the previous 
chapter — continue to exist today. This chapter has contended that these complex and 
interconnected transnational issues are difficult to address solely on a national basis, and 
require broader regional cooperation. Regional food security frameworks such as the 
AIFS Framework have the potential to play a role in supporting the livelihoods of 
farmers across East Asia, and protecting those who are most vulnerable to food 
insecurity during food emergencies. That said, regional rice reserves schemes — such as 
APTERR — need to consider the local context and be engaged and responsive to the 
unique needs of local communities, including cultural and environmental considerations 
(Ananta 2012; Elliott 2011). It has been argued that despite some technical, financial 
and institutional limitations, some crucial aspects of APTERR include the potential for 
the scheme to increase transparency in the regional rice market through the mutual 
exchange of information and ensure availability and supply of food during emergencies. 
It has been contended in the previous chapter that state-centric approaches to food 
security after the Global Food Crisis of 2007–08 have spatially and temporally 
reproduced food insecurities, moving these insecurities around geographically within 
the region. From a regional perspective, APTERR represents an attempt to take a more 
multilateral approach to food security and to overcome some of the inherent limitations 
of state-centric approaches. It is suggested that, if managed and moderated carefully, 
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regional food reserves may be able to significantly benefit countries facing food 
emergencies and have potential to be an effective way of promoting regional 
cooperation and mutual assistance among countries, amid challenges posed by 
increasing instability and price volatility in the contemporary global food system.  
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8. Discussions and conclusion 
8.0 Introduction  
This concluding chapter recapitulates the main arguments and contributions to 
knowledge for the thesis. It also reflects on the research design and process, as well as 
on future areas of research. The first part of this chapter restates the central research 
questions and provides a summary of the main arguments. The second part reviews the 
conceptual and empirical original contributions to knowledge of the thesis, and 
discusses their possible wider implications for knowledge. The third part of this chapter 
reflects on the theoretical framework, methodology, and research process of the thesis. 
The last part suggests some future areas of research.  
In summation, this thesis had outlined in the introduction three main objectives: 
(1) to provide a critical political economy study of the complex interplay between rice, 
politics and power in East Asia; (2) to make a contribution to understanding the 
evolution of the regional and global food system through an historically contextualised 
exploration of the political economy of rice in the East Asian region; and (3) to suggest 
an alternative analytical framework for the political economy of food insecurity in the 
region. 
To fulfil these objectives, this study focused on the agricultural commodity of rice 
as a prism through which to examine and explore the complex and multidimensional 
nature of food insecurity in the region, with rice providing a lens through which to 
explore social relations and relations of power that underpin the political economy of 
food and agriculture. In the Introduction, this study identified a number of gaps in 
literature in relation to a contemporary analysis of the political economy of rice, with a 
second gap appearing in relation to the evolution of the global food system from an East 
Asian perspective. This thesis has made a contribution towards addressing these gaps in 
literature. 
8.1 Central research question and summary of main arguments 
This thesis has investigated and responded to the following research questions and sub-
questions: (1) What are the socio-political and economic characteristics of the 
commodity complex of rice in the East Asian region? What role does the political 
economy of rice play in regional food insecurity? (2) What does the political economy 
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of rice in the East Asian region reveal about the characteristics of the contemporary 
global food system? To what extent do the socio-political and economic characteristics 
of the commodity complex of rice in the East Asian region contradict or reaffirm a 
neoliberal corporate food regime? (3) What does the political economy of rice in the 
East Asian region reveal about the Global Food Crisis of 2007–08? (4) What are the 
regional governance structures and institutions for the commodity complex of rice? 
How effective are these regional structures and institutions of governance, such as 
regional rice reserves, in addressing food insecurity? 
To investigate these questions, this thesis has outlined and employed an 
interdisciplinary theoretical framework — drawing on the strengths of a variety of 
social and political science disciplines, including critical approaches to IPE, rural 
sociology and agrarian political economy. This study has attempted to move beyond the 
market logic of neoclassical and orthodox economic analysis, which renders rice as 
merely another commercial or purely economic commodity. Arguably, the 
interdisciplinary critical IPE approach has enabled a more holistic exposition of the 
socio-political, economic and cultural dimensions of the commodity complex of rice 
and food insecurity in East Asia.  
The thesis has argued four main points. Firstly, due to the cultural, socio-political, 
and economic importance of rice in East Asia, few governments in the region have 
allowed the domestic rice sector to be influenced wholly by global market supply and 
demand forces. Rather, governments in the region routinely intervene in rice markets in 
an attempt to reconcile the paradoxical objectives of providing low rice prices for 
consumers and remunerative incentives to support the lives and livelihoods of farmers. 
Secondly, state-centric approaches to food security after the Global Food Crisis of 
2007–08 have spatially and temporally reproduced food insecurities, moving these 
insecurities around geographically within the region. Thirdly, much of the critical agri-
food literature to date has focused on the neoliberal characteristics of the contemporary 
corporate food regime. However, this literature has often overlooked the nuances in 
varieties of capitalism in East Asia, largely ignoring the rise of state capitalism and the 
emergence of neomercantilism. Finally, the East Asian rice complex is characterised by 
state-led capitalism and neomercantilism. The concept of a global neoliberal food 
regime does not properly account for the agri-food sector in the East Asian region, nor 
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does it capture the unique historical and cultural context of the region. Many states in 
the East Asian region, including China and Thailand, employ neomercantilist strategies 
in the rice sector.  
This study has revealed that there is currently no regional or global ‘free market’ in 
rice, nor historically has there ever been. Laissez-faire in the regional and global rice 
market is indeed a ‘utopia’ (Polanyi 1944, 1947). Instead, the political economy of the 
rice complex of East Asia is characterised by new forms of mercantilism and state-led 
capitalism. This has important implications for current and ongoing negotiations in 
relation to so-called free trade agreements (FTAs). This is not to say that some 
governments in East Asia are not implementing economic liberalisation in their argi-
food sectors; indeed, some states in the region have adopted neoliberal settings in some 
agri-food sectors. This is the paradox of rice, politics and power in East Asia. This 
paradox can be seen in the case study in Chapter 4 that discussed Chinese state 
capitalism in the agri-food sector. China has implemented aspects of economic 
liberalisation, and this is evident with accession to the WTO and liberalisation of some 
of its agri-food sectors, such as soy; however, at the same, it is adopting a new state–led 
mercantilist strategy in key grains such as rice — utilising SOEs such as COFCO to 
secure global supply chains of feed, food and fuel. In many parts of East Asia, including 
China, the commodity of rice epitomises national food security.  
While governments in the region agree to liberalise with one hand, on the other 
hand, they continue to intervene in strategic markets and key political and 
economically-strategic sectors — such as rice — to implement new forms of 
mercantilism and protectionism. This was evident in the case study in Chapter 5, with 
the Thai rice pledging subsidy scheme that contributed to former Prime Minister, 
Yingluck Shinawatra, and her Pheu Thai Party coming to power in Thailand. It also, in 
the end, contributed to the downfall of the Pheu Thai Party. This demonstrated that 
governments and the ruling elite in many parts of East Asia are acutely aware of the 
cultural significance and socio-political power of rice farmers and producers, traders 
and consumers. Political fortunes in the region can literally rise and fall with the price 
of rice.  
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This humble grain that played such an important role historically in the 
establishment and expansion of many of the ancient civilisations and state building and 
formation in the region continues to hold a special cultural significance in the lives and 
livelihoods of local peoples. Rice is the most widely consumed and ecologically 
adaptable cereal on earth, and is essential commodity in relation to food insecurity in 
the region. This was examined in Chapter 5, and Chapter 6 with a case study of the role 
of rice in the Global Food Crises of 2007–08. The crisis highlighted that the causes and 
consequences of food insecurity are increasingly transnational, complex and 
interconnected. The state-centric protectionist or neomercantilist responses to the crises 
only exacerbated and reproduced food insecurities in the region, moving these 
insecurities around geographically. In response to the crisis, states in the region 
increased regional cooperation in relation to a regional rice reserve: APTERR. Regional 
strategies have been based upon the need to consider the local context and be engaged 
and responsive to the unique needs of local communities, including cultural and 
environmental considerations. Regional food security frameworks have been developed 
with the aims of supporting and improving the livelihoods of farmers across East Asia, 
protecting those who are most vulnerable to food insecurity, and responding to local 
needs and environmental change (including climate change). 
However, this study has contended that rice is not just a commercial crop that 
sustains livelihoods and a staple food that provides calories to sustain life — it is an 
allegory for culture, society, polity, ecology and a sense of identity in many parts of 
East Asia. Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 have outlined the rationale of why rice is seen by many 
governments in East Asia, including the Chinese and Thai Governments, as a strategic 
political commodity: it is the single most important element in the diet of the poor and 
vulnerable sections of society and an important source of employment and income for 
rural farmers. Hence, the visible hand of the state routinely intervenes in domestic rice 
markets to ensure socio-political stability and economic objectives. The interventions 
take many forms, including rice subsidy schemes. An example of the rice subsidy 
scheme in Thailand was examined in detail in Chapter 5. 
One of the central arguments posited in this study is that the commodity complex of 
rice in East Asia cannot be characterised as neoliberal. This has important implications 
for the characterisation of the East Asian food system and the broader global food 
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system and any conceptualisation of an emergent third food regime. This is 
fundamentally because rice is a crucial socio-cultural, political and economic 
commodity that lies at the critical intersection of politics and power in East Asia. 
Reflecting on these conclusions, it is insightful to return again to the postulation 
outlined by Pritchard and Burch (2003:1) and Young (2012:10) in the opening chapter. 
Indeed, neoliberal globalisation in the agri-food system is a highly ‘contested historical 
process’ shaped ‘by patterns of power and privilege’ in the global political economy, 
and as such, it is far from an inevitable process. 
8.2: Summary of contributions to knowledge 
As outlined in the introductory chapter, through its study of the dynamic interplay 
between rice, politics and power in East Asia and the political economy of food 
insecurity in the region, this thesis makes four main original contributions to 
knowledge. Firstly, by adopting an interdisciplinary theoretical framework, this research 
makes a contribution to a broad range of agri-food literature in the fields of critical IPE, 
rural sociology and agrarian political economy. Secondly, it brings new conceptual 
knowledge and empirical information from case studies about China and Thailand into 
existing literature on the regional and global agri-food system, and the political 
economy of rice in East Asia. Thirdly, case studies about the role of rice during the 
Global Food Crisis of 2007–08 and the role of regional rice reserves in the East Asian 
region bring new conceptual knowledge and empirical information into existing 
literature on these topics. Finally, the thesis provides new perspectives and analysis of 
food regime literature, and makes a historically contextualised and culturally attuned 
contribution to understanding the commodity complex of rice in the agri-food system of 
East Asia. 
8.3: Reflections on research design and process 
This part of the chapter reflects on the theoretical framework, methodology, and 
research process of the thesis. This study has emphasised that a regional perspective can 
reveal much about the contours of the global food system. The significance of 
comprehending the historical and cultural differences between regions in the global 
food system and varieties of capitalism are important. This is akin to Mintz’s (1977, 
1985, 1998) ‘regional analysis’ of the Caribbean — discussed in Chapter 2 — which 
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went to great lengths to carefully differentiate the Caribbean as a culturally and 
historically specific sector of the ‘periphery’ within a broader world-systems analysis. A 
historically contextualised, culturally nuanced and differentiated regional perspective 
reiterates the importance of Western agri-food scholars being careful not to assume an 
ahistorical Western-centric or an ethno-centric political economy perspective of the 
agri-food system or an emergent third food regime. Reflecting on the research design 
and process, this study has been careful to try and avoid this type of problematic 
analysis. This thesis has attempted to engage with some substantive scholarship and 
literature from East Asian scholars and researchers.  
There are some limitations in this process. It is important to note that there were 
some primary and secondary sources that were not available with an English translation 
and were difficult to access and translate. In particular, with Thailand now under 
military rule, some critical articles and reports written by Thai scholars are no longer 
accessible online and have been removed. While the author had previously spent time as 
a visiting scholar at Peking University in Beijing, China, he planned to return to 
Thailand to source some additional primary and secondary sources for this study. These 
travel plans were prevented by ongoing violence and unrest in the lead up to the 
Military coup in Thailand. Nonetheless, a supportive network of Chinese and Thai 
scholars interested in critical agri-food studies and IPE have provided some substantive 
additional sources for this study and assisted in overcoming this limitation.  
While established scholars and researchers across many disciplines are increasingly 
engaging in collaborative and interdisciplinary research, some substantive challenges 
remain for early career researchers and PhD candidates in attempting to adopt an 
interdisciplinary theoretical framework and methodology for a thesis. Often, early 
career researchers face significant resistance and critique for daring to be an 
interdisciplinary ‘heretic’ and collaborate across disciplinary boundaries at such an early 
stage in their research careers. Yet, a burgeoning network of critical agri-food and IPE 
scholars are deeply committed to the merits of interdisciplinary study, and have greatly 
assisted with research towards this thesis. Despite the challenges of interdisciplinary 
research — which are significant—the author remains convinced of the substantive 
contribution that can be made through the cross-fertilisation of disciplines and 
collaborative research.  
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8.4: Reflections on future areas of research 
There is a need for more research in this area. Future studies of the global agri-food 
system need to be sensitive to historical and cultural differences in the political 
economy between regions in the global political economy. This study has highlighted 
the importance of understanding historically and culturally differentiated regional 
contexts when examining the political economy of individual agri-food commodities in 
the global food system. This study has drawn inspiration from the pioneering agri-food 
studies of the commodity complexes in the East Asian region and the East Asian food 
system undertaken by Burch et al. (1994), Burch (1996), McMichael (2000a) and 
Pritchard and Curtis (2004). Most of these critical agri-food studies were completed 
over a decade ago. This study has made a further contribution to understanding the 
political economy of rice and the East Asia food system. Further research on the 
political economy of the East Asian agri-food system is required in order to more fully 
comprehend the role that this region plays in the global food system and an incipient 
third food regime. Further research in required on agri-food systems in other regions 
too. For example, researchers might consider questions such as, ‘Does the concept of a 
neoliberal corporate food regime account for the political economy of the agri-food 
system in South Asia?’, and ‘What can a regional perspective reveal about the 
distinctive cultural and historical development of agri-food system and markets in this 
region?’  
Another important area for future research is comparing and contrasting APTERR 
with other regional food reserves, such as the South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation Food Bank. This type of comparative regional research may provide 
greater insights into regional cooperation mechanisms in relation to food insecurity and 
the role of regional food reserves. 
This thesis has made a contribution to understanding of the varieties of state-led 
capitalism in the agri-food sector in East Asia — specifically Chinese state capitalism 
and state capitalism in Thailand. While this study examined COFCO — China’s largest 
SOE in the agri-food sector — further research is needed on other SOEs and SWFs in 
the East Asian region and globally to examine the extent to which state-owned 
companies are primarily pursuing profits and/or implementing state-centric 
neomercantilist strategies in the agri-food sector. Evidence is emerging of growing 
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opposition, in host countries, to foreign-based government-owned enterprises investing 
in farmlands, with transparency of, and motivations for, farm purchase being the 
primary concerns. The dynamic interplay between states, corporations and agri-food 
markets is fertile ground for further research.  
Drawing on the recent critical IPE studies by Ebenau et al. (2015) and Nolke (2015), 
further research is needed in relation to conceptions of state capitalism and its historical 
and contemporary role in the global agri-food system. Future research could focus on 
the BRICS practising distinct varieties of state-led capitalism, including the emergence 
of potential neomercantilist strategies in the agri-food sector. While the traditional 
North–South axis of trade remains dominant in the global food system, South–South 
trade and power relations are playing an increasingly important role in the global food 
system. Further research is needed to examine the incipient importance of South–South 
relations in the global food system. For example, is the emergence of new nodes of 
power in the constellation of agri-food import and export complexes facilitating a 
reconfiguration of the global food system? This research would provide greater insights 
into the rise of the BRICS and the proliferation of increasingly powerful SOEs and 
SWFs — and their substantive role in the transformation of the global food system and 
conceptual implications for a nascent third food regime. 
While this study has examined China and Thailand, further research is needed in 
relation to the rise of agri-food powerhouses such as Brazil and India. Further research 
might examine the extent to which of these states and their agri-food corporations, 
national champions and SOEs are reshaping the agri-food landscape and relations of 
power in the global political economy. Such research could also critically examine the 
resource scarcity narrative and the conjecture that SOEs and SWFs are intensifying the 
competition for natural resources — including food, feed and fuel across the globe. 
Further analysis in this area could provide more comprehensive insights into the 
conjecture of a transition towards a more polycentric or multipolar global food, feed, 
fuel and finance system.  
Further research in this area would have much to contribute to the burgeoning agri-
food literature on resource grabbing and provide further conceptual and empirical 
contributions in relation to the hypothesis that some states, which are evoking a 
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discourse of national food security, are attempting to secure and guarantee their access 
to global supply chains of food, feed and fuel through the acquisition of agricultural 
infrastructure, natural resources and foreign land. Further studies in this area would 
have much to contribute to understanding the contemporary politics of food insecurity.  
As highlighted by the substantive work on political ecology of food and agro-
ecology of scholars such as Altieri (2009) and Shiva (1992, 2000, 2009), there are deep 
ecological dimensions to understanding the production of rice in East Asia. This study 
does touch on some of these ecological dimensions; however, as discussed in the 
opening chapter, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to engage with substantive 
ecological issues and debates in relation to rice production. Future research focusing on 
the socio-political ecology of rice in East Asia would add a further dimension to a more 
holistic understanding of the politics of rice in the region.  
Finally, drawing inspiration from the influential work of Mintz (1995) and 
McMichael (2000b), this study has sought to make a conceptual contribution to 
understanding the relationship between food and concepts of power. There have been 
many other substantive agri-food studies that examined this relationship; however, there 
is still space for further research on the dynamic interplay between food and concepts of 
power. Further research in this area has much to offer IPE and agri-food studies.  
As argued in Chapter 1 and 2, both critical IPE and agri-food studies have much to 
offer conceptually and empirically to an understanding of the agri-food systems — both 
past and present. As discussed in Chapter 3, the current restructuring of the global food 
system and its socio-political and economic features has consequences for 
comprehending the broader configuration and transformation of the contemporary 
global political economy. Future research that draws on literature from both critical IPE 
and agri-food studies has much to offer both fields of study in relation to 
comprehending the structures and relations of power in the global food system. 
Reflecting once again on the citation discussed in Chapter 2, Higgot and Payne 
(2000: ix) have adeptly articulated that in order to address the fundamental analytical 
challenge of understanding ‘complex transnational phenomena’, what is required is a 
readiness to employ interdisciplinary methodological approaches to social and political 
science. The author remains committed to this collaborative approach, with the hope 
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that it will inspire further interdisciplinary research into the political economy of food 
and agri-food systems, as well as other complex transnational phenomena in the global 
political economy.  
  
  
148 
References 
Abbott, Jason P. and Owen Worth. 2002. ‘Introduction: The Many Worlds of Critical 
International Political Economy.’ In Critical Perspectives on International 
Political Economy, eds. J. P. Abbott and O. Worth. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Aligica, Paul D. and Vlad Tarko. 2012. ‘State Capitalism and the Rent-seeking 
Conjecture’. Constitutional Political Economy 23(4): 1–23. 
Altieri, Miguel A. 2009. ‘Agroecology, Small Farms, and Food Sovereignty’. 
Monthly Review 61(3): 102–113. 
Amin, Samir. 2013. ‘China 2013’. Monthly Review 64(10): 1. Accessed 26 June 
2015. Available at http://monthlyreview.org/2013/03/01/china-2013/ 
Ananta, Aris. 2012. ‘Sustainable and Just Social Protection in Southeast Asia’. 
ASEAN Economic Bulletin 29(3): 171-183. 
Ananta, Aris and Richard Barichello. eds. 2012. Poverty and Global Recession in 
Southeast Asia. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 
Arase, David. 2010. ‘Non-Traditional Security in China–ASEAN Cooperation: The 
Institutionalization of Regional Security Cooperation and the Evolution of East 
Asian Regionalism’. Asian Survey 50(4): 808–833. 
Araghi, Farshad. 2003. ‘Food Regimes and the Production of Value: Some 
Methodological Issues’. The Journal of Peasant Studies 30(2): 337–368. 
Arrighi, Giovanni. 2007. Adam Smith in Beijing: Lineages of the Twenty-First 
Century. London: Verso. 
Arrighi, Giovanni. 2010. The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power and the 
Origins of our Times. London: Verso. 
Arunrat, Noppol and Nathsuda Pumijumnong. 2015. ‘The Preliminary Study of 
Climate Change Impact on Rice Production and Economic in Thailand’. Asian 
Social Science 11(15): 275–294. 
  
149 
ASEAN Plus Three Emergency Rice Reserve (APTERR). 2014. ‘APTERR 
Activations’. Press Release. Bangkok. Accessed 26 June 2015. Available at 
http://www.apterr.org. 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). 2008. ‘ASEAN Is Ready to 
Tackle Soaring Food Prices’. Press Release. Jakarta, Indonesia: ASEAN 
Secretariat. Accessed 26 June 2015. Available at 
http://www.aseansec.org/21492.htm. 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). 2009. ASEAN Integrated Food 
Security (AIFS) Framework and Strategic Plan of Action on Food Security in the 
ASEAN Region (SPA-FS) 2009–2013. Jakarta, Indonesia: ASEAN Secretariat. 
Accessed 26 June 2015. Available at 
http://www.gafspfund.org/sites/gafspfund.org/files/Documents/Cambodia_11_of_
16_REGIONAL_STRATEGY_ASEAN_Integrated_Food_Security_Framework.p
df. 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). 2011. ASEAN Plus Three 
Emergency Rice Reserve Agreement. Jakarta, Indonesia: ASEAN Secretariat. 
Accessed 26 June 2015. Available at 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/97411992/APTERR-Agreement. 
Asia Society and International Rice Research Institute (IRRI). 2010. ‘Never an 
Empty Bowl: Sustaining Food Security in Asia’. Task Force Report: Executive 
Summary. New York: Asia Society. 
Atanassova-Cornelis, Elena and Frans-Paul van der Putten. eds. 2014. Changing 
Security Dynamics in East Asia: A Post-US Regional Order in The Making? 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Bakker, Isabella and Stephen Gill. eds. 2003. Power, Production, and Social 
Reproduction: Human Insecurity in the Global Political Economy. New York: 
Palgrave McMillian.  
Ban, Cornel and Mark Blyth. 2013. ‘The BRICs and the Washington Consensus: An 
introduction’. Review of International Political Economy 20(2): 241–255. 
  
150 
Barker, Randolph, Robert. W. Herdt and Beth Rose. 1985. The Rice Economy of 
Asia. Washington DC: Resources for the Future. 
Barrett, Christopher B, eds. 2013. Food Security and Sociopolitical Stability. 
London: Oxford University Press. 
Bassett, Thomas J. and Alex Winter-Nelson. 2010. The Atlas of World Hunger. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
Bazoobandi, Sara, ed. 2014. The Politics of Food Security: Asian and Middle Eastern 
Strategies. Berlin: Gerlach Press. 
Beeson, Mark. 2007 ‘The Political Economy of Security: Geopolitics and Capitalist 
Development in the Asia–Pacific’. In Critical Security in the Asia–Pacific, eds. 
M. McDonald and A. Burke. New York: Manchester University Press. 
Bello, Amelia L. 2005. ‘Ensuring Food Security: A Case for ASEAN Integration’. 
Asian Journal of Agriculture and Development 2(1–2): 87–108. 
Bello, Walden. 2009. The Food Wars. New York: Verso. 
Bello, Walden, Shea Cunningham and Poh Li Kheng. 1998. A Siamese Tragedy. 
Development and Disintegration in Modern Thailand. New York: Zed Books. 
Best, Jacqueline and Matthew Paterson, eds. 2010. Cultural Political Economy. 
London: Routledge.  
Shepherd, Laura, ed. 2013. Critical Approaches to Security: An Introduction to 
Theories and Methods. London: Routledge. 
Blyth, Mark. 2002. Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth 
Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Borras Jr., Saturnino M., Philip McMichael and Ian Scoones, eds. 2011a. The Politics 
of Biofuels, Land and Agrarian Change. New York: Routledge. 
Borras Jr., Saturnino M., Philip McMichael and Ian Scoones, eds. 2011b. ‘Towards a 
better understanding of global land grabbing: an editorial introduction’. Journal 
of Peasant Studies 38(2): 209–216. 
  
151 
Braun, Joachim von and Maximo Torero. 2009. ‘Implementing Physical and Virtual 
Food Reserves to Protect the Poor and Prevent Market Failure’. IFPRI Policy 
Brief 10. Washington DC: IFPRI.  
Bremmer, Ian. 2008. ‘The Return of State Capitalism’. Survival: Global Politics and 
Strategy 50(3): 55–64. 
Bremmer, Ian. 2009. ‘State Capitalism Comes of Age: The End of the Free Market?’ 
Foreign Affairs May/June. 
Bremmer, Ian. 2010. The End of the Free Market: Who Wins the War Between States 
and Corporations? New York: Portfolio.  
Breslin, Shaun. 2007. China and the Global Political Economy. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Briones, Roehlano. 2011. ‘Regional Cooperation for Food Security: The Case of 
Emergency Rice Reserves in the ASEAN Plus Three’. ADB Sustainable 
Development Working Paper Series 18. Manila: Asian Development Bank 
(ADB). Accessed 26 June 2015. Available at: 
http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/adb-wp18-regional-cooperation-food-
security.pdf. 
Briones, Roehlano, Alvaro Durand-Morat, Eric Wailes and Eddie Chavez. 2012. 
‘Climate Change and Price Volatility: Can we Count on the ASEAN Plus Three 
Emergency Rice Reserve?’ ADB Sustainable Development Working Paper Series 
24. Manila: Asian Development Bank (ADB). Accessed 26 June 2015. Available 
at: http://www.adb.org/publications/climate-change-and-price-volatility-can-we- 
count-asean-plus-three-emergency-rice-reserve. 
Brohman, John. 1995. ‘Economism and Critical Silences in Development Studies: a 
Theoretical Critique of Neoliberalism’. Third World Quarterly 16(2): 297–310. 
Brown, Lester. 2011. ‘The New Geo-politics of Food’, Foreign Policy. May/June. 
Brown, Lester. 2012. Full Planet, Empty Plates: The New Geopolitics of Food 
Scarcity. New York: Norton and Company.  
  
152 
Burch, David. 1996. ‘Globalized Agriculture and Agri-food Restructuring in 
Southeast Asia: the Thai Experience’. In Globalization and Agri-food 
Restructuring: Perspectives from the Australasia Region, eds. D. Burch, R. E. 
Rickson and G. Lawrence. Aldershot: Avebury. 
Burch, David and Geoffrey Lawrence. 2009. ‘Towards a Third Food Regime – 
Behind the Transformation’. Agriculture and Human Values 26(4): 267–279. 
Burch, David, Tim Lloyd and Morrissey Oliver. 1994. ‘Agribusiness, Peasant 
Agriculture and the State: the Case of Contract Farming in Thailand.’ In Poverty, 
Inequality and Rural Development, eds. T. Lloyd, and O. Morrissey. Basingstoke: 
Macmillan Press Ltd. 
Burke, Anthony and Matt McDonald. 2007. Critical Security in the Asia-Pacific. 
New York: Manchester University Press. 
Busch, Lawrence, and Arunas Juska. 1997. ‘Beyond Political Economy: Actor 
Networks and the Globalization of Agriculture.’ Review of International Political 
Economy 4(4): 688–708. 
Caballero-Anthony Mely, Ralf Emmers and Amitav Acharya. 2006. Understanding 
Non-Traditional Security in Asia: Dilemmas in Securitization. UK: Ashgate. 
Cai, Kevin G. 2010. The Politics of Economic Regionalism: Explaining Regional 
Economic Integration in East Asia. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Cai, Meina. 2012. ‘Yasheng Huang, Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics: 
Entrepreneurship and the State’. Journal of Chinese Political Science 17(2): 215–
216. 
Campbell, Horace. 2008. ‘China in Africa: Challenging US Global Hegemony’. 
Third World Quarterly 29(1): 89–105. 
Campbell, Hugh and Jane Dixon. 2009. ‘Introduction to the Special Symposium: 
Reflecting on Twenty Years of the Food Regimes Approach in Agri-Food 
Studies’. Agriculture and Human Values 26(4): 261-265. 
Carolan, Michael. 2013. Reclaiming Food Security, London: Earthscan. 
  
153 
Casanova, Lourdes and Julian Kassum. 2014. The Political Economy of an Emerging 
Global Power: In Search of the Brazil Dream. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Chandra, Alexander C. and Lucky A. Lontoh. 2010. ‘Regional Food Security and 
Trade Policy in Southeast Asia: The Role of ASEAN’. Policy Report No. 3. 
Winnipeg: International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD). 
Chan, Kwok B., Tak-sing Cheung and Agnes S. Ku. 2007. Chinese Capitalisms. Vol. 
3. Boston: Brill. 
Chang, Ha-Joon. 2008. Bad Samaritans: The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret 
History of Capitalism. New York: Bloomsberry Press. 
Chen, Jie. 2007. ‘Rapid urbanization in China: A real challenge to soil protection and 
food security’. Catena 69: 1–15. 
Chiengkul, Prapimphan. 2012.‘Towards an Ethical Agri-food System? Resistance 
and Alternatives to the Corporate Control of the Agri-food System in Thailand’. 
14th World Congress of Social Economics, Glasgow: University of Glasgow. 
Accessed 29 June 2015. Available at: 
http://socialeconomics.org/Papers/Chiengkul5C.pdf. 
Chiengkul, Prapimphan. 2013.‘Trapped in the corporate agri-food system: resource 
grabbing and political-economic constraints in Thailand.’ IIPPE's Fourth Annual 
Conference in Political Economy, The Hague, Netherlands: International Institute 
for Social Studies. Accessed 29 June 2015. Available at http://iippe.org/wp/wp-
content/uploads/2013/06/Chiengkul-prapimphan-draft-2.pdf. 
Chiengkul, Prapimphan. 2015. Hegemony and Counter-Hegemony in the Agri-Food 
System in Thailand (1990–2014). Doctoral Thesis. University of Warwick.  
Choe, Chong Woo and Yin Xiang Kang. 2000. ‘Do China’s State-Owned Enterprises 
Maximise Profit?’Economic Record 76(234): 273–284. 
Chu, Yin-wah, ed. 2010. Chinese Capitalisms: Historical Emergence and Political 
Implications. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
  
154 
Clapp, Jennifer. 2009. ‘Food Price Volatility and Vulnerability in the Global South: 
Considering the Global Economic Context’. Third World Quarterly 30(6): 1183–
96. 
Clapp, Jennifer. 2012. Food. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Clapp, Jennifer and Marc J. Cohen. 2009. The Global Food Crisis: Governance 
Challenges and Opportunities. Canada: Wilfrid Laurier University Press. 
Clapp, Jennifer and Eric Helleiner. 2012. ‘Troubled Futures? The Global Food Crisis 
and the Politics of Agricultural Derivatives Regulation’. Review of International 
Political Economy 19(2): 181–207. 
Clayton, Sophie. 2010. ‘Country Highlights: IRRI in Thailand’. Rice Today 9(2): 42–
43.  
China National Cereals, Oils and Foodstuffs Corporation (COFCO). 2014. Accessed 
23 June 2014. Available at http://www.cofco.com/en/. 
Cohen, Benjamin J. 2009. ‘Sovereign wealth funds and national security: the great 
tradeoff’. International Affairs. 85(4): 713–731. 
Collier, David, Edward Henry and Jason Seawright. 2004. ‘Sources of Leverage in 
Causal Inference: Toward an Alternative View of Methodology’. In Rethinking 
Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards, eds. D. Collier and H. Brady. 
Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield. 
Cotula, Lorenzo. 2012. ‘The international political economy of the global land rush: a 
critical appraisal of trends, scale, geography and drivers’. Journal of Peasant 
Studies 39(3/4): 1–32. 
Cox, Robert W. 1981. ‘Social forces, states and world orders’, Millennium 10(2): 
155–62. 
Cox, Robert W. 1987. Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the 
Making of History. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Cox, Robert W. and Michael. G. Schechter. 2002. The Political Economy of a Plural 
World. London: Routledge. 
  
155 
Coy, Peter. 2012. ‘China’s State-Capitalism Trap’. Bloomberg Business. 2 February. 
Accessed 20 October 2013. Available at 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/chinas-state-capitalism-trap-
02022012.html. 
Cribb, Julian. 2010. The Coming Famine: The Global Food Crisis and What We Can 
Do to Avoid It. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Crotty, Michael. 1998. The Foundations of Social Research: Meaning and 
Perspective in the Research Process. London: Sage.  
Dano, Elenita and Elpidio Peria. 2006. Emergency or Expendency? Study of 
Emergency Rice Reserve Schemes in Asia. Manila, Philippines: Joint Publication 
of AFA and AsiaDHRRA. 
Dauvergne, Peter and Kate J. Neville. 2009. ‘The Changing North–South and South–
South Political Economy of Biofuels’. Third World Quarterly 30 (6): 1087-1102. 
David, Cristina C., and Huang, Jikun. 1996. ‘Political economy of rice price 
protection in Asia’. Economic Development and Cultural Change 44(3): 463–483. 
Dawe, David. 2008. ‘Have Recent Increases in International Cereal Prices Been 
Transmitted to Domestic Economies? The Experience in Seven Large Asian 
Countries’. Rome: Agricultural Development Economics Division, Food and 
Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO). 
Dawe, David, ed. 2010. The Rice Crisis: Markets, Policies and Food Security. 
London: Earthscan. 
Dawe, David and Tom Slayton. 2010. The world rice market crisis of 2007–2008. In 
The Rice Crisis: Markets, Policies, and Food Security, ed. D. Dawe. London: 
Earthscan  
Dawe, David and Peter Timmer. 2012. ‘Why stable food prices are a good thing: 
Lessons from stabilizing rice prices in Asia’. Global Food Security 1: 127–133. 
Dawe, David, Steven Jaffee and Nuno Santos. 2014. Rice in the Shadow of 
Skyscrapers: Policy Choices in a Dynamic East and Southeast Asian Setting. 
  
156 
Rome: FAO. Accessed 29 June 2015. Available at: http://www.fao.org/3/a-
i4238e.pdf. 
De Castro, Paolo, Felice Adinolfi, Fabian Capitanio, Salvatore Di Falco and Angelo 
Di Manbro. eds. 2013. The Politics of Land and Food Scarcity. London: 
Earthscan. 
De Schutter, Olivier. 2008. Building resilience: a human rights framework for food 
and nutritional security: report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, 
Olivier De Schutter. 8 September. A/HRC/9/23. New York: United Nations. 
Accessed 29 June 2015. Available at 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/48cf71dd2.html. 
De Schutter, Olivier. 2009. ‘The Role of the Right to Food in Achieving Sustainable 
Global Food Security’, Statement by the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to 
Food to the World Summit on Food Security, Rome, 18 November. 
Dixon, Jane. 2002. The Changing Chicken: Chooks, Cooks, and Culinary Cultures. 
Sydney: University of New South Wales University Press. 
Durrenberger, Paul, ed. 1996. ‘State Power and Culture in Thailand’. Southeast Asia 
Studies: Monograph 44. New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press. 
Ebenau, Matthias, Ian Bruff and Christian May. eds. 2015. New Directions in 
Comparative Capitalisms Research: Critical and Global Perspectives. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Elliott, Lorraine. 2011. ‘Securitising Food Futures in the Asia–Pacific: Human 
Securitising Regional Frameworks’. Asia Security Initiative Policy Series 
Working Paper 15. Singapore: RSIS, Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) 
Studies. 
Ervin, Kate and Gavin Fridell. eds. 2015. Beyond Free Trade: Alternative 
Approaches to Trade, Politics and Power. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Falvey, Lindsay. 2000. Thai Agriculture: Golden Cradle of Millennia. Thailand: 
Kasetsart University Press. 
  
157 
Falvey, Lindsay. 2010. Small Farmers Secure Food: Survival Food Security, the 
World’s Kitchen & the Crucial Role of Small Farmers. Songkhla: Thaksin 
University Book Center. 
Fairbairn, Madeleine. 2011. Indirect dispossession: how domestic power imbalances 
mediate foreign demand for land in Mozambique. Presentation to LDPI Land 
Grab conference. University of Sussex. April. 
He, Fan. 2014. ‘The Long March to the Mixed Economy’. East Asia Forum 
Quarterly 6(4): 3–5. October–December.  
Farnsworth, Eric. 2011. ‘The New Mercantilism: China's Emerging Role in the 
Americas’. Current History. Americas Society/Council of the Americas (AS/COA). 
Accessed March 31, 2015. Available at http://www.as-coa.org/articles/new-
mercantilism-chinas-emerging-role-america. 
Farrelly, Nicolas. 2014. ‘Thailand in 2013: Haunted by the History of a Perilous 
Tomorrow’. Southeast Asian Affairs (1): 303–318. 
Finch, Steve. 2012. ‘How Rice is Causing a Crisis in Thailand’. The Diplomat. 
Accessed 23 March 2015. Available at http://thediplomat.com/2012/11/rice-piles-
how-thailand-lost-its-spot-as-worlds-top-rice-exporter/. 
Finch, Steve. 2014. ‘Thailand’s Rice Scheme Post-Mortem’. The Diplomat. Accessed 
23 March 2015. Available at http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/thailands-divisive-
rice-scheme/. 
Fine, Ben. 1994. ‘Towards a political economy of food’. Review of International 
Political Economy 1(3): 519–545. 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). 2003. Financing Normal Levels of 
Commercial Imports of Basic Foodstuffs — Commodity Policy and Projections 
Service Commodities and Trade Division. Rome: FAO. Accessed 29 June 2015. 
Available at: http://www.fao.org/3/a-y5109t.pdf. 
Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO). 2009a. ‘Declaration of the World 
Summit on Food Security’, WSFS 2009/2, Rome, November. Accessed 14 March 
2012. Available at 
  
158 
http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/wsfs/Summit/Docs/Final_Declaration/W
SFS09_D eclaration.pdf. 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). 2009b. The State of Food Insecurity in the 
World: Economic Crises – Impacts and Lessons Learned. Rome: FAO. Accessed 
29 June 2015. Available at: ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/012/i0876e/i0876e.pdf. 
Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO). 2011. The State of Food Insecurity in the 
World: How Does International Price Volatility Affect Domestic Economies and 
Food Security, Rome: FAO. 
Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO). 2012. The State of Food Insecurity in the 
World. Rome: FAO. 
Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO). 2013. The State of Food Insecurity in the 
World. Rome: FAO. Accessed 29 June 2015. Available at: 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/018/i3434e/i3434e.pdf. 
Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO). 2015a. ‘FAO Food Price Index’. 
Accessed 29 June 2015. Available at: 
http://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/foodpricesindex/en/. 
Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO). 2015b. ‘Rice Market Monitor’. Accessed 
29 June 2015. Available at: http://www.fao.org/economic/est/publications/rice-
publications/rice-market-monitor-rmm/en/. 
France-Presse, Agence. 2015. ‘Thailand’s Vital Rice Belt is Drying Up’. The Straits 
Times. Accessed 20 July 2015. Available at: http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-
asia/thailands-vital-rice-belt-drying-up. 
Friedland, William H., Amy E. Barton and Robert J. Thomas. 1981. Manufacturing 
Green Gold: Capital, Labor, and Technology in the Lettuce Industry. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Friedmann, Harriet. 1982. ‘The Political Economy of Food: the Rise and Fall of the 
Postwar International Food Order’. American Journal of Sociology 88: 248–286. 
Friedmann, Harriet. 1993. ‘The Political Economy of Food: a Global Crisis’. New 
Left Review 197:29–57. 
  
159 
Friedmann, Harriet. 2005. ‘From Colonialism to Green Capitalism: Social 
Movements and Emergence of Food Regimes’. In New Directions in the 
Sociology of Global Development, eds. F. H. Buttel and P. McMichael. 
Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
Friedmann, Harriet and Philip McMichael. 1989. ‘Agriculture and the State System: 
the Rise and Fall of National Agricultures, 1870 to the present’. Sociologia 
Ruralis 29(2): 93–117. 
Fuller, Dorian. 2011. ‘Pathways to Asian Civilizations: Tracing the Origins and 
Spread of Rice and Rice Cultures’. Rice 4(3): 78-92. 
Gamble, Andrew, Anthony Payne, Ankie Hoogvelt, Michael Dietrich and Michael 
Kenny. 1996. ‘Editorial: New Political Economy’. New Political Economy 1(1): 
5-11.  
George, Aurelia. 1998. Rice Politics in Japan. Canberra: Australia–Japan Research 
Centre. 
Goodman, David, and Michael Watts. 1994. ‘Reconfiguring the Rural or Fording the 
Divide? Capitalist Restructuring and the Global Agro‐food System.’ The Journal 
of Peasant Studies 22 (1): 1–49. 
Goss, Jasper, and David Burch. 2001. ‘From Agricultural Modernisation to Agri-food 
Globalisation: the Waning of National Development in Thailand’. Third World 
Quarterly 22 (6): 969–986. 
Goss, Jasper, David Burch and Roy Rickson. 2000. ‘Agri-food Restructuring and 
Third World Transnationals: Thailand, the CP Group and the Global Shrimp 
Industry.’ World Development 28(3): 513–530. 
Graz, Jean-Christophe. 2004. ‘Transnational Mercantilism and the Emergent Global 
Trading Order’. Review of International Political Economy 11 (3): 597-617. 
GRiSP (Global Rice Science Partnership). 2013. Rice almanac: Source Book for the 
Most Important Economic Activity on Earth. 4th ed. Los Baños (Philippines): 
International Rice Research Institute. 
Guedes, Jade. 2011. ‘Millets, Rice, Social complexity, and the Spread of Agriculture 
  
160 
 to the Chengdu Plain and Southwest China’. Rice 4(3): 104-113.  
Hall, Derek. 2011. ‘Land Grabs, Land Control, and Southeast Asian Crop Booms’. 
The Journal of Peasant Studies, 38(4): 837–858. 
Hamilton, Roy. 2003. The Art of Rice: Spirit and Sustenance in Asia. Los Angeles: 
UCLA Fowler Museum of Cultural History. 
Hanks, Jane. 1964. ‘Reflections on the Ontology of Rice’. In Primitive Views of the 
World, ed. S. Diamond. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Hanks, Lucien. 1972. Rice and Man: Agricultural Ecology in Southeast Asia. USA: 
University of Hawaii Press. 
Harvey, David. 2005. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Helleiner, Eric. 2009. ‘The Geopolitics of Sovereign Wealth Funds: An Introduction’. 
Geopolitics. 14(2): 300–304. 
Higgott, Richard and Anthony Payne, eds. 2000. The New Political Economy of 
Globalisation. London: Edward Elgar. 
Hoffstaedter, Gerhard and Chris Roche. 2012 ‘Security From Below: an Alternative 
Perspective on Human Security’. In Why Human Security Matters: Rethinking 
Australian Foreign Policy, eds. D. Altman et al. London: Allen & Unwin. 
Hofman, Irna and Peter Ho. 2012. ‘China’s “Developmental Outsourcing”: a Critical 
Examination of Chinese Global “Land Grabs” Discourse’. Journal of Peasant 
Studies 39(1): 1–48. 
Holcombe, Charles W. 2001. The Genesis of East Asia, 221 B.C.– A.D. 907. Hawaii: 
University of Hawaii Press. 
Holt-Giménez, Eric. ‘Forward’. In Food Security, Nutrition and Sustainability, eds. 
G. Lawrence, K. Lyons and T. Wallington. New York: EarthScan.  
Holt-Giménez, Eric and Raj Patel, eds. 2009. Food Rebellions! Crisis and the Hunger 
for Justice. Oakland, CA: Pambazuka Press. 
Holslag, Jonathan. 2006. ‘China’s New Mercantilism in Central Africa.’ African and 
Asian Studies 5(2): 132–168. 
  
161 
Zhang, Hongzhou. 2011a. ‘China and Global Food Security: Conflicting Notions’. In 
Strategic Currents: Issues in Human Security in Asia. Y.R. Kassim. ed. 
Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.  
Zhang, Hongzhou. 2011b. ‘China’s Food Security: Questioning the Numbers’. RSIS 
Commentaries. Singapore: Nanyang Technological University (NTU). 
Hont, Istvan. 2005. Jealousy of Trade: International Competition and the Nation-
State in Historical Perspective. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Horst, Cindy. 2006. Transnational Nomads: How Somalis Cope with Refugee Life in 
Dadaab Camps of Kenya. New York: Berghahn Books. 
Horton, Sue. 2009. ‘The 1974 and 2008 Food Price Crises: Déjà vu?’ In The Global 
Food Crisis: Governance Challenges and Opportunities, eds. J. Clapp and M. 
Cohen. Canada: Wilfrid Laurier University Press. 
Hou, Xiaoshuo. 2013. Community Capitalism in China: The State, the Market, and 
Collectivism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Huang, Yasheng. 2008. Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics: Entrepreneurship 
and the State. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Huang, Jukun, Scott Rozelle, Mark W. Rosegrant, and Ne Li. 2002. ‘China’s Rice 
Economy and Policy: Supply, Demand, and Trade in the 21st century’. In 
Developments in the Asian Rice Economy, eds. M. Sombilla, M. Hossain and B. 
Hardy. Philippines: International Rice Research Institute (IRRI). 
Huang, Philip. 2012. ‘Profit-Making State Firms and China’s Development 
Experience: “State Capitalism” or “Socialist Market Economy”?’ Modern China 
38(6): 591–629.  
Huchet-Bourdon, Marilyne. 2011. ‘Agricultural Commodity Price Volatility: An 
Overview’. OECD Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Papers 52. OECD 
Publishing. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5kg0t00nrthc-en. 
Humphreys, David. 2013. ‘New Mercantilism: A perspective on How Politics is 
Shaping World Metal Supply’. Resources Policy 38(3): 341. 
  
162 
Ingram, John, Diana Liverman and Polly Ericksen. 2010. Food Security and Global 
Environmental Change. London: Earthscan. 
International Rice Research Institute (IRRI). 2010. ‘Never an Empty Bowl: 
Sustaining Food Security in Asia’. Task Force Report: Executive Summary. New 
York: Asia Society. 
Isvilanonda, Somporn and Isriya Bunyasiri. 2009. ‘Food Security in Thailand Status, 
Rural Poor Vulnerability, and Some Policy Options’. The International Seminar 
on Agricultural and Food Policy Reforms: Food Security from the Perspective of 
Asian Small-scale Farmers. Seoul. Accessed 29 June 2015. Available at 
http://agri.eco.ku.ac.th/RePEc/kau/wpaper/are200901.pdf. 
Jacques, Martin. 2012. When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World 
and the Birth of a New Global Order. New York: Penguin Books. 
Jongskul, Apichart. 2012. ‘Current Operations of ASEAN Plus Three Emergency 
Rice Reserve (APTERR)’. Presentation delivered at the Asia–Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) Food Emergency Response Mechanism Working Meeting. 
Taipei. Accessed 29 June 2015. Available at: http://apecfsf.tier.org.tw/docs.asp. 
Kang, David C. 2010. East Asia Before the West. New York: Columbia University 
Press.  
Kroger, Markus. 2012. ‘Neo-mercantilist Capitalism and Post-2008 Cleavages in 
Economic Decision-making Power in Brazil’. Third World Quarterly 33(5): 887–
901. 
Kugelman, Michael and Susan Levenstein. 2013. The Global Farms Race: Land 
Grabs, Agricultural Investment and the Scramble for Food Security. Washington, 
DC: Island Press. 
Kyung-Sup, Chang, Ben Fine and Linda Weis. 2012. Developmental Politics in 
Transition: The Neoliberal Era and Beyond. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Laidi, Zaki. 2012. ‘BRICS: Sovereignty Power and Weakness’. International Politics 
49(5): 614–632. 
  
163 
Larionova, Marina. 2012. ‘BRICS in the System of Global Governance’, 
International Affairs 3: 33–44. 
Lane, David. 2008. ‘From Chaotic to State-led Capitalism’. New Political Economy 
13(2): 177–84. 
Lang, Tim, David Barling and Martin Caraher. 2009. Food Policy: Integrating 
Health, Environment and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Lang, Tim and Michael Heasman. 2004. Food Wars: The Global Battle for Minds, 
Mouths and Markets. London: EarthScan. 
Latham, Anthony J. H. 1998. Rice: the Primary Commodity. London: Routledge. 
Lawrence, Geoffrey. 2015.‘Defending Financialization’. Dialogues in Human 
Geography 5(2): 201–205. 
Lawrence, Geoffrey, Kristen Lyons and Tabatha Wallington, eds. 2010. Food 
Security, Nutrition and Sustainability. New York: EarthScan. 
Lawrence, Geoffrey, and Philip McMichael. 2012. ‘The Question of Food Security’. 
International Journal of Sociology of Agriculture and Food 19(2): 135–142. 
Lensa Indonesia. 2012. ‘APTERR Kucurkan Bantuan 50 ton Beras di Bojonegoro 
(APTERR releases 50 tons of rice in Bojonegoro)’. Press release. Accessed 29 
June 2015. Available at: http://www.lensaindonesia.com/2012/12/03/apterr-
kucurkan-bantuan-50- ton-beras-di-bojonegoro.html. 
Levi-Faur, David. 1997. ‘Friedrich List and the Political Economy of the Nation-
State’. Review of International Political Economy 4(1): 154–178. 
Li, Weiye and Louis Putterman. 2008, ‘Reforming China’s SOEs: An Overview’. 
Comparative Economic Studies 50(3): 353–380. 
Li, Xi, Xuewen Liu and Yong Wang. 2012. ‘A Model of China’s State Capitalism’. 
The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology Working Papers Series. 
October 2012. 
Lin, Li-Wen. 2013. ‘We are the (National) Champions: Understanding the 
Mechanisms of State Capitalism in China’. Stanford Law Review 65(4): 697–759.  
List. Friedrich. 1841. National System of Political Economy. London: Longmans. 
  
164 
Loewenberg, Samuel. 2008. ‘Global Food Crisis Looks Set to Continue’. The Lancet 
327 (9645): 1209- 1210.  
Lyons, Gerard. 2008. ‘State Capitalism: The Rise of Sovereign Wealth Funds’. Law 
and Business Review of the Americas. 14(1): 456–469. 
Magdoff, Fred and Tokar, Brian. 2010. Agriculture and Food in Crisis: Conflict, 
Resistance, and Renewal. New York: Monthly Review Press. 
Magnusson, Lars. 1994. Mercantilism. The Shaping of an Economic Language. London: 
Routledge. 
Magnusson, Lars, ed. 1993. Mercantilist Economics. London: Kluwer. 
Magnusson, Lars, ed. 1995. Mercantilism. 4 vols. London: Routledge. 
Mahoney, James. 2007. ‘Qualitative Methodology and Comparative Politics’. 
Comparative Political Studies 40(2): 122–142. 
Mangahas, Michael. 1974. The Political Economy of Rice in the New Society. 
Institute of Economic Development and Research, School of Economics, 
University of the Philippines. 
Martin, William G. 2008. ‘Africa’s Futures: from  North–South to East–South?’ 
Third World Quarterly 29(2): 339–356. 
Mathur, Arpita. 2010. ‘Rising Food Prices and Food Security: Impact of the 2008 
Food Crisis in Asia’. NTS Insight. August, Singapore: RSIS Centre for Non-
Traditional Security (NTS) Studies. Accessed 29 June 2015. Available at: 
http://www.rsis.edu.sg/nts/HTML-Newsletter/Insight/NTS- Insight-Aug-
1001.html. 
Maxwell, Simon. 1996. ‘Food Security: A Post-Modern Perspective’. Food Policy 
21(2): 155–170.  
McCargo, Duncan. 2003. ‘Populism and Reformism in Contemporary Thailand’. 
Southeast Asia Research 9(1): 89–107. 
McDonald, Bryan. 2010. Food Security, Cambridge: Polity Press. 
  
165 
McKeon, Nora. 2013. ‘One Does Not Sell the Land Upon Which the People Walk: 
Land Grabbing, Rural Social Movements, and Global Governance’. 
Globalizations 10(1): 105–112. 
McMahon, Paul. 2013. Feeding Frenzy: Can the World Continue to Feed Itself? 
London: Profile Books Ltd.  
McMichael, Philip. 1990. ‘Incorporating Comparison Within a World-Historical 
Perspective: An Alternative Comparative Method’. American Sociological 
Review 55(3): 385–397. 
McMichael, Philip. 1992. ‘Rethinking Comparative Analysis in a Post-Development 
Context’. International Social Science Journal 133: 351–365. 
McMichael, Philip, ed. 1995. Food and Agrarian Orders in the World-economy. 
Westport USA: Greenwood Publishing Group. 
McMichael, Philip. 2000a. ‘A Global Interpretation of the Rise of the East Asian 
Food Import Complex’. World Development 28(3): 409–424. 
McMichael, Philip. 2000b. ‘The Power of Food’. Agriculture and Human Values 
17(1): 21– 33. 
McMichael, Philip. 2000c. ‘World-Systems Analysis, Globalization, and 
Incorporated Comparison’. Journal of World-Systems Research 1(3): 68–99. 
McMichael, Philip. 2005a. ‘Globalizations’. In Handbook of Political Sociology, eds. 
T. Janoski, A. Alford, A. Hicks and M.A. Schwartz. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
McMichael, Philip. 2005b. ‘Global Development and the Corporate Food Regime’. 
In New directions in the Sociology of Global Development, eds. F. H. Buttel and 
P. McMichael. New York: Elsevier.  
McMichael, Philip. 2006. ‘Peasant Prospects in the Neoliberal Age’. New Political 
Economy 11(3): 407–418. 
McMichael, Philip. 2008. ‘Peasants Make Their Own History, But Not Just As They 
Please...’ Journal of Agrarian Change 8(2–3): 205–228. 
  
166 
McMichael, Philip. 2009a. ‘A Food Regime Analysis of the “World Food Crisis”’. 
Agriculture and Human Values 26(4): 281–295.  
McMichael, Philip. 2009b. ‘A Food Regime Genealogy’. The Journal of Peasant 
Studies 36(1): 139–169. 
McMichael, Philip. 2010a. ‘Agrofuels in the Food Regime’. The Journal of Peasant 
Studies 37(4): 609–630. 
McMichael, Philip. 2010b. Contesting Development: Critical Struggles for Social 
Change. New York: Routledge. 
McMichael, Philip. 2012a. ‘The “Land Grab” and Corporate Food Regime 
Restructuring’. Journal of Peasant Studies 39(3/4): 681–701. 
McMichael, Philip. 2012b. Development and Social Change: a Global Perspective. 
Los Angeles: Sage. 
McMichael, Philip 2013a. ‘Land Grabbing as Security Mercantilism in International 
Relations’. Globalizations 10(1): 47–64.  
McMichael, Philip. 2013b. Food regimes and Agrarian Questions. Fernwood. 
Halifax. 
McMichael, Philip and Frederick H. Buttel. 1990. ‘New Directions in the Political 
Economy of Agriculture’. Sociological Perspectives 33(1): 89–109. 
McNally, Christopher A. 2007. ‘China’s Capitalist Transition: The Making of a New 
Variety of Capitalism’. In Capitalisms Compared, eds. L. Mjøset and T. H. 
Clausen. Emerald Group Publishing Limited. 
McNally, Christopher A. 2012. ‘Sino-Capitalism: China’s Reemergence and the 
International Political Economy’. World Politics 64 (4): 741–776. 
McNally, Christopher A. 2013. ‘How Emerging Forms of Capitalism are Changing 
the Global Economic Order’. Asia Pacific Issues 107: 1–8. 
McNally, David. 1998. The Political Economy and the Rise of Capitalism: A 
Reinterpretation. California: University of California Press. 
Mendell, Marguerite and Daniel Salee. 1991. The Legacy of Karl Polanyi: Market, 
State and Society at the End of the Twentieth Century. Hong Kong: Macmillan.  
  
167 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of The Kingdom of Thailand. 2013. ‘The Committee on 
Disaster Relief Assistance to the Philippines for Typhoon Haiyan’. Press release. 
Bangkok: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Accessed 29 June 2015. Available at: 
http://www.mfa.go.th/main/en/media-center/14/41953-The-Committee-on-
Disaster-Relief-Assistance-to-the.html. 
Mintz, Sidney W. 1977. ‘The So-called World-system: Local Initiative and Local 
Response’. Dialectical Anthropology (2)1–4: 253–270. 
Mintz, Sidney W. 1985. Sweetness and Power: the Place of Sugar in Modern 
History. New York: Viking.  
Mintz, Sydney W. 1995. ‘Food and Relationship to Concepts of Power’. In Food and 
Agrarian Orders in the World-economy, ed. P. Michael. Westport USA: Greenwood 
Publishing Group.  
Mintz, Sidney W. 1998. ‘The Localization of Anthropological Practice: From Area 
Studies to Transnationalism’. In Critique of Anthropology 18(2): 117–133. 
Mintz, Sidney W. and Christine M. Du Bois. 2002. ‘The Anthropology of Food and 
Eating’. Annual Review of Anthropology 31: 99-119. 
Miyagi, Taizō,. 2012. ‘Shifting Definitions of “East Asia” and Regional 
Cooperation’. A Changing East Asia. Accessed 31 March 2015. Available at 
http://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/a01504/ 
Morton, Katherine. 2012. ‘Learning by Doing: China’s Role in the Global 
Governance of Food Security’. RCCPB Working Paper 30. Indiana University: 
Research Centre for Chinese Politics and Business. 
Modi, Renu, ed. 2011. South-South Cooperation: Africa on the Centre Stage. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.  
 Mukherjee, Amitava. 2008. ‘Food Insecurity: A Growing Threat in Asia, Beijing: 
United Nations Asia Pacific Centre for Agricultural Engineering and Machinery 
(UNAPCAEM). Accessed 29 June 2015. Available at: 
http://www.unapcaem.org/publication/FoodInsecurityInAsia.pdf.  
  
168 
Mukherjee, Amitava. 2009. ‘Securing Food Security in the Asia Pacific: A Partial 
Analysis’. Beijing: United Nations Asia Pacific Centre for Agricultural 
Engineering and Machinery (UNAPCAEM). 
http://www.unapcaem.org/publication/FoodInsecurity09.pdf.  
Mun, Thomas. [1664] 1895. England’s Treasure by Forraign (Foreign) Trade. New 
York: MacMillan and Co.  
Murphy, Sophia. 2009. ‘Strategic Grain Reserves in an Era of Volatility’. Institute for 
Agriculture and Trade Policy (IATP) Report. Washington D.C.: IATP. 
Murphy, Sophia, David Burch and Jennifer Clapp. 2012. Cereal Secrets: The World’s 
Largest Grain Traders and Global Agriculture. Oxfam research report. Accessed 
10 July 2015. Available at https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/rr-
cereal-secrets-grain-traders-agriculture-30082012-en.pdf. 
Musacchio, Aldo, and Sérgio G. Lazzarini. 2014. Reinventing State Capitalism: 
Leviathan in Business, Brazil and Beyond. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press. 
Zhong, Nan. 2015. ‘COFCO commits to Belt and Road Initiative’. ChinaDaily 
(USA). Accessed on the 05 July 2015. Available at 
http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2015-06/03/content_20900987.htm. 
Nash, Kate. 2010. Contemporary Political Sociology: Globalisation, Politics, and 
Power. London: Wiley-Blackwell.  
Neuman, William L. 2006. Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative 
Approaches. New York: Pearson  
Nolke, Andreas, ed. 2015. Multinational Corporations From Emerging Markets: 
State Capitalism 3.0. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Nutzenadel, Alexander and Frank Trentmann. 2008. Food and Globalization: 
Consumption, Markets and Politics in the Modern World. California: University 
of California. 
  
169 
OECD. 2015. State-Owned Enterprises in the Development Process. Paris: OECD 
Publishing. Accessed on the 23 March 2015. Available at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264229617-en 
O’Brien, Robert and Williams, Marc, eds. 2011. Global Political Economy. London: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
O’Connor, Richard. 1995. ‘Agricultural Change and Ethnic Succession in Southeast 
Asian States: A case for Regional Anthropology’. Journal of Asian Studies 54(4): 
74–102. 
O’Connor, Richard. 1996. ‘Rice, Rule, and the Thai State’. In State Power and 
Culture in Thailand, ed. P. Durrenberger. Southeast Asia Studies: Monograph 44. 
New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press. 
Ohnuki-Tierney, Emiko. 1993. Rice as Self. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Palan, Ronen, ed. 2000. Global Political Economy: Contemporary Theories. London: 
Routledge. 
Pandey, Sushil, Derek Byerlee, David Dawe, Achim Dobermann, Samarendu 
Mohanty, Scott Rozelle, and Bill Hardy, eds. 2010. Rice in the Global Economy: 
Strategic Research and Policy Issues for Food Security. Los Baños (Philippines): 
International Rice Research Institute. 
Pant, Girijesh. 2014. ‘Globalising Asia: Problematizing the Politics of Food 
Security’. In The Politics of Food Security: Asian and Middle Eastern Strategies, 
ed. S. Bazoobandi. Berlin: Gerlach Press. 
Patel, Raj. 2009a. Stuffed and Starved: Markets, Power and the Hidden Battle for the 
World Food System. Melbourne: Black Inc. 
Patel, Raj. 2009b. ‘Grassroots Voices: Food Sovereignty’. Journal of Peasant Studies 
36(3): 663–706. 
Pechlaner, Gabriela and Gerardo Otero. 2010. ‘The Neoliberal Food Regime: 
Neoregulation and the Division of Labour in North America’. Rural Sociology 
75(2): 179–208. 
  
170 
Perrotta, Cosimo. 1991. ‘Is the Mercantilist Theory of the Favorable Balance of 
Trade Really Erroneous?’ History of Political Economy 23(2): 301–336. 
Perrotta, Cosimo. 2014. ‘Thomas Mun’s England’s Treasure by Forraign (Foreign) 
Trade: The 17th-Century Manifesto for Economic Development’. History of 
Economics Review (59): 94-106. 
Philips, Nicola and Catherine E. Weaver. 2011. International Political Economy: 
Past, Present and the Future. New York: Routledge.  
Phoenix 2015. ‘Phoenix Commodities Ltd’. Accessed 25 January 2015. Available at 
http://www.phoenixcommodities.com/rice-trader.aspx 
Phongpaichit, Pasuk, and Chris Baker. 2004. Thaksin: the Business of Politics in 
Thailand. Chiang Mai: Silkworms Books. 
Ping, Li. 2008. ‘Hopes and Strains in China’s Overseas Farming Plan’. Economic 
Observer. Beijing. Accessed 29 June 2015. Available at: 
http://www.eeo.com.cn/ens/Industry/2008/07/03/105213.html. 
Polanyi, Karl. 1944. The Great Transformation. Boston: Beacon Press. 
Polanyi, Karl. 1947. ‘Our Obsolete Market Mentality’. In Primitive, Archaic and 
Modern Economies, ed. G. Dalton. Boston: Beacon Press. 
Ponciano, Intal and Marissa Garcia. 2008. ‘Rice and Philippine Politics’, Research 
Paper Series. Philippine Institute for Development Studies No. 1: 1–20. 
Potter, Clive and Mark Tilzey. 2005. ‘Agricultural Policy Discourses in the European 
Post-Fordist Transition: Neoliberalism, Neomercantilism and Multifunctionality’. 
Progress in Human Geography 29(5): 581–600. 
Pottier, Johan. 1999. Anthropology of food: The Social Dynamics of Food Security. 
Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Prasartset, Suthy. 1979. State Capitalism in the Development process: Thailand, 
1932-1959. Bangkok: Institute of Developing Economies. 
Pratruangkrai, Petchanet. 2012. ‘Senate Panel Calls for a Urgent Review into Thai Rice 
Subsidy Scheme’. AsiaNewsNet. Accessed 23 March 2015. Available at 
http://www.asianewsnet.net/news-37984.html. 
  
171 
Pritchard, Bill. 2009. ‘The Long Hangover From the Second Food Regime: A World-
Historical Interpretation of the Collapse of the WTO Doha Round’. Agriculture 
and Human Values 26(4): 297–307. 
Pritchard, Bill and David Burch. 2003. Agri-food Globalization in Perspective: 
International Restructuring in the Processing Tomato Industry. Surrey: Ashgate 
Publishing Ltd. 
Pritchard, Bill and Rebecca Curtis. 2004. ‘The Political Construction of Agro-Food 
Liberalization in East Asia: Lessons From the Restructuring of Japanese Dairy 
Provisioning’. Economic Geography 80(2): 173-190. 
Ragin, Charles. 2000. Fuzzy-Set Social Science. Chicago: Chicago University Press. 
Ravenhill, John. 2014. Global Political Economy. 4th ed. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Rice Department. 2015. Rice Knowledge Bank. Accessed 22 March 2015. Available 
at http://www.ricethailand.go.th. 
Richardson, Ben. 2009. Sugar: Refined Power in a Global Regime. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Richardson, Michael. 2011. ‘The Volatile Politics of Rice’. The Japan Times. Accessed 
23 March 2015. Available at 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2011/10/14/commentary/the-volatile-politics-
of-rice/. 
Robinson, Joan. 1966. The New Mercantilism: An Inaugural Lecture. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Rodrick, Dani. 2013. ‘The New Mercantilist Challenge’. Project Syndicate. Accessed 
March 31, 2015. Available at http://www.project-syndicate.org/print/the-return-of-
mercantilism-by-dani-rodrik. 
Rosegrant, Mark W., Mercedita-Agcaoili Sombilla and Nicostrato D. Perez. 1995. 
‘Rice and the Global Food Economy: Projections and Policy Implications of 
Future Food Balances’. In Final Conference on the Medium-and Long-Term 
Projections of World Rice Supply and Demand. Sponsored by the International 
  
172 
Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and the International Rice Research 
Institute (IRRI), Beijing: 23–26. 
Rosin, Christopher, Paul Stock and Hugh Campbell, eds. 2012. Food Systems 
Failure: the Global Food Crisis and the Future of Agriculture. London: 
Earthscan. 
Rosset, Peter M. 2006. Food is Different: Why we must get the WTO out of 
Agriculture. London: Zed Books. 
Rosset, Peter M., Robert Rice and Michael Watts. 1999. ‘Thailand and the World 
Tomato: Globalization, New Agricultural Countries (NACs) and the Agrarian 
Question.’ International Journal of Sociology of Agriculture and Food 8: 71–94. 
Russi, Luigi. 2013. Hungry Capital: The Financialization of Food. Washington: Zero 
Books. 
Sahlins, Marshall. 1974. Stone Age Economics. London: Tavistock.  
Sen, Amartya and Jean Dreze. 2001. Hunger and Public Action. Oxford, UK: 
Clarendon Press. 
Sen, Amartya. 1981. Poverty and Famine. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press. 
Sen, Amartya. 1983. ‘The Food Problem: Theory and Policy’. In South–South 
Strategy. A. Gauhar, ed. London: Third World Foundation. 
Sen, Amartya. 1986. ‘Food, Economics and Entitlements’. Lloyds Bank Review 160: 
1–20. 
Sen, Amartya. 1992. Inequality Reexamined. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press. 
Shepherd, Laura J, ed. 2013. Critical Approaches to Security: An Introduction to 
Theories and Methods. London: Routledge. 
Shepherd, Christopher J. and Andrew McWilliams. 2011.‘Ethnography, Agency, and 
Materiality: Anthropological Perspectives on Rice Development in East Timor’. 
East Asian Science, Technology and Society 5(2): 189–215. 
Shields, Stuart, Ian Bruff and Huw Macartney, eds. 2011. Critical International 
Political Economy: Dialogue, Debate and Dissensus. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
  
173 
Shiva, Vandana. 1992. The Violence of Green Revolution: Third World Agriculture, 
Ecology and Politics. London: Zed Books. 
Shiva, Vandana. 2000. Stolen Harvest: The Hijacking of the Global Food Supply. 
Cambridge, MA: South End Press. 
Shiva, Vandana. 2009. ‘Soil Not Oil’. Alternatives Journal 35(3): 19. 
Silk, Richard and Chuin-wei Yap. 2014. ‘China’s COFCO Plans IPO: Offering 
Would Include Assets Acquired Earlier This Year From Nidera and Noble’. Wall 
Street Journal. Accessed 20 December 2014. Available at 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-cofco-plans-ipo-1414494184. 
Smith, Adam. 1776. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. 
Chicago: Chicago University Press. 
Smith, Elta C. 2008. Governing Rice: The Politics of Experimentation in Global 
Agriculture. Harvard University: Harvard University Press. 
Smith, Marisol, Judy Pointing and Simon Maxwell. 1992. ‘Part III Household Food 
Security: Concepts and Definitions — An Annotated Bibliography’. In Household 
Food Security: Concepts, Indicators and Measurements. A Technical Review, eds. 
S. Maxwell and T. Frankenberger. IFAD. Accessed 10 July 2015. Available 
online at http://www.ifad.org/gender/tools/hfs/hfspub/hfs_3.pdf. 
Sombilla, Mercedita and Mahabub Hossain. 2000. ‘Rice and Food Security in Asia: 
A Long-term Outlook’. In Food Security in Asia, eds. W. Chern, C. Carter and S. 
Shei. Northhampton: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
Sombilla, Mercedita, Mahabub Hossain, and Bill Hardy, eds. 2002. Developments in 
the Asian Rice Economy. Philippines: International Rice Research Institute 
(IRRI).  
Stern, Philip and Carl Wennerlind. 2014. Mercantilism Reimagined: Political Economy 
in Early Modern Britain and its Empire. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Stilwell, Frank. 2002. Political Economy: The Contest of Economic Ideas. 
Melbourne: Oxford. 
  
174 
Stopford, John M. and Susan Strange. 1991. Rival States, Rival Firms: Competition 
for Market Shares. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Strange, Susan. 1986. Casino Capitalism. Oxford: Blackwell.  
Strange, Susan. 1988. States and Markets. 2nd ed. London: Pinter.  
Strange, Susan. 1991. ‘Big Business and the State’. Millennium 20(2): 245-50.  
Suwannakij. Supunnabul. 2014. ‘Thailand Regains Top Spot in Rice Trade Amid 
Sale of Reserves’. Bloomberg Business, 18 December. Accessed 29 June 2015. 
Available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-12-18/thailand-
regains-top-spot-in-rice-trade-amid-sale-of-reserves. 
Szamosszegi, Andrew. 2011. An Analysis of State-owned Enterprises and State 
Capitalism in China. U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission. 
Accessed 20 October 2013. Available at http://www.uscc.gov/Research/analysis-
state-owned-enterprises-and-state-capitalism-china. 
Tadem, Eduardo. 1986. ‘Grains and Radicalism: The Political Economy of Rice in 
the Philippines: 1965–1985’. Commodity Series No.5. Manilla: University of the 
Philippines.  
Takashi, Toyoda and Opal Suwunnamek. 2011. ‘Regional Cooperation for Food 
Security in East Asia: From Rice Reserve APTERR and Information System 
AFSIS to Common Agricultural policy’. Presentation at the 7th Asian Society of 
Agricultural Economists (ASAE) Conference, Hanoi, 13–15 October 2011. 
Accessed 29 June 2015. Available at 
http://7thasae.ipsard.gov.vn/ppt/presentation/A4/A4_ASAE_Takeshi%20Toyoda.
pdf. 
Taylor, Monique. 2014. The Chinese State, Oil and Energy Security. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan.  
Teng, Paul. 2011. ‘Food Price Spiral: Causes and Consequences’. RSIS 
Commentaries. Singapore: Nanyang Technological University (NTU). 
  
175 
Teng, Paul, Jackson Ewing and Margarita Escaler. 2011. ‘Asia’s Food Security 
Conundrum’. RSIS Commentaries. Singapore: Nanyang Technological University 
(NTU). 
Thai Rice Exporters Association. 2012. Rice Exports 2012. Accessed 29 June 2015. 
Available at 
http://www.thairiceexporters.or.th/Local%20news/News_2012/news_170112-
2.html. 
Thai Rice Mills Association. 2012. Monthly Rice Report. Accessed 25 March 2015. 
Available at http://www.thairicemillers.com.  
Thai Rice Mills Association. 2015. Major Importers of Thai Rice 2009–2014. 
Accessed 20 January 2016. Available at 
http://www.thairicemillers.com/images/stories/2557/Rice_Web/major%20importe
rs.pdf. 
Thongrattana, Phatcharree Toghaw. 2012. An Analysis of the Uncertainty Factors 
Affecting the Sustainable Supply of Rice Production in Thailand. Doctor of 
Philosophy (PhD) Thesis. Sydney Business School, University of Wollongong. 
Accessed 29 June 2015. Available at http://ro.uow.edu.au/theses/3550. 
Tilly, Charles. 1984. Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons. New 
York: Russel Sage Foundation.  
Timmer, Peter. 1975. ‘The Political Economy of Rice in Asia: A Methodological 
Introduction’. Food Research Institute Studies 14(3): 102-121. 
Timmer, Peter. 1997. Food Security Strategies: The Asian Experience. Rome, Italy: 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. 
Timmer, Peter. 2010. ‘The Changing Role of Rice in Asia’s Food Security’. ADB 
Sustainable Development Working Paper Series 15. Manila: Asian Development 
Bank (ADB). Accessed 26 June 2015. Available at 
http://www.adb.org/documents/papers/adb- working-paper-series/adb-wp15-rice-
food-security.pdf. 
  
176 
Timmer, Peter and David Dawe. 2010. ‘Food Crises, Past, Present (and Future?): 
Will we ever learn?’ In The Rice Crisis: Markets, Policies, and Food Security, 
eds. D. Dawe. London: Earthscan.  
Timmer, Peter. 2013. ‘Food Security and Sociopolitical Stability in East and 
Southeast Asia’. In Food Security and Sociopolitical Stability, ed. C. Barrett. 
London: Oxford University Press. 
Trethewie, Sally. 2012. ‘Politics and Distrust in the Rice Trade: Implications of the 
Shift towards Self-Sufficiency in the Philippines and Indonesia’. NTS Alert. 
February. Singapore: RSIS Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies for 
NTS-Asia. Accessed 26 June 2015. Available at 
http://www.rsis.edu.sg/nts/HTML-Newsletter/alert/NTS-alert-feb-1201.html. 
Trethewie, Sally. 2013. ‘The ASEAN Plus Three Emergency Rice Reserve 
(APTERR): Cooperation, commitment and contradictions’. NTS Working Paper 
8. Singapore: RSIS Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies. 
Tsang, Denise. 2014. ‘COFCO’s Noble Deal Underscores Role Takeover of 
Agricultural Trader to Help Mainland Maintain Stable Food Supply and Improve 
Safety’. South China Morning Post. Accessed 27 June 2015. Available at 
http://www.scmp.com/business/china-business/article/1464178/cofcos-noble-
deal-underscores-role. 
United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 
(UNESCAP). 2009. Sustainable Agriculture and Food Security in the Asia 
Pacific, Bangkok: UNESCAP. 
United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 
(UNESCAP). 2010. ‘Sustainable Development in Asia and the Pacific: Trends, 
Challenges, Opportunities and Policy Perspectives’, Note by the Secretariat, 
Prepared for the Sixth Ministerial Conference on Environment and Development 
in Asia and the Pacific, E/ESCAP/MCED(6)/1, 28 July. 
University of Warwick. 2015. Food GRP Calendar Competition. Accessed 10 July 
2015. Available at 
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/research/priorities/foodsecurity/newsandevents/competi
  
177 
tion/. 
Uzunidis, Dimitri. 2011. ‘Principles Of The New Mercantilism and The Crisis Of 
Global Economy’. Laboratoire de Recherche sur l'Industrie et l'Innovation. 
Université du Littoral Côte d‘Opale. 
Van Apeldoorn, Bastiaan, Ian Bruff and Magnus Ryner. 2011. ‘The Richness and 
Diversity of Critical IPE Perspectives: Moving Beyond the Debate on the British 
School’. In International Political Economy: Past, Present and the Future. N. 
Philips and C. E. Weaver. eds. New York: Routledge.  
Vanichanont, Pramote. 2004. Thai Rice: Sustainable Life for Rice Growers: 
Proceedings of the FAO Rice Conference 2004: rice in global markets. Rome, 
Italy: Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO). Accessed 
02 June 2015. Available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/008/a0033e/a0033e00.pdf. 
Wade, Robert H. 2011.‘Emerging World Order? From Multipolarity to 
Multilateralism in the G20, the World Bank, and the IMF’. Politics and Society 
39(3): 347–378. 
Walker, Andrew. 2003. ‘Agricultural Transformation and the Politics of Hydrology 
in Northern Thailand’. Development and Change 34(5): 941–964. 
Walker, Andrew. 2008. The Rural Constitution and the Everyday Politics of 
Elections in Northern Thailand. Journal of Contemporary Asia 38(1): 84–105. 
Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1974. The Modern World-System: Capitalist Agriculture and 
the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century. New York: 
Academic Press Inc. 
Walton, John and David Seddon. 1994. Free Markets and Food Riots: The Politics of 
Global Adjustment. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Wansleben, Leon. 2013. ‘Dreaming with BRICs’. Journal of Cultural Economy 12: 
1–19. 
Watson, Matthew. 2005. Foundations of International Political Economy. London: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
  
178 
Watson, Matthew. 2007. The Political Economy of International Capital Mobility. 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Weber, Heloise. 2007. ‘A Political Analysis of the Formal Comparative Method: 
Historicising the Globalization and Development Debate’. Globalizations 4(4): 
559–572. 
Weis, Tony. 2007. The Global Food Economy: The Battle for the Future of Farming. 
London: Zed Books. 
White, Ben, Saturnino M. Borras Jr., Ruth Hall, Ian Scoones and Wendy Wolford. 
2012. ‘The New Enclosures: Critical Perspectives on Corporate Land Deals’. 
Journal of Peasant Studies 39(3): 619–647. 
Willoughby, Robin and Adam Parsons. 2009. Global Food Reserves: Framing the 
Context for a New Multilateralism. London: Share the World’s Resources. 
Wolf, Steven A. and Alessandro Bonanno, eds. 2014a. The Neoliberal Regime in the 
Agri-Food Sector: Crisis, Resilience and Restructuring. New York: Routledge. 
Wolf, Steven A. and Alessandro Bonanno. 2014b. ‘Introduction’. In The Neoliberal 
Regime in the Agri-Food Sector: Crisis, Resilience and Restructuring, eds. S. 
Wolf and A. Bonanno. New York: Routledge. 
Wooldridge, Adrian. 2012. State Capitalism: The Visible Hand. United Kingdom: 
Penguin.  
Worth, Owen. 2011. ‘Reclaiming Critical IPE from the ‘British’ School.’ In Critical 
International Political Economy Dialogue, Debate and Dissensus, eds. S. Shields, 
I. Bruff and H. Macartney. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 
Xing, Li and Timothy M. Shaw. 2013. ‘The Political Economy of Chinese State 
Capitalism.’ Journal of China and International Relations 1(1): 88–113. 
Yahuda, Michael. 2011. The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific. New York: 
Routledge. 
Xu, Yi-Chong. 2009. ‘Who’s Afraid of Sovereign Wealth Funds?’. Australian 
Journal of International Affairs 63(1): 1–21. 
  
179 
Xu,Yi-Chong. 2012. The Political Economy of State-owned Enterprises in China and 
India. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Xu,Yi-Chong and Gawdat Bahgat. 2010. The Political Economy of Sovereign Wealth 
Funds. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Young, Elizabeth M. 2012. Food and Development. NewYork: Routledge.  
Yoshimatsu, Hidetaka. 2014. Comparing Institution Building in East Asia: Power 
Politics, Governance and Critical Junctures. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Yun, Michelle and Yuri Humber. 2014. ‘COFCO Buys Noble AgriUnit Stake as 
China Seeks Food Supply’. Bloomberg News. Accessed on 25 April 2014. 
Available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-04-01/cofco-to-pay-
1-5-billion-for-stake-in-noble-s-agriculture-unit. 
Zoomers, Annelies. 2010. ‘Globalisation and the Foreignisation of Space: Seven 
Processes Driving the Current Global Land Grab’. The Journal of Peasant Studies 
37(2): 429–444. 
